Communication and time distortion by Riedl, Thomas
c© 2014 Thomas Riedl
COMMUNICATION AND TIME DISTORTION
BY
THOMAS RIEDL
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2014
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Andrew Singer, Chair
Professor Bruce Hajek
Adjunct Professer Sean Meyn
Professor Pierre Moulin
Professor Ru¨diger Urbanke, E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne
ABSTRACT
Communication systems always suffer time distortion. At the physical layer
asynchrony between clocks and motion-induced Doppler effects warp the time
scale, while at higher layers there are packet delays.
Current wireless underwater modems suffer a significant performance degra-
dation when communication platforms are mobile and Doppler effects cor-
rupt the transmitted signals. They are advertised with data rates of a few
kbps, but the oil and gas industry has found them useful only to around 100
bps. In our work, time-varying Doppler is explicitly modeled, tracked and
compensated. Integrated into an iterative turbo equalization based receiver,
this novel Doppler compensation technique has demonstrated unprecedented
communication performance in US Navy sponsored field tests and simula-
tions. We achieved a data rate of 39kbps at a distance of 2.7km and a data
rate of 1.2Mbps at a distance of 12m. The latter link is capable of streaming
video in real-time, a first in wireless underwater communication.
Time distortion can also be intentional and be used for communication.
We explore how much information can be conveyed by controlling the timing
of packets when sent from their source towards their destination in a packet-
switched network. By using Markov chain analysis, we prove a lower bound
on the maximal channel coding rate achievable at a given blocklength and
error probability.
Finally, we propose an easy-to-deploy censorship-resistant infrastructure,
called FreeWave. FreeWave modulates a client’s Internet traffic into acous-
tic signals that are carried over VoIP connections. The use of actual VoIP
connections allows FreeWave to relay its VoIP connections through oblivious
VoIP nodes, hence keeping the FreeWave server(s) unobservable and unblock-
able. When the VoIP channel suffers packet transfer delays, the transmitted
acoustic signals are time distorted. We address this challenge and prototype
FreeWave over Skype, the most popular VoIP system.
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW
Communication systems always suffer time distortion. At the physical layer
asynchrony between clocks and motion-induced Doppler effects warp the time
scale, while at higher layers there are packet delays. Particularly in acoustic
communication channels, Doppler can be catastrophic if not compensated
dynamically. This is mainly due to the higher Mach numbers experienced in
these channels. Our research in acoustic communications tries to understand
the fundamental causes of this effect and uses the gained insight towards the
implementation of more robust and faster acoustic communication systems.
Acoustic communication is still in its infancy and the research community has
yet to agree on a standard channel model. Chapter 2 gives a comprehensive
overview of current acoustic research and methods and derives a new channel
model from first principles. Perhaps a fatal flaw of previous works is that
they borrow the channel model from the radio communication community.
Our model builds upon the established physical principles of acoustic wave
propagation. We unveil the close relationship between acoustic positioning
and communications. This opens the door for inertial sensors to enhance sig-
nal detection. We derive an efficient receiver algorithm based upon this new
channel model and show its superior performance in simulations, laboratory
experiments and at-sea field-tests.
In Chapter 3 we explore how much information can be conveyed by con-
trolling the timing of packets when sent from their source towards their des-
tination in a packet-switched network. The aggregate effect of the involved
forwarding nodes can be modeled as a queuing timing channel. The expo-
nential server timing channel is known to be the simplest, and in some sense
canonical, queuing timing channel. The capacity, C, of this infinite-memory
channel is known. We discuss practical finite-length restrictions on the code-
words and attempt to understand the maximal rate that can be achieved for
a target error probability. By using Markov chain analysis, we prove a lower
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bound on the maximal channel coding rate achievable at blocklength n and
error probability . The bound is approximated by C−n−1/2σQ−1(), where
Q denotes the Q-function and σ2 is the asymptotic variance of the underlying
Markov chain. A closed form expression for σ2 is given.
Open communication over the Internet poses a serious threat to countries
with repressive regimes, leading them to develop and deploy censorship mech-
anisms within their networks. Unfortunately, existing censorship circumven-
tion systems face difficulties in providing unobservable communication with
their clients; this highly limits their availability as censors can easily block
access to circumvention systems that make observable communication pat-
terns. Moreover, the lack of unobservability may pose serious threats to
their users. Recent research takes various approaches to tackle this problem;
however, they introduce new challenges, and the provided unobservability
is breakable. In Chapter 4 we propose an easy-to-deploy and unobserv-
able censorship-resistant infrastructure, called FreeWave. FreeWave works
by modulating a client’s Internet traffic into acoustic signals that are carried
over VoIP connections. Such VoIP connections are targeted to a server, the
FreeWave server, that extracts the tunneled traffic and proxies them to the
uncensored Internet. The use of actual VoIP connections, as opposed to traf-
fic morphing, allows FreeWave to relay its VoIP connections through oblivious
VoIP nodes (e.g., Skype supernodes), hence keeping the FreeWave server(s)
unobservable and unblockable. In addition, the use of end-to-end encryption,
which is supported/mandated by most VoIP providers like Skype, prevents
censors from distinguishing FreeWave’s VoIP connections from regular VoIP
connections. To utilize a VoIP connection’s throughput efficiently we design
communications encoders tailored specifically for VoIP’s lossy channel. We
prototype FreeWave over Skype, the most popular VoIP system. A major
challenge is the time distortion that the acoustic signal experiences when
sent over the Skype channel. This distortion is caused by packet transfer
delays and its intensity depends on the level of network congestion and the
number of routers along the way of transmission. We show that FreeWave is
able to reliably achieve communication bandwidths that are sufficient for web
browsing, even when clients and the FreeWave server are thousands of miles
apart. We also validate FreeWave’s communication unobservability against
traffic analysis and standard censorship techniques.
2
CHAPTER 2
ACOUSTIC POSITIONING AND
COMMUNICATION
2.1 Introduction
Imagine that you are in the midst of events that are about to
trigger the largest accidental marine oil spill in history, and you
do not even know it is happening. What is worse, even if you
know what is happening, miles beneath the ocean surface, you
have no way to stop it.
An explosion at the surface causes massive structural failure.
Communication wires are cut. Control of the subsea infrastruc-
ture is lost.
The ensuing collapse of the column destroys the blowout preven-
ter, eliminating the last remaining safety mechanism that could
have prevented an uncontrolled oil flow from the Deepwater Hori-
zon site into the ocean in April 2010.
During this process, according to the US Government Macondo
Expert Report [1], a reliable underwater wireless communication
backup link was unavailable, but could have prevented the result-
ing unimaginable environmental disaster.
Days passed before the fire on the surface was sufficiently un-
der control for a ship to be brought to the location safely. This
enabled a remotely operated vehicle, tethered by cabled commu-
nications, to begin subsea repair. Immediate remote vehicle op-
eration via wireless control, enabling operation at a safe distance,
was (and still is) unavailable.
This is but one scenario illustrating the need for a dramatic improvement
in the wireless communications and control capabilities within our world’s
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oceans. Imagine life today without GPS, WIFI, or mobile phones. The
transition from wired to wireless communication over the past 20 years has
fundamentally changed how people interact and how industries operate. Un-
fortunately, this technological revolution has had little impact on communi-
cation undersea. Radio waves - used to carry information wirelessly above
land - propagate poorly in seawater. As a result, revolutionizing wireless
communication technologies such as GPS, WIFI or cellular communication
do not work below the ocean surface: Industries and organizations that oper-
ate underwater are still in the digital dark ages. Communication underwater
is still almost entirely done through wired links; literally a wire or a cable
connects the sender to the receiver.
Underwater operations that rely on divers are expensive, restricted to shal-
low waters, and put a human life at risk. The subsea industry relies on re-
motely operated vehicles (ROVs) for virtually all work performed in the deep
ocean. An operator on the surface communicates with the machine through
a bulky cable that usually is about 3.5km long [2]. A massive surface ship
is required to safely deploy such a vehicle and handle its heavy cable to the
sea floor. Even when winds are strong and waves are high, the surface ship
needs to be capable to hold its position right above the vehicle. Mooring
or anchoring is not practical in deep water or above dense infrastructure at
the sea bottom. So instead these ROV support ships are outfitted with ex-
pensive dynamic positioning systems that use GPS, inertial sensor and gyro
compass readings to automatically control position and heading exclusively
by means of active thrust. Such ships cost about $120k per day [3, 4]. If,
instead of a cable, a wireless carrier is used to communicate with the ROV,
the heavy cables can be cut and these expensive surface ships are no longer
needed. Subsea missions could be accomplished quicker, cheaper and with
fewer personnel. The surface vessel is the main cost driver in underwater
vehicle operations. In 2013, the subsea industry demanded more than 123k
ROV days [5, 6] and these are expected to increase to at least 140k days
in 2017. Since each ROV support ship only carries 1 − 2 ROVs, the total
expenditure on these ships is over $7B. Wireless links could eliminate the
surface vessel and associated cost.
There is a clear need for reliable, high-speed wireless underwater com-
munications for remote-control of subsea machinery. A data rate of 1Mbps
and a range of 100m are the minimum communication requirements for this
4
application [3]. Existing wireless solutions are far from satisfying these re-
quirements. They are based on acoustic modem technology developed in the
late 1980s. Their vendors advertise them with data rates of a few kbps, but
the oil and gas industry has found them useful only to around 100bps [3],
relegating this technology to only the most rudimentary of low data rate ap-
plications if not completely unusable. Uploading a simple 100 kilobyte image
takes hours. Video and real-time control is impossible.
The ocean covers 71% of the Earth’s surface. It holds the vast majority of
its mineral and fossil resources, it is home to over 95% of the world’s living
biomass and it carries 90% of international trade. The exploration, utiliza-
tion, and protection of this space is of utmost importance to society, but
they require deployment of subsea machinery and an effective way of com-
municating with it. Leading energy firm Douglas-Westwood [7] and the US
Navy underline the importance of underwater communications. The Navy
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan [8], for example, repeat-
edly highlights communications as a severe limitation in today’s undersea
missions, and “particularly in the area of acoustic communications, advance-
ments are desirable in bandwidth, data rates, range, security, and reliability.”
The acoustic communication technology described in this thesis is capable
of meeting these needs. It has the potential to completely revolutionize un-
derwater environmental monitoring, scientific exploration, resource discovery
and harvesting, and national defense. For example, this technology would
allow the collection of data from underwater sensors in real-time. Compre-
hensive environmental monitoring is essential to effective climate modeling
and the assessment of climate change.
2.2 Alternative Wireless Communication Technologies
There are two types of waves that can be used to carry information wirelessly
subsea: Electromagnetic (EM) waves and acoustic waves. We argue that
acoustic waves are the superior carrier and have the potential to meet the
wireless communication needs of the subsea industry. We start by reviewing
some of the properties of EM wave propagation underwater.
Salt water has a significantly higher electrical conductivity than air and
attenuates EM waves substantially as they propagate. The level of attenu-
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Figure 2.1: Attenuation of a plane electromagnetic wave in sea water as a
function of frequency.
ation depends on frequency. Figure 2.1 sketches the attenuation of an EM
plane wave in seawater for frequencies up to about 1016Hz [9–12]. Only at
frequencies below about 100Hz and in the visible spectrum is the attenua-
tion low enough to allow useful penetration into the water column [9]. Note
that the attenuation is greater than 30dB/m for all radio frequencies above
1MHz. Inside the visible spectrum, blue-green light, around 480nm in wave-
length, propagates with the least attenuation [13]. So-called extremely low
frequency (ELF) waves are EM waves with frequencies below 100Hz. These
waves are still the only practical means to communicate wirelessly with a
submerged vessel from land. The main drawback of ELF communication is
the low bandwidth available and hence low achievable data rate of less than
1bps [14]. In typical seawater, a 100Hz EM wave is attenuated by 100dB
after 323m and a 100kHz EM wave is attenuated by 100dB after only 8.8m.
At a range of 50m, data rates of only about 300bps have been reached [14].
The company WFS sells RF underwater modems with an advertised data
rate of 156kbps at a 3m range using 27 watts of power.
Free-space optical communication underwater has received renewed inter-
est from researchers due to recent improvement in laser and LED technol-
ogy [15, 16]. LEDs are low-cost and power-efficient light sources and their
light intensity and switching speed have been shown to accommodate wire-
less underwater communication at 1Mbps over 100m [15]. The authors of
this work report that transmissions were error free for ranges up to 100m,
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but their data also shows that the error rate increases sharply at ranges
beyond 100m. The error rate reaches 0.5 at about 140m making reliable
communication impossible. This is still a significant step up from RF com-
munication. Several serious issues, however, limit the applicability of free-
space optical communication in practice: First and perhaps most impor-
tantly, communication range is highly dependent upon water turbidity. The
above values for light attenuation in water only hold for operation in pristine
and transparent water. But near-shore and estuarine waters are typically
highly turbid because of inorganic particles or dissolved organic matter from
land drainage [17]. Light attenuation is exponential in distance. If, for a
given wavelength λ, I0(λ) is the light intensity at the source, the light inten-
sity I(λ, z) at distance z from the source is described by the Beer-Lambert
law [18]
I(λ, z) = I0e
−c(λ)z (2.1)
The wavelength-dependent factor c(λ) is the extinction coefficient of the
water through which the optical system operates. For the type of light
best suited for optical communication, blue-green light with a wavelength
of 480nm, the extinction factor is about 0.16m−1 for pristine ocean water
and about 2.8m−1 for typical coastal waters [17]. The above mentioned ex-
periment that proved the feasibility of error free optical underwater commu-
nication at 1Mbps over 100m was conducted in the clearest water - near the
seafloor in the deep ocean [15], for which the authors measured the extinc-
tion coefficient to be 0.05m−1. According to Equation 2.1, the attenuation
would have been 21.7dB at 100m distance in this clear-water environment.
This suggests that in typical coastal water with an extinction coefficient of
about 2.8m−1, this system would likely only manage a range of about 1.8m.
Note that the waters of most commercial interest, such as in the Gulf of
Mexico or in the Irish sea, are highly turbid. Measurements in the Gulf
of Mexico indicate that the extinction factor exceeds 3m−1 at many sites
and can be as high as 5.1m−1 [19]. Turbidity is also high near underwa-
ter work and construction sites because sand and other particles are stirred
up by operations. These are the spaces in which most underwater vehicles
operate, and in which the need for wireless communication is greatest. An-
other issue of underwater optical communication is that different hardware
7
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Figure 2.2: 100dB attenuation of an electromagnetic plane wave vs. an
acoustic plane wave in sea water.
is needed for the emission and reception of light - LEDs for emission and a
photo-multiplier tube for reception, for example. This roughly doubles the
footprint of the complete system. Further, available light emission hardware
such as LEDs and lasers are highly directional and require the transmitter
and receiver to be aligned with each other. This is a major issue in mobile
applications where the emitter would need to be constantly reaimed as the
mobile platform moves through the water. In summary, high sensitivity to
water turbidity, bulkiness and tight alignment requirements are major issues
in free-space underwater optical communication and limit its applicability to
cases where a clear line-of-sight path is available and alignment of transmitter
and receiver is simple.
The only practical method of carrying information wirelessly undersea over
distances greater than a couple of meters is through acoustic wave propaga-
tion. In seawater, acoustic waves are significantly less attenuated than radio
waves. Figure 2.2 compares how far acoustic and radio waves can propagate
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Figure 2.3: Information theoretic channel capacity of the underwater
acoustic channel as a function of distance and source power.
through seawater until total attenuation reaches 100dB. At a frequency of
1MHz, radio waves are attenuated by 100dB at only about 3m of distance.
At the same frequency, acoustic waves propagate for 200m until this level
of attenuation is observed. These lower levels of attenuation allow acoustic
communication systems to achieve much higher data rates than would be
possible with underwater radio communication. Figure 2.3 shows the infor-
mation theoretic capacity of the underwater acoustic channel for different
levels of transmit power. The transmit power is given as sound pressure level
(SPL) at one meter distance from the sound source. This plot does not in-
clude the frequency limitations imposed by commercially available acoustic
sources but shows the potential of acoustic communication in general without
the restrictions imposed by the limitations of today’s hardware. At an SPL of
160dB, a data rate greater than 4Mbps can be achieved at a range of 100m.
At an SPL of 210dB the data rate increases to more than 20Mbps for the
same range. If the characteristics of available acoustic sources and sensors
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transducers using 2W of input power in sea water as a function of distance.
are taken into account data rates will drop, but they remain above 1Mbps
at a range of 100m. If an off-the-shelf transducer such as the ITC-1089D
is used to emit and sense the acoustic signal, the channel capacity is about
1.75Mbps at 100m distance. Figure 2.4 illustrates the data rates that can
be achieved with this transducer model at various ranges. These data rates
are significantly higher than the achievable subsea radio communication data
rates mentioned above.
Acoustic communication does not suffer from any of the issues of free-space
optical communication and has significantly more range. Acoustic waves do
attenuate more in turbid water than they do in clear seawater, but only
marginally so. Acoustic attenuation depends on the concentration of parti-
cles suspended in the water. A mass concentration of 1kgm−3 is the extreme
case for estuarine and coastal waters [20]. This level of concentration can, for
example, be observed in shallow estuarine waters with strong turbulent tidal
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currents and a bed consisting of fine sand. At peak flow, mass concentrations
close to 1kgm−3 have been measured [21]. For this level of concentration the
attenuation of a 100kHz acoustic wave increases from 0.03dB/m for clear
saltwater to 0.04dB/m [22]. Acoustic communication further does not re-
quire that the transmitter and receiver be aligned. Omnidirectional acoustic
sources, such as the ITC-1089D transducer, are commercially available and
remove the need for alignment. Also note that the same hardware - a ceramic
electro-mechanical transducer - can be used for signal emission and recep-
tion. Because of these reasons, we view acoustic communication as strictly
superior to EM wave-based communication underwater and hence focus on
this technology in the remainder of this chapter.
The above capacity calculations ignored multi-path effects and assumed
line-of-sight communication between stationary platforms. In this case, the
underwater acoustic channel is well understood and can be modeled as a lin-
ear time-invariant (LTI) system with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
[23]. A line-of-sight between transmitter and receiver is often available under-
water, but in a mobile communication scenario the assumption of stationary
communication platforms is clearly invalid. There is no consensus on the
statistical characterization of this type of time variability [23] and, “in the
absence of good statistical models for simulation, experimental demonstra-
tion of candidate communication schemes remains a de facto standard.” In
this chapter we shall introduce a novel channel model for mobile acoustic
communication that builds upon the established physical principles of acous-
tic wave propagation and also derive communication algorithms from it that
outperform all existing acoustic modems by several orders of magnitude.
Unlike in mobile radio systems on land, motion-induced Doppler effects
cannot be neglected in acoustic communication systems. Remotely operated
underwater vehicles (ROVs) typically move at speeds up to about 1.5m/s
[24], autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) can run at speeds greater than
3m/s [25], modern submarines reach speeds greater than 20m/s [26,27], and
supercavitating torpedoes propel to speeds of up to 100 m/s [27]. This leads
to underwater acoustic Mach numbers v/c (v = vehicle velocity projected
onto the signal path between transmitter and receiver, c = wave propagation
speed in the medium) on the order of 10−2 and higher. In comparison, the
world’s fastest train in regular commercial service - the Transrapid magnetic
levitation train - operates at a top speed of 430km/h [28]. At this speed,
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the radio communication channel experiences a Mach number of only 4 ∗
10−7, i.e., five orders of magnitude smaller. Relative motion between the
transmitter and receiver always manifests as time-varying temporal scaling
of the received waveform. In radio channels, such Doppler effects are minimal
and are easily correctable under the popular narrowband assumption, while
in acoustic communications, they can be catastrophic if not compensated
dynamically. Further, when acoustic communication signals have multiple
interactions with scatterers underwater, such as the surface or the ocean
bottom, harsh multi-path arises. There are several acoustic modems on the
market that provide a transparent data link and can reach a net data rate
of about 2.5kbps over 1km distance, but when they are mobile or multiple
signal paths to the receiver exist due to reflective boundaries nearby, these
modems perform poorly and only achieve a net data rate of about 100bps
[29, 30]. Multi-path effects are typically most severe when communication
signals propagate through a wave guide or in shallow water where both the
surface and the bottom reflect the acoustic signal multiple times. Note that
horizontal long range communication basically always occurs in a waveguide
because waves are always refracted towards the horizontal layer of water at
which the speed of sound is lowest. This phenomenon has been described as
the Sound Fixing and Ranging (SOFAR) channel and was first discovered in
the 1940s [31].
2.3 Related Work
The first underwater acoustic modems employed frequency-shift keying (FSK)
which maps digital information to a sequence of discrete tones. Guard inter-
vals between consecutive tones ensure that reverberation does not correlate
them and guard bands guarantee that Doppler shifts do not cause misinter-
pretation at the receiver. FSK is relatively easy to implement and can be
made to be robust but then uses the available time and frequency resources
rather inefficiently. Underwater modems using this technique typically have a
data rate less than 1kbps [32]. In the 1990s, it was shown that acoustic wave
propagation allows phase-coherent digital communication underwater [33].
The authors combined an adaptive linear decision feedback equalizer (DFE)
and a phase locked loop (PLL) to combat the channel distortion due to re-
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verberation and Doppler effects. This system was then evaluated on data
from at-sea experiments and the authors demonstrated a data rate of 10kbps
in shallow water over 3.7km distance using 5kHz of acoustic bandwidth, a
stationary 183dB SPL source and a stationary directional receiving element
(hydrophone). This work indicated that coherent communication had the
potential to significantly improve data rate and bandwidth efficiency. Note,
however, that the directional hydrophone required alignment with the source
and that no platform mobility was allowed. The directional hydrophone
helped reject the noise generated at the surface due to wind and wave mo-
tion and also limited reverberation since the multi-path components with
most delay generally impinge on the hydrophone at the widest angle. In
practice, neither hydrophone alignment nor platform stability can be guar-
anteed. In a later follow-up paper researchers including the author of [33]
recognize that the communication system devised in [33] cannot handle the
level of Doppler introduced by standard mobile platforms such as autonomous
underwater vehicles (AUVs) and that “its performance has been unsatisfac-
tory under realistic field conditions” [29]. They extend the original approach
and propose a two-step detection algorithm. For each received data block,
the detector first obtains an estimate of the average Doppler factor over the
entire transmission and then resamples (interpolates) and phase corrects the
demodulated base-band signal based on this factor. In the second step, the
original method from [33] is used to estimate the sent data symbols. The
phase-locked loop (PLL) is employed to remove any residual Doppler distor-
tion from the demodulated signal and the adaptive equalizer estimates the
transmitted symbols from the Doppler compensated signal. They claimed
to achieve a data rate of 2.5kbps on data from moving platforms at relative
speeds up to 6 knots but did not specify over what distance. Even this ex-
tended approach, however, only works if the Doppler variation is sufficiently
small and roughly constant for the duration of a block. The ‘micromodem’ of
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI), like most state-of-the-
art systems, implements this algorithm for coherent communication and also
offers a robust low data rate frequency-shift keying with frequency-hopping
(FH-FSK) mode [29, 30, 34, 35]. The WHOI micromodem was the basis for
a US Navy submarine deployment in the mid 1990s and the technology in
the research and commercial community have not changed substantially in
the interim. In a more recent paper, WHOI reports that for communication
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with AUVs the micromodem relies on its “robust FH-FSK modulation and
error correction coding (ECC) scheme to communicate at long ranges (2− 4
kilometers), in the very shallow water zone” at a data rate of 80bps using
4kHz of bandwidth and a powerful 190dB SPL source [30]. This performance
corresponds to a bandwidth efficiency of only 0.02bps/Hz.
There are many other research papers discussing extensions of the algo-
rithm proposed in [33] and the data rates that these extensions achieve in
at-sea field-tests. In [36], multiple transmitters and space-time trellis codes
are used to capitalize on the benefits of the transmit diversity available in
the reverberant horizontal shallow water acoustic communication channel.
The highest data rate the authors could reliably achieve is 40kbps at a bit
error rate (BER) of about 10−2 using four transmitters and 23kHz of band-
width. The transmit and receive array were stationary and 2km apart. The
source power level was set to 190dB. The system suggested in [36] uses com-
plex hardware and heavy software but only gives a bandwidth efficiency of
0.375bps/Hz per transmitter. In [37], two transducers were mounted onto
the ends of a 10m pole which was then vertically submerged. The authors
achieved a data rate of 150kbps using 25kHz bandwidth with an unspecified
transmit power. This translates to a bandwidth efficiency of 6bps/Hz. Note,
though, that in both of these works the transmitter and the receiver were
stationary which considerably simplified the conducted experiments. Motion-
induced Doppler effects would have severely degraded the performance of the
proposed algorithms.
There is another line of underwater acoustic communication research that
investigates the use of orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM).
OFDM fundamentally assumes that the channel is linear and time invariant
for the length of each ODFM symbol. Platform motion and environmen-
tal fluctuations make the underwater acoustic channel highly time-variant
and the application of standard OFDM leads to communication algorithms
that break down when transmitter or receiver are mobile. Several ad hoc
modifications to the original OFDM receiver algorithm have been suggested
and tested in at-sea field-tests [38–42]. One OFDM modification [39] essen-
tially precedes the regular OFDM receiver with the first step of the receiver
algorithm proposed in [29]. But again, this type of Doppler compensation
assumes that Doppler variation is sufficiently small and roughly constant for
the duration of an OFDM symbol. Since this approximation improves with
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shorter OFDM symbols, short OFDM symbols of a length of only 512 to
2048 carriers are used. At the same time the underwater acoustic channel
is highly reverberant and long cyclic prefixes or zero padding is necessary
between consecutive OFDM symbols to eliminate intersymbol interference.
This means that, during a significant fraction of time, no information can be
sent, leading to low achievable data rates. In [39], a data rate of 9.7kbps is
achieved at a BER of 10−2 using a bandwidth of 12kHz and 2048 carriers
over a distance somewhere between 50m and 800m. Taking into account
the additional layer of channel coding necessary to reduce the BER to below
10−9, the bandwidth efficiency of this system is 0.7275bps/Hz at best, as-
suming a capacity achieving code. Some of the authors of this paper tried to
commercialize this technology (AquaSeNT) but were unable to turn its SBIR
funding into a commercial product. This likely failed due to motion-induced
Doppler effects under which the OFDM carriers are no longer orthogonal and
severe inter-carrier-inference (ICI) arises. Another team out of the Univer-
sity of Florida ran into similar troubles with an STTR joint with EdgeTech,
citing motion-induced Doppler effects as the fundamental stumbling block.
The fatal flaw of many of these works is that the channel model is borrowed
from the radio communication community and only slightly modified, if at all,
and hence does not properly respect the physics of acoustic wave propagation.
A popular assumption is that the Doppler is constant over the time of a data
block and the remaining channel effect is linear and time-invariant, but in
reality the Doppler can be highly time-varying and different wave propagation
paths can experience different Doppler.
In our work, we have developed a sample-by-sample, recursive resampling
technique, in which time-varying Doppler is explicitly modeled, tracked and
compensated. Integrated into an iterative turbo equalization based receiver,
this novel Doppler compensation technique has demonstrated unprecedented
communication performance in US Navy sponsored field tests and simula-
tions. Some of our field data stems from the MACE10 experiment conducted
in the waters 100 km south of Martha’s Vineyard, MA. Under challenging
conditions (harsh multi-path, ranges up to 7.2 km, SNRs down to 2 dB
and relative speeds up to 3 knots) our algorithms sustained error-free com-
munication over the period of three days at a data rate of 39kbps at 2.7km
distance and a data rate of 23.4kbps at 7.2km distance using a 185dB source.
In this experiment we had used only 9.76kHz of acoustic bandwidth lead-
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ing to bandwidth efficiencies of 3.99bps/Hz and 2.40bps/Hz, respectively.
Compared to frequency-shift keying with frequency-hopping (FH-FSK) with
a bandwidth efficiency of 0.02bps/Hz, which is the only existing acoustic
communication method robust enough to handle these conditions, this im-
plies an improvement of two orders of magnitude in data rate and bandwidth
efficiency.
Since our interaction and discussions with the subsea oil and gas industry,
we have begun to focus on communication over shorter distances while scaling
up bandwidth and data rate. In a 1.22m x 1.83m x 49m wave-tank, we have
begun to experiment with a set of ITC-1089D transducers, which have around
200kHz of bandwidth at a center frequency of around 300kHz. We recently
achieved 1.2Mbps over a distance of 12m using this experimental setup. In
a smaller tank, we reached rates of 120Mbps over distances of less than 1m.
These are to the best of our knowledge by far the highest data rates ever
recorded for acoustic underwater communication.
The underwater acoustic channel remains one of the most difficult com-
munication channels [23,43] and our understanding of it is still in its infancy.
The Sections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 will review the physical properties of
acoustic wave propagation and introduce a novel channel model derived from
the acoustic wave equation. Section 2.10 discusses the interesting connection
between underwater acoustic positioning and underwater acoustic commu-
nication. Finally, in Section 2.11 we derive an efficient receiver algorithm
based upon the introduced new channel model and we show its superior
performance in simulations, laboratory experiments and at-sea field-tests in
Section 2.12.
2.4 Notation
We will typeset vectors and sequences bold-face. The set of integers is de-
noted by Z and Z+ = {z ∈ Z : z ≥ 0}. The sets of real and complex numbers
are denoted by R and C, respectively. The set R> = {x ∈ R : x > 0} and
R≥ = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}. The sets R< and R≤ are defined analogously. The
set [j : n] denotes {z ∈ Z : j ≤ z ≤ n} with [n] ≡ [1 : n]. For any complex
number x, x? denotes the conjugate of x. For any function x : R → R, the
function x˙(t) denotes its first derivative and x(k)(t) its k-th derivative. The
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real number ‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of the vector x. When A is a
matrix of dimension n×m, then A[i:j],[l:k] denotes the matrix B of dimension
1 + j − i× 1 + k − l where Bp,q = Ai−1+p,l−1+q.
2.5 Physical Modeling of the Problem
By definition, acoustic communication uses acoustic waves to carry informa-
tion. To communicate digital information acoustically, a digitized waveform
is converted into an electrical signal by a suitable waveform generator cir-
cuit and this electrical signal is then amplified and delivered to an acoustic
transducer. The electrical signal stimulates the transducer to vibrate. The
resulting pressure fluctuations in the medium create an acoustic signal that
radiates off the transducer and propagates through the water. The trans-
ducer is typically a piezo-electric ceramic encapsulated in plastic. This type
of transducer can be used for both the transmission and the reception of
acoustic signals. It converts electrical signals into acoustic signals and vice
versa. When a transducer is used for transmission, it is often referred to as
a projector. When it is used as a receiver, it is usually called a hydrophone.
At some distance from projector, the hydrophone is stimulated by the inci-
dent pressure fluctuations and generates an electrical signal. The measured
electrical signal is amplified and digitized by another suitable circuit.
Given a point of reference, the position and orientation of a transducer
array are uniquely determined by a six dimensional vector describing the
translation in three perpendicular axes combined with the rotation about
three perpendicular axes, the six degrees of freedom (6DoF). We propose a
channel model that explicitly models these states for the transmit and the
receive array. Figure 2.5 sketches a transmit array at position xi with ori-
entation θi and a receive array at position xl with orientation θl. When
there are multiple acoustic signal paths from the transmitting array to the
receive array due to reflection off nearby boundaries, each propagation path
is modeled as a line of sight path from a phantom source with its own po-
sition and orientation. Figure 2.6 illustrates this idea. The p-th phantom
source appears to be at position xi;p(t) with orientation θi;p(t). Along each
path, some dispersion is induced due to the frequency dependent absorption
loss. Each 6DoF vector, as well as the attenuations along each path, will
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Figure 2.5: A transmit array at position xi with orientation θi and a
receive array at position xl with orientation θl.
be modeled as a continuous time random process. These states are observed
through the acoustic pressure measurements of the receive hydrophone ar-
rays and also possibly through inertial sensors mounted onto the transmit
and receive array. Inference based on this model yields position estimates
and if the sent signals are used for communication and are unknown at the
receiver, they can be modeled as random processes and be estimated as well.
The receiver then performs positioning and data detection jointly. There is
also an interesting connection with beam-forming. Emitted wavefronts may
arrive at different times on the elements of the receiver array. The receiver
algorithm we shall propose essentially obtains estimates of these arrival times
and then compensates the received signals such that they add constructively
- a technique similar to broadband receive beam-forming. Another interest-
ing idea is to perform transmit beam-forming based upon the known location
of the receiver. This has the potential to mitigate multi-path in short range
channels.
Our goal is to establish a model of the acoustic channel that is sophisti-
cated enough to capture the dominant physical effects but simple enough to
allow computationally tractable inference. We begin from first principles of
acoustic wave propagation.
As a first step, let us consider the acoustic signal path starting at the
projector array and ending at the receive hydrophone array as our commu-
nication channel. We will also assume for a moment that there is only one
transducer element on the transmit and receive array and that their positions
are x1(t) and x2(t), respectively, which depend on the time t. The trans-
mitter emits the acoustic signal s˜1(t) and the receiver senses the acoustic
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Figure 2.6: Multi-path effects: Each path interpreted as a line of sight path
to a phantom source.
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signal r˜2(t). If these elements were operating in an ideal fluid, where energy
was conserved and there was no absorption loss and no ambient noise, the
acoustic wave equation completely describes the channel:
1
c2
∂2p
∂t2
−4p = 4pi ∂
∂t
{
δ(x− x1(t))
∫ t
−∞
s˜1(τ)dτ
}
(2.2)
where p(x, t) is the sound pressure at position x and time t, c is speed of
sound and 4 denotes the Laplace operator [44, 45]. Assuming there are no
reflective boundaries and both transmitter and receiver move subsonically,
the far field solution to this equation at position x2(t) is
pFF (x2(t), t) =
(
∂te
∂t
)2
||x2(t)− x1(te)|| s˜1(te) (2.3)
where te is the unique solution to the implicit equation
t− te − ||x2(t)− x1(te)||
c
= 0 (2.4)
[45]. The time te is often called the emission time or retarded time. Neglect-
ing the near field component of the solution, we set r˜2(t) = p
FF (x2(t), t).
This relationship completely describes the communication channel under the
mentioned assumptions. We can write
r˜2(t) = h(t)s˜1(te) (2.5)
and consider h(t) a time dependent channel gain factor. Taking a close look
at Equation 2.3, we notice that the gain h(t) is inversely proportional to the
communication distance. Further the “Doppler factor” ∂te
∂t
is always positive,
equal to unity when there is no motion, greater than unity when the source
and receiver are moving towards each other and smaller than unity otherwise.
The solution te to Equation 2.4 can be interpreted as a fixed-point and can
be computed by a fixed-point iteration algorithm.
Theorem 1. Assume there are two functions x˙1(t) : R → R3 and x˙2(t) :
R → R3, and that x˙1(t) is continuously differentiable and ||x˙1(t)|| < c.
20
Define the function
Ft(te) = t− 1
c
||x2(t)− x1(te)|| (2.6)
Then for any t and te[0], the sequence te[n], n = 0, 1, 2, ... with
te[n+ 1] = Ft(te[n]), n = 0, 1, 2, ... (2.7)
converges to a real number te(t). This number is the unique solution to the
implicit equation te = Ft(te), which is equivalent to Equation 2.4.
Proof. We know f(x) = ||x|| is a continuous function and derive
d
dt
||x1(t)|| = lim
δ→0
||x1(t+ δ)|| − ||x1(t)||
δ
(2.8)
≤ lim
δ→0
∥∥∥∥x1(t+ δ)− x1(t)δ
∥∥∥∥ (2.9)
=
∥∥∥∥limδ→0 x1(t+ δ)− x1(t)δ
∥∥∥∥ (2.10)
= ‖x˙1(t)‖ (2.11)
and
− d
dt
||x1(t)|| = lim
δ→0
−||x1(t+ δ)||+ ||x1(t)||
δ
(2.12)
≤ lim
δ→0
∥∥∥∥x1(t+ δ)− x1(t)δ
∥∥∥∥ (2.13)
= ‖x˙1(t)‖ (2.14)
for any t ∈ R. The inequalities follow from the triangle inequality. So
| d
dt
‖x1(t)‖ | ≤ ‖x˙1(t)‖. Further,∣∣∣∣ ddteFt(te)
∣∣∣∣ = 1c
∣∣∣∣ ddte ‖x2(t)− x1(te)‖
∣∣∣∣ (2.15)
≤ 1
c
‖x˙1(te)‖ < 1 (2.16)
The function Ft(te) is hence a contraction mapping in te. By the Banach
fixed-point theorem [46], there exists an unique te that solves the equation
Ft(te) = te and the sequence te[n], n = 0, 1, 2, ... converges to this solution.
Obviously, the implicit equation Ft(te) = te is equivalent to Equation 2.4.
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We had assumed the absence of absorption in the derivation of Equa-
tion 2.5. In reality, however, emitted acoustic signals experience attenuation
due to spreading and absorption, i.e., thermal consumption of energy. The
absorption loss of acoustic signals in sea water increases exponentially in dis-
tance and super exponentially in frequency. The loss due to spreading is in
principle the same as in electromagnetics. The total attenuation of the signal
power is given by
A(l, f) =
|S˜1(f)|2
|R˜2(f)|2
= lka(f)l−1 (2.17)
where f is the signal frequency, l is the transmission distance and S˜1(f) and
R˜2(f) are the Fourier transforms of the signals s˜1(t) and r˜2(t), respectively.
The exponent k models the spreading loss. If the spreading is cylindrical
or spherical, k is equal to 1 or 2, respectively. Several empirical formulas
for the absorption coefficient a(f) have been suggested [47–52]. Marsh and
Schulkin [47] conducted extensive field experiments and derived the following
empirical formula to approximate 10 log10 a(f) in sea water at frequencies
between 3kHz and 0.5MHz:
10 log10 a(f) ≈ 8.68 · 103
(
SAfTf
2
f 2T + f
2
+
Bf 2
fT
)
(1− 6.54 · 10−4P ) [dB/km]
(2.18)
where A = 2.34 · 10−6, B = 3.38 · 10−6, S is salinity in promille, P is
hydrostatic pressure [kg/cm2], f is frequency in kHz and
fT = 2.19 · 106−1520/(T+273) (2.19)
is a relaxation frequency [kHz], with T the temperature [◦C] [53]. Figure
2.7 is a composite plot using the formulas from [47] and [52] and illustrates
the dependency of 10 log10 a(f) on frequency for a salinity of 35 promille, a
temperature of 5◦C and a depth of 1000m. It becomes evident that the band-
width available for communication is severely limited at longer distances. For
shorter distances, the bandwidth of the transducer becomes the limiting fac-
tor. A 1MHz sine wave experiences a 31.89dB absorption loss over 100m
distance and a 318.9dB absorption loss over 1km distance. From Equation
2.17, we see that for a fixed transmission distance l, signal attenuation is
22
10
1
10
2
10
3
10
4
10
5
10
6
10
7
10
−6
10
−5
10
−4
10
−3
10
−2
10
−1
10
0
10
1
10
2
Frequency (Hz)
A
b
s
o
rp
ti
o
n
c
o
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t
(d
B
/m
)
Figure 2.7: Absorption coefficient, 10 log10 a(f) in dB/m.
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linear and time-invariant. When the transmitter or the receiver move, sig-
nal attenuation is still a linear effect, but it varies with time. The received
acoustic signal can hence be related to the emitted acoustic signal by a time-
varying convolution integral with kernel h(t, τ). We suggest the following
extension to the channel model from Equation 2.5 to take this time-varying
signal attenuation into account:
r˜2(t) =
∫
τ
h(t, τ)s˜1(te(t)− τ)dτ (2.20)
Acoustic channel observations in reality also always contain some noise.
There is ambient noise and site-specific noise. Site-specific noise is for exam-
ple caused by underwater machines or biologics. Ambient noise arises from
wind, turbulence, breaking waves, rain and distant shipping. The ambient
noise can be modeled as a Gaussian process but has a colored spectrum [54].
At low frequencies (0.1 − 10Hz), the main sources are earthquakes, under-
water volcanic eruptions, distant storms and turbulence in the ocean and
atmosphere. In the frequency band 50 − 300Hz, distant ship traffic is the
dominant noise source. In the frequency band 0.5−50kHz the ambient noise
is mainly dependent upon the state of the ocean surface (breaking waves,
wind, cavitation noise). Above 100kHz, molecular thermal noise starts to
dominate [53]. The power spectral density of the ambient noise has been
measured and modeled by many researchers [55–58]. Coates [56] breaks the
overall noise spectrum N(f) up into a sum of four components: The turbu-
lence noise Nt(f), the shipping noise Ns(f), surface agitation noise Nw(f)
and the thermal noise Nth(f). These noise spectra are given in µPa
2/Hz as
a function of frequency in kHz
10 log10Nt(f) = 17− 30 log10(f) (2.21)
10 log10Ns(f) = 40 + 20(s− 0.5) + 26 log10(f)− 60 log10(f + 0.03) (2.22)
10 log10Nw(f) = 50 + 7.5w
1/2 + 20 log10(f)− 40 log10(f + 0.4) (2.23)
10 log10Nth(f) = −15 + 20 log10(f) (2.24)
and sum up to give the total ambient noise N(f)
N(f) = Nt(f) +Ns(f) +Nw(f) +Nth(f) (2.25)
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In this empirical expression, s is the shipping activity factor taking values
between 0 and 1 and w is the wind speed in m/s. Figure 2.8 is reproduced
from [59] and plots N(f) for different values of s and w. The ambient noise
and the signal originating from the transmitter add at the receiver. Defining
v˜(t) to be an independent Gaussian random process with power spectral
density given by N(f), the channel model from Equation 2.20 can be further
refined to
r˜2(t) =
∫
τ
h(t, τ)s˜1(te(t)− τ)dτ + v˜(t) (2.26)
So far we considered the acoustic signal path starting at the projector and
ending at the receive hydrophone as our channel. But in reality, the involved
transducers and amplifiers also shape the signal and introduce noise. We will
hence now extend our notion of the communication channel to encompass the
distortion effects of the involved amplifiers and transducers as well. The effect
of any frequency response shaping can readily be absorbed into the kernel
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Figure 2.9: Typical self-noise referred to input of the Reson TC4014 broad
band spherical hydrophone reproduced from [60].
h(t, τ). But at the receiver also significant electronic noise is added. The
voltage generated by a hydrophone in response to an incident acoustic signal
is small and needs to be preamplified to better match the voltage range of the
digitizer. The electronic noise produced at the input stage of the preamplifier
depends upon the capacitance of the hydrophone, but is usually so high that
it dominates the acoustic ambient noise picked up by the hydrophone. The
most sensitive high frequency hydrophones by market leading companies ITC
and RESON introduce self-noise of at least 45dB re µPa/
√
Hz referred to
input. Figure 2.9 shows the typical self-noise referred to input of the Reson
TC4014 broadband spherical hydrophone and compares it to seastate zero
ambient noise, i.e. the ambient noise when wind waves and swell levels are
minimal. Comparing Figures 2.8 and 2.9, we notice that even for high levels
of wind, the hydrophone self-noise dominates the ambient noise at frequencies
above about 20kHz. Since the acoustic projectors most suited for broadband
communication do not cover frequencies below about 10kHz, we will assume
that the electronic noise dominates the ambient noise in our further analysis.
The electronic noise is well approximated by an independent Gaussian noise
process with flat power spectral density in the band of interest and we will
hence now assume that v˜(t) is such a process.
Next, we will model transmission involving transmit and receive arrays
with multiple transducers and consider multi-path effects arising from reflec-
tions off nearby scatterers.
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We fix a Cartesian frame of reference at a known location in space. All
positions and angles are given with respect to this reference system. Assume
xi(t) and θi(t) are the three-dimensional position and orientation vectors of
the i-th transducer array. The total number of available arrays depends on
the scenario, but we will always start indexing them with the integer 1. We
will have two types of arrays: A trivial array with only one element and a
non-trivial array with K elements and fixed geometry. There is a function
T : R6 → R3×K that maps the position xi(t) and orientation θi(t) of the
i-th array to the positions xi,j(t), j ∈ [K], of its omnidirectional elements.
Figure 2.5 applies this notation.
The j-th transducer of the i-th array sends the signal s˜i,j(t) and receives
r˜i,j(t). We assume there is no multiple access interference (MAI). So, in case
there is no multi-path but only a line of sight, the received signals can be
expressed as
r˜l,m(t) =
∑
j
∫
τ
hi,j;l,m(t, τ)s˜i,j(ti,j;l,m(t)− τ)dτ + v˜l,m(t) (2.27)
where hi,j;l,m(t, τ) denotes the time-varying signal attenuation kernel along
the path from the j-th transducer of the i-th array to the m-th transducer
of the l-th array, ti,j;l,m(t) is the unique solution to the implicit equation
t− ti,j;l,m − ||xl,m(t)− xi,j(ti,j;l,m)||
c
= 0 (2.28)
and the v˜l,m(t) are independent Gaussian noise processes with flat power
spectral density in the band of interest. When there is multi-path, we in-
terpret each path as the line of sight path from a phantom source array at
position xi;p(t) and orientation θi;p(t), p ∈ [Pi;l], that sends out the same
signals. The integer Pi;l counts the number of paths present between array i
and l. Figure 2.6 shows the real source and three phantom sources, one for
each reflection. In the multi-path case, the received signals read
r˜l,m(t) =
∑
j∈[K],p∈Pi;l
∫
τ
hi,j;p;l,m(t, τ)s˜i,j(ti,j;p;l,m(t)− τ)dτ + v˜l,m(t) (2.29)
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where ti,j;p;l,m(t) is the unique solution to the implicit equation
t− ti,j;p;l,m − ||xl,m(t)− xi,j;p(ti,j;p;l,m)||
c
= 0 (2.30)
xi,j;p(t), j ∈ [K], are the positions of the transducer elements on the p-th
phantom array and hi,j;p;l,m(t, τ) denotes the time-varying signal attenuation
kernel along the path from the j-th transducer of the p-th phantom of the
i-th array to the m-th transducer of the l-th array.
2.6 Signal Design and Sampling
We wish to design waveforms that are suitable for bandwidth efficient data
communication and channel estimation. Standard single carrier source sig-
nals are well-suited for this task. It is possible to detect and track motion
from the phase margin or lag with respect to the carrier (center frequency).
Furthermore, modulation of the phase can be used to embed data.
A common approach to construction of such a communication signal is
through varying the amplitude and phase of a collection of basis functions
with limited bandwidth. Suppose the j-th transducer of the i-th array is to
transmit length N + 1 sequences of symbols si,j[n], n ∈ [0 : N ], from a finite
set of signal constellation points A ⊂ C. To this end, the sequence si,j[n] is
mapped to a waveform si,j(t) : R→ C
si,j(t) =
∑
l∈[0:N ]
si,j[l]p(t− lT ) (2.31)
by use of a basic pulse p(t) time shifted by multiples of the symbol period T .
The pulse p(t) is typically assumed to have a bandwidth of no more than 1/T .
If some of the these symbols are unknown, they can usually be assumed to be
i.i.d., either because the underlying symbols have been optimally compressed
or randomly interleaved. This signal is then modulated to passband
s˜i,j(t) = 2 Re{si,j(t)e2pi
√−1fCit} (2.32)
at carrier frequency fCi. These frequencies are chosen such that there is no
multiple access interference (MAI), i.e., |fCi − fCi′| > 1/T for all i 6= i′.
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At the receiving array, the signal r˜l,m(t) from Equation 2.29 is demodulated
by fCi and low-pass filtered, which yields
rl,m(t) =
∑
j,p
∫
τ
hi,j;p;l,m(t, τ)e
2pi
√−1fCi(ti,j;p;l,m(t)−τ−t)si,j(ti,j;p;l,m(t)− τ)dτ
+vl,m(t)
(2.33)
where vl,m(t) denotes the demodulated and filtered noise processes. Motion-
induced Doppler shifts might widen the bandwidth of the received signal. If
the low-pass filter had only a bandwidth of 1/T , a significant fraction of the
signal could be lost. We assume that vmax is the maximal experienced speed.
The maximum frequency of the emitted signal is designed to be fCi + 1/2T
and a sinusoid with that frequency would then experience a Doppler shift
of at most fdi = (fCi + 1/2T )
vmax
c
. We hence increase the cut-off frequency
of the low-pass filter by fdi and sample the filtered signal at the increased
frequency 1/Ti = 1/T + 2fdi. The sampled output equations read
rl,m[n] =
∑
j,p,k
hi,j;p;l,m[n, k]e
2pi
√−1fCi(ti,j;p;l,m[n]−nTi)si,j(ti,j;p;l,m[n]− kTi)
+vl,m[n]
(2.34)
where ti,j;p;l,m[n] = ti,j;p;l,m(nTi), vl,m[n] is the sampled noise process and
hi,j;p;l,m[n, k] = Tihi,j;p;l,m(nTi, kTi)e
−2pi√−1fCikTi (2.35)
is the demodulated and sampled kernel. The original noise process vl,m(t)
was Gaussian and white in the band of interest and hence the noise samples
vl,m[n] are i.i.d. Gaussian.
Our objective is to communicate data sequences to the receiver. That
is, parts of the sequences si,j[l] are unknown and we would like to esti-
mate them from the available observations rl,m[n]. Unfortunately, the kernels
hi,j;p;l,m[n, k] as well as the position and orientation vectors of the transmit
and receive arrays are unknown as well. A possible approach to this prob-
lem is to model all these states probabilistically and then perform Bayesian
estimation and estimate all these states jointly. We will propose suitable
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probabilistic models next.
2.7 Probabilistic Modeling of Attenuation
The channel gains hi,j;p;l,m[n] are random and we assume their evolution is
described by the following state equations
hi,j;p;l,m[n+ 1, k] = λhi,j;p;l,m[n, k] + ui,j;p;l,m[n, k] (2.36)
where, for each choice of the indices i, j, p, l,m and k, the random variables
ui,j;p;l,m[n, k] form an independent white Gaussian noise process in n with
variance σ2u. The parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) is the forgetting factor. More sophis-
ticated a priori models for the evolution of these gains could be used but we
will start off with this simple model. We, hence, neglect the clear dependence
of the length and the attenuation of the involved signal propagation paths.
2.8 Probabilistic Modeling of Receiver Motion
Various motion models have been considered in the position tracking litera-
ture [61]. There are discrete time and continuous time models. The channel
observations rl,m[n] depend on transmitter and receiver motion only through
the emission time ti,j;p;l,m[n] which, by definition, is the solution to the im-
plicit Equation 2.30 for t = nTi. Clearly, the emission time is only influenced
by the values of the functions xl(t) and θl(t) where t = nTi, n = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
and we hence model the evolution of the receiver position and orientation in
discrete time. Among the commonly used discrete time motion models, the
discrete d-th order white noise model is among the simplest. In this model,
each coordinate xl;k(t) of the vector xl(t) is uncoupled and for each coordi-
nate, k, the d-th derivative x
(d)
l;k (t) is right-continuous and constant between
sampling instants and x
(d)
l;k [n] = x
(d)
l;k (nTi), n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , is a white Gaussian
noise process with variance σ2a. Iterated integration of x
(d)
l;k (t) and sampling
with period Ti yields the following linear discrete time state equations with
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Toeplitz transition matrix:
xl;k[n+ 1]
x
(1)
l;k [n+ 1]
...
x
(d−1)
l;k [n+ 1]
 =
 1 Ti . . . T d−1i(d−1)
0
. . . . . .


xl;k[n]
x
(1)
l;k [n]
...
x
(d−1)
l;k [n]
+

T di
d
...
Ti
 an
(2.37)
where an is an independent white Gaussian noise process with variance σ
2
a
and d > 1. Other more sophisticated motion models for example allow corre-
lation across coordinates and take into account on-line information about the
maneuver, but we postpone a more detailed modeling. Further, the orienta-
tion and position of an array are often correlated. Vehicles typically move
in the direction of the orientation vector. For simplicity, we postpone the
modeling of this effect as well and assume orientation and position to evolve
independently but to share the same probabilistic model.
2.9 Probabilistic Modeling of Transmitter Motion
Again, the channel observations rl,m[n] depend on transmitter motion only
through the emission time ti,j;p;l,m[n]. If both the position xi;p(t) and the
orientation θi;p(t) of the (phantom) transmit array are modeled by random
processes with continuous sample paths and their speed is bounded by a
sufficiently small value, then the positions xi,j;p(t), j ∈ [K], p ∈ [Pi;l], of its
array elements also have continuous sample paths and their speed is less than
the speed of sound. In that case, by Theorem 1, there is a unique solution
ti,j;p;l,m[n] to the implicit Equation 2.30 for t = nTi and each array element
j ∈ [K] and path p ∈ [Pi;l]. Note that the emission times ti,j;p;l,m[n], j ∈
[K], p ∈ [Pi;l] can be viewed as hitting times
ti,j;p;l,m[n] = inf
{
te :
||xl,m(nTi)− xi,j;p(te)||
c
+ te = nTi
}
(2.38)
We propose to model each coordinate of the transmitter position xi;p(t) and
orientation θi;p(t) as independent strong Markov processes [62]. More specif-
ically, we propose to model the evolution of each coordinate by a bidimen-
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sional random process; the first dimension is a speed process, modeled as a
Brownian motion reflected off a symmetric two-sided boundary, and the sec-
ond dimension is the position process, which is the integral of the first dimen-
sion. For this setup, we conjecture that the vector (xi;p(t), x˙i;p(t),θi;p(t), θ˙i;p(t))
describes a Feller process [62] and that the set of states
{(xi;p(t), x˙i;p(t),θi;p(t), θ˙i;p(t)), t = ti,j;p;l,m[n], j ∈ [K]} (2.39)
indexed by the discrete time variable n, form a Markov chain of order R for
each p ∈ [Pi;l] given the receiver motion. The order R depends on the array
geometry and the maximal speed of the above mentioned Brownian motion
speed processes. We prove this conjecture for some special cases and discuss
our thoughts on how these proofs could be extended to cover the general
case. The first special case we will look at is that of one-dimensional motion
on a line with one element transmit and receive arrays.
Let the random processes xi(t) and xl(t) denote the position of the trans-
mitter and receiver on the real line at time t, respectively. Unfortunately, the
simple model presented in Section 2.8 and Equation 2.37 is insufficient when
transmitter motion is allowed. It would allow the transmitter and receiver
to get arbitrarily high velocities with non-zero probability, leading to super-
sonic speed and non-unique emission times. Transmitter speed needs to be
bounded in order for Theorem 1 to guarantee unique emission times. Fur-
ther, receiver speed needs to be bounded in order for the emission times te[n]
to form a strictly increasing sequence. This is a necessary condition for the
bidimensional process (xi(te[n]), x˙i(te[n])) to be Markov in n. The following
definitions and theorems will make these points more precise and give an ap-
proximation of the transition kernel of the Markov chain (xi(te[n]), x˙i(te[n])).
We will drive our motion model by a Brownian motion.
Definition 1. A stochastic process B(t), t ∈ R≥0, is called a Brownian
motion if
1. B(0) = 0
2. B(t) is continuous almost surely
3. B(t) has independent increments
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4. B(t)−B(s) ∼ N(0, t−s) for 0 ≤ s < t, where N(0, t−s) is the normal
distribution with zero mean and variance t− s.
The following motion model uses Brownian motion as the speed process,
gives continuous sample paths, is strongly Markov, has Gaussian distributed
independent increments and its hitting time distribution is well studied [63–
66].
Definition 2. (Integrated Brownian motion (IBM) model) For any non-
negative time t ∈ R≥0, the position of the transmitter is given by
x(t) = x0 +
∫ t
0
x˙(τ)dτ (2.40)
where the speed process x˙(t) is given by
x˙(t) = x˙0 + αB(t) (2.41)
the values x0, x˙0 ∈ R and α ∈ R>0 are model parameters and B(t) is a
Brownian motion as in Definition 1. For any negative time t, x(t) = x0 + x˙0 t
and x˙(t) = x˙0. The bidimensional process ξ(t) = (x(t), x˙(t)) defines the
integrated Brownian motion (IBM) model.
The problem with this motion model is that speed is unbounded and hence
emission times can become non-unique. We propose a motion model that is
similar to the one above but gives position sample paths whose speed is
bounded by some value smaller than the speed of sound so that there is
a unique emission time. We simply reflect the above speed process off a
symmetric two sided boundary to ensure it is bounded almost surely.
Definition 3. (Integrated reflected Brownian motion (IRBM) model) For
any non-negative time t ∈ R≥0, the position of the transmitter is given by
x(t) = x0 +
∫ t
0
x˙(τ)dτ (2.42)
where the speed process x˙(t) is given by
x˙(t) = g(x˙0 + αB(t)) (2.43)
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Figure 2.10: The operation of the function g(x˙) from Definition 3 for
x˙max = 1.
the values x0, x˙0 ∈ R and α ∈ R>0 are model parameters and B(t) is a
Brownian motion as in Definition 1. We have that
g(x˙) = (−1)n(x˙)(x˙− 2x˙maxn(x˙)) (2.44)
where n(x˙) =
⌊
x˙
2x˙max
⌉
, the operator b·e denotes rounding to the nearest inte-
ger and x˙max ∈ R>0 bounds |x˙(t)|. Both |x˙0| and x˙max are always chosen to be
smaller than the speed of sound c. For any negative time t, x(t) = x0 + x˙0 t
and x˙(t) = x˙0. The bidimensional process ξ(t) = (x(t), x˙(t)) defines the
integrated reflected Brownian motion (IRBM) model.
For any function x˙(t), the function g(x˙(t)) reflects values greater than x˙max
inwards. The operation of the function g(x˙) is illustrated in Figure 2.10 for
x˙max = 1. The function g(x˙) has an interesting property that we will exploit
in Theorem 2 below.
Lemma 1. If g(x˙) and n(x˙) are the functions defined in Equation 2.44 in
Definition 3 for some x˙max > 0, then
g((−1)mx˙+ 2x˙maxm) = g(x˙) (2.45)
for any integer m.
Proof. We have
n((−1)mx˙+ 2x˙maxm) =
⌊
(−1)mx˙+ 2x˙maxm
2x˙max
⌉
(2.46)
= m+ (−1)m
⌊
x˙
2x˙max
⌉
(2.47)
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and hence
g((−1)mx˙+ 2x˙maxm) (2.48)
= (−1)m+(−1)mb x˙2x˙max e
(
(−1)mx˙+ 2x˙maxm− 2x˙max
(
m+ (−1)m
⌊
x˙
2x˙max
⌉))
(2.49)
= (−1)m+(−1)mb x˙2x˙max e
(
(−1)mx˙− 2x˙max(−1)m
⌊
x˙
2x˙max
⌉)
(2.50)
= (−1)(−1)mb x˙2x˙max e
(
x˙− 2x˙max
⌊
x˙
2x˙max
⌉)
(2.51)
= (−1)b x˙2x˙max e
(
x˙− 2x˙max
⌊
x˙
2x˙max
⌉)
(2.52)
= g(x˙) (2.53)
Remark 1. For the applications of interest in this thesis, the maximum
platform speed and acceleration of the underwater vehicle is about 2m/s and
0.3m/s2, respectively [67]. The parameter α in the above motion models
determines the level of acceleration and is chosen such that the standard
deviation of αB(Ti) is a third of 0.3Ti, i.e. α = 0.1
√
Ti. Further we choose
x˙max = 5m/s.
The integrated reflected Brownian motion (IRBM) model ξ(t) defined in
Definition 3 is no longer an independent increment process, but its sample
paths are continuous and we can prove that it is a Feller process. We prove
this property so that we may exploit the strong Markov property that follows
from it [62].
Definition 4. (Markov Process) Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space and let
(S,S) be a measurable space. The S-valued stochastic process ξ = (ξ(t), t ∈
R≥0) with natural filtration (Ft, t ∈ R≥0) is said to be a strong Markov
process, if for each A ∈ S, s > 0 and any stopping time τ ,
P (ξ(τ + s) ∈ A|Fτ ) = P (ξ(τ + s) ∈ A|ξ(τ)) (2.54)
where
Fτ = {A ∈ F : A ∩ {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft for all t ≥ 0} (2.55)
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is the sigma algebra at the stopping time τ . If Equation 2.54 only holds for
the trivial stopping times τ = t for any t ≥ 0, then the process is just called
a Markov process. The Markov transition kernel µt,t+s(ξ0, A) : R≥0 × R≥0 ×
S × S) → [0, 1] is a probability measure given any initial state ξ0 ∈ S and
any t, s > 0 and further
µt,t+s(ξ(t), A) = P (ξ(t+ s) ∈ A|ξ(t)) (2.56)
almost surely for any A ∈ S and any t, s > 0. A Markov process is homoge-
neous if for any initial state ξ0 ∈ S, any A ∈ S and any t, s > 0
µt,t+s(ξ0, A) = µ0,s(ξ0, A) (2.57)
For homogeneous Markov processes, we use the notation
Pξ0(ξ(s) ∈ A) ≡ µ0,s(ξ0, A) (2.58)
When the expected value of some random variable G is computed with respect
to this probability measure, we write Eξ0 [G].
Definition 5. (Feller Process) Let ξ = (ξ(t), t ∈ R≥0) be a homogeneous
Markov process as defined in Definition 4. Then this process is called a Feller
process, when, for all initial states ξ0,
1. for any t ≥ 0, any event A ∈ S and any sequence of states ξn ∈ S,
limn→∞ ξn = ξ0 implies limn→∞ Pξn(ξ(t) ∈ A) = Pξ0(ξ(t) ∈ A)
2. for any  > 0, limt→0 P (‖ξ(t)− ξ0‖ > |ξ(0) = ξ0) = 0
Theorem 2. The bidimensional random process ξ(t) from Definition 3 is a
Feller process.
Proof. The sample paths of the process ξ(t) are continuous and hence Prop-
erty 2 in Definition 5 holds. We will now prove that ξ(t) is a homogeneous
Markov process and that Property 1 in Definition 5 holds as well. Let Fxt
and F x˙t be the natural filtrations of the processes x(t) and x˙(t), respectively.
We immediately establish from the definition of the function g(x˙) in Equa-
tion 2.44 that
αB(t) + x˙0 = g(αB(t) + x˙0)(−1)n + 2x˙maxn (2.59)
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where we abbreviated the notation n(αB(t) + x˙0) by n.
Further, we note that
x˙(t+ τ) = g(αB(t+ τ) + x˙0) (2.60)
= g(α(B(t+ τ)−B(t)) + αB(t) + x˙0) (2.61)
= g(α(B(t+ τ)−B(t)) + g(αB(t) + x˙0)(−1)n + 2x˙maxn) (2.62)
= g((−1)n(αB′(τ) + g(αB(t) + x˙0)) + 2x˙maxn) (2.63)
= g(αB′(τ) + g(αB(t) + x˙0)) (2.64)
= g(αB′(τ) + x˙(t)) (2.65)
Equation 2.62 follows from Equation 2.59. Equation 2.64 follows from Lemma
1. The weighted difference B′(τ) = (−1)n(B(t+τ)−B(t)) is itself a Brownian
motion and independent of Fxt and F x˙t .
Next, we take a look at the conditional moment-generating function [62]
of the bidimensional process ξ(t).
Ex0,x˙0 [eux(t+τ)+vx˙(t+τ)|Fxt ,F x˙t ] (2.66)
= Ex0,x˙0 [eu(x(t)+
∫ τ
0 x˙(t+τ)dτ)+vx˙(t+τ)|Fxt ,F x˙t ] (2.67)
= Ex0,x˙0 [eu(x(t)+
∫ τ
0 g(αB
′(τ)+x˙(t))dτ)+vg(αB′(τ)+x˙(t))|Fxt ,F x˙t ] (2.68)
= Ex0,x˙0 [eu(x(t)+
∫ τ
0 g(αB
′(τ)+x˙(t))dτ)+vg(αB′(τ)+x˙(t))|x(t), x˙(t)] (2.69)
= Ex(t),x˙(t)[eu(x(0)+
∫ τ
0 g(αB(τ)+x˙(0))dτ)+vg(αB(τ)+x˙(0))] (2.70)
= Ex(t),x˙(t)[eux(τ)+vx˙(τ)] (2.71)
Equation 2.68 follows from Equation 2.65. Equation 2.69 follows from the
Markov property of Brownian motion. Equation 2.71 follows from the fun-
damental theorem of calculus and Equation 2.43. So ξ(t) is a homogeneous
Markov process. Now assume there are two sequences xn : Z+ → R and
x˙m : Z+ → R such that limn→∞ xn = x0 and limm→∞ x˙m = x˙0. Then
lim
n,m→∞
Exn,x˙m [eux(τ)+vx˙(τ)] (2.72)
= lim
n,m→∞
E[eu(xn+
∫ τ
0 g(αB(τ)+x˙m)dτ)+vg(αB(τ)+x˙m)] (2.73)
= E[eu(limn→∞ xn+
∫ τ
0 g(αB(τ)+limm→∞ x˙m)dτ)+vg(αB(τ)+limm→∞ x˙m)] (2.74)
= E[eu(x0+
∫ τ
0 g(αB(τ)+x˙0)dτ)+vg(αB(τ)+x˙0)] (2.75)
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Equation 2.74 follows from the dominated convergence theorem [62]. Con-
vergence of the moment-generating function implies convergence of the corre-
sponding distribution and hence Property 1 in Definition 5 holds as well.
Now assuming that the motion model for the transmitter and receiver is as
defined in Definition 3, transmitter speed is bounded and there is a unique
solution te to the implicit equation
t− te − |xl(t)− xi(te)|
c
= 0 (2.76)
for any t by Theorem 1. We can show that the sequence te[n], the solutions
of the implicit Equation 2.76 for t = nTi, is strictly increasing in n.
Theorem 3. Assume both transmitter and receiver motion, ξi(t) and ξl(t),
are as defined in Definition 3. If te[n] denotes the solution of the implicit
Equation 2.76 for t = nTi, then
te[n+ 1] > te[n], ∀n (2.77)
Further,
Ti
(
1 + x˙max
c
1− x˙max
c
)
≥ |te[n+ 1]− te[n]| ≥ Ti
(
1− x˙max
c
1 + x˙max
c
)
(2.78)
Proof. Evaluating the implicit Equation 2.76 for t = nTi and t = (n + 1)Ti
gives
nTi − te[n]− |xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])|
c
= 0 (2.79)
and
(n+ 1)Ti − te[n+ 1]− |xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n+ 1])|
c
= 0 (2.80)
The theorem essentially follows from iterated application of the triangle
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inequality. By a suitable zero-sum expansion,
|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n+ 1])|
=|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xl(nTi) + xl(nTi)− xi(te[n]) + xi(te[n])− xi(te[n+ 1])|
≤|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xl(nTi)|+ |xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])|+ |xi(te[n])− xi(te[n+ 1])|
(2.81)
Subtracting Equation 2.80 from Equation 2.79, yields
− Ti + (te[n+ 1]− te[n]) (2.82)
=
1
c
(|xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])| − |xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n+ 1])|) (2.83)
≥ −1
c
(|xi(te[n+ 1])− xi(te[n])|+ |xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xl(nTi)|) (2.84)
≥ −1
c
(x˙max|te[n+ 1]− te[n]|+ x˙maxTi) (2.85)
The first inequality follows from Inequality 2.81. The second inequality fol-
lows from the fact that the involved motion processes have bounded speed.
We can hence write
te[n+ 1]− te[n] ≥ Ti − x˙max
c
(|te[n+ 1]− te[n]|+ Ti) (2.86)
and conclude
(te[n+ 1]− te[n])
(
1 + sgn(te[n+ 1]− te[n]) x˙max
c
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ Ti
(
1− x˙max
c
)
> 0 (2.87)
and
|te[n+ 1]− te[n]| ≥ Ti
(
1− x˙max
c
1 + x˙max
c
)
(2.88)
This proves Inequality 2.77 and the right-hand side inequality in Equation
2.78. If instead of expanding the argument of the right-hand side norm of
Equation 2.83, the argument of the left-hand side norm of Equation 2.83 is
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expanded, we get the inequality
te[n+ 1]− te[n] ≤ Ti + x˙max
c
(|te[n+ 1]− te[n]|+ Ti) (2.89)
and we conclude
|te[n+ 1]− te[n]| ≤ Ti
(
1 + x˙max
c
1− x˙max
c
)
(2.90)
The fact that the emission times te[n] are strictly increasing allows us to
prove that ξi(te[n]) is Markov.
Theorem 4. Assume both transmitter and receiver motion, ξi(t) and ξl(t),
are as defined in Definition 3, but that the receiver motion ξl(t) is given at
the times nTi. Also, let the time te[n] denote the solution of the implicit
Equation 2.76 for t = nTi. Then the sequence ξi(te[n]) is Markov, i.e., for
any A ∈ B(R2),
Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n+ 1]) ∈ A|ξi(te[k − 1]), k ≤ n)
= Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n+ 1]) ∈ A|ξi(te[n])) (2.91)
Further,
Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n+ 1]) ∈ A|ξi(te[n]))
= Pξi(te[n])(ξi(δte) ∈ A) (2.92)
where
δte = inf
{
δte : Ti − δte = 1
c
(
|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0)−
∫ δte
0
x˙i(τ)dτ | . . .
−|xl(nTi)− xi(0)|)}
(2.93)
Proof. The sequence of σ-algebras Fξit = σ{ξi(τ)−1(B(R2)), 0 ≤ τ ≤ t} is
the natural filtration of the process ξi(t). Let s and τ be some non-negative
real numbers. The emission times te[n] are stopping times and Fξite[n]+s is
the stopping time σ-algebra for the stopping time te[n] + s. Since ξi(t) is a
40
time-homogeneous strong Markov process, by Theorem 2, we have for any
s, τ ≥ 0 and A ∈ B(R2) that
Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n] + s+ τ) ∈ A|Fξite[n]+s)
= Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n] + s+ τ) ∈ A|ξi(te[n] + s)) (2.94)
= Pξi(te[n]+s)(ξi(τ) ∈ A) (2.95)
For any two σ-algebras Y and Z of subsets ofΩ, σ{Y ,Z} denotes the smallest
σ-algebra that contains both Y and Z. We define
F˘ξite[n]+s = σ{
(
ξi(te[n] + γ)
−1(B(R2)), 0 ≤ γ ≤ s) ,(
ξi(te((k − 1)Ti))−1(B(R2)), k ≤ n
)} (2.96)
The stopping times te[n] form a strictly increasing sequence in n by Theorem
3 and hence
F˘ξite[n]+s ⊂ F
ξi
te[n]+s
(2.97)
By the tower property of conditional expectation and Equations 2.94, 2.95
and 2.97, for any A ∈ B(R2),
Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n] + s+ τ) ∈ A|F˘ξite[n]+s)
= Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n] + s+ τ) ∈ A|ξi(te[n] + s)) (2.98)
= Pξi(te[n]+s)(ξi(τ) ∈ A) (2.99)
So the process ξi(t) renews itself after any stopping time te[n].
Let δte[n + 1] = te[n + 1] − te[n]. By the definition of the emission times
te[n],
δte[n+ 1] = inf {δte : Ti − δte = . . .
1
c
(|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n] + δte)| − |xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])|)
}
(2.100)
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or equivalently
δte[n+ 1] = inf {δte : Ti − δte = . . .
1
c
(
|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])−
∫ δte
0
x˙i(te[n] + τ)dτ | . . .
−|xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])|)} (2.101)
Note that δte[n+ 1] is independent of Fξite[n] given ξi(te[n]) and hence
Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n] + δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A|ξi(te((k − 1)Ti)), k ≤ n)
= Pξi(0)(ξi(te[n] + δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A|ξi(te[n])) (2.102)
= Pξi(te[n])(ξi(δte) ∈ A) (2.103)
where δte is as defined in Equation 2.93.
We do not have an exact solution to the kernel Pξi(te[n])(ξi(δte) ∈ A) from
the previous theorem, but we can find a damn good approximation.
Theorem 5. Assume both transmitter and receiver motion, ξi(t) and ξl(t),
are as defined in Definition 3, but that the receiver motion ξl(t) is given at the
times nTi. Further assume that the motion ξ
′
i(t) is as defined in Definition
2. The value ξi(0) is given, it is the initial condition for the motion processes
ξi(t) and ξ
′
i(t) and it is such that
|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0)| > x˙maxδtmax (2.104)
where
δtmax ≡ Ti
(
1 + x˙max
c
1− x˙max
c
)
(2.105)
Then, for any A ∈ B(R2),
|Pξi(0)(ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A)− Pξi(0)(ξ′i(δt′e[n+ 1]) ∈ A)|
≤ 2 erfc (η)− erfc (3η) (2.106)
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where
δte[n+ 1] = inf
{
δte : Ti − δte = 1
c
(
|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0)−
∫ δte
0
x˙i(τ)dτ | . . .
−|xl(nTi)− xi(0)|)} (2.107)
δt′e[n+ 1] = inf
{
δt′e : Ti − δt′e =
1
c
(|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0)| . . .
− sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0))
∫ δt′e
0
x˙′i(τ)dτ − |xl(nTi)− x′i(0)|
)}
(2.108)
and
η =
x˙max − |x˙i(0)|
α
√
2δtmax
. (2.109)
Proof. For all δte ≤ δtmax, Inequality 2.104 ensures∣∣∣∣∫ δte
0
x˙i(τ)dτ
∣∣∣∣ ≤ x˙maxδtmax < |xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0)| (2.110)
and hence
|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0)−
∫ δte
0
x˙i(τ)dτ |
= |xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0)| − sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0))
∫ δte
0
x˙i(τ)dτ (2.111)
Note that by Theorem 3 the inequality δte[n+1] ≤ δtmax holds almost surely.
We can thus write
δte[n+ 1] = inf
{
δte : Ti − δte = 1
c
(|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0)| . . .
− sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(0))
∫ δte
0
x˙i(τ)dτ − |xl(nTi)− xi(0)|
)}
(2.112)
43
By the law of total probability,
Pξi(0)(ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A)
= Pξi(0)({ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A} ∩ {|x˙i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}) + . . .
+ Pξi(0)({ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A} ∩ {|x˙i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}C)
(2.113)
By Definition 2 and 3 and Equation 2.111,
Pξi(0)({ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A} ∩ {|x˙i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax})
= Pξi(0)({ξ′i(δt′e[n+ 1]) ∈ A} ∩ {|x˙′i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}) (2.114)
because given {|x˙i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}, the integrated Brownian mo-
tion model and the integrated reflected Brownian motion model coincide.
Further by monotonicity
0 ≤ Pξi(0)({ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A} ∩ {|x˙i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}C)
(2.115)
≤ Pξi(0)({|x˙i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}C) (2.116)
And by the Fre´chet inequalities [68,69],
max
(
0, Pξi(0)(ξ
′
i(δt
′
e[n+ 1]) ∈ A) + Pξi(0)(|x˙′i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax)− 1
)
≤ Pξi(0)({ξ′i(δt′e[n+ 1]) ∈ A} ∩ {|x˙′i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}) (2.117)
≤ Pξi(0)(ξ′i(δt′e[n+ 1]) ∈ A) (2.118)
We conclude
|Pξi(0)(ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A)− Pξi(0)(ξ′i(δt′e[n+ 1]) ∈ A)|
≤ Pξi(0)({|x˙i(δt)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax}C) (2.119)
≤ P
({
|B(δt)| < x˙max − |x˙i(0)|
α
, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax
}C)
(2.120)
We are now going to give an expression and an upper bound for the last
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term. We define the square wave
sBmax(b) =
∞∑
n=−∞
(−1)n1{2n−1<b/Bmax<2n+1}. (2.121)
for Bmax =
x˙max−|x˙i(0)|
α
> 0. This function is antisymmetric around Bmax and
−Bmax. Let τ be the first time the Brownian motion B(t) hits either of those
values. Then, by the reflection principle,
B′(t) = B(t) + 1{t≥τ}2(B(τ)−B(t)) (2.122)
is also a Brownian motion. We have
1{τ>δtmax} =
1
2
(sBmax(B(δtmax)) + sBmax(B
′(δtmax))) (2.123)
Applying the expectation operator on both sides gives
P (|B(δt)| < Bmax, 0 ≤ δt ≤ δtmax)
= E[(sBmax(B(δtmax))] (2.124)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
sBmax(b)pδtmax(b)db (2.125)
where pδtmax(b) is the density of the N(0, δtmax) Gaussian distribution. This
integral can easily be bounded by truncating the sum sBmax(b), because
|sBmax(b)| = 1 and the density pδtmax(b) is decreasing in |b|:∫ ∞
−∞
sBmax(b)pδtmax(b)db ≥
∫ Bmax
−Bmax
pδtmax(b)db− 2
∫ 3Bmax
Bmax
pδtmax(b)db
(2.126)
= 2 erf
(
Bmax√
2δtmax
)
− erf
(
3Bmax√
2δtmax
)
(2.127)
And hence
|Pξi(0)(ξi(δte[n+ 1]) ∈ A)− Pξi(0)(ξ′i(δt′e[n+ 1]) ∈ A)|
≤ 1− 2 erf
(
Bmax√
2δtmax
)
+ erf
(
3Bmax√
2δtmax
)
(2.128)
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For large real η, the following asymptotic expansion of the complementary
error function exists [70]:
erfc(η) =
e−η
2
η
√
pi
∞∑
n=0
(−1)n (2n− 1)!!
(2η2)n
(2.129)
The realistic values x˙max = 5, Ti = 10
−5, |x˙i(0)| = 2 and α = 0.1
√
Ti, yield
a η = 2.1143× 106. The corresponding error
2 erfc(η)− erfc(3η) < 10−1012 (2.130)
and is negligible.
We will now give an expression for the approximate transition probability
Pξi(0)(ξ
′
i(δt
′
e[n+ 1]) ∈ A) from the previous theorem.
Theorem 6. Assume the transmitter motion ξ′i(t) is as defined in Definition
2, the receiver motion ξl(t) is given at the times nTi and ξ
′
i(0) is the initial
condition for the motion process ξ′i(t). Let
δt′e[n+ 1] = inf
{
δt′e : Ti − δt′e =
1
c
(|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0)| . . .
− sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0))
∫ δt′e
0
x˙′i(τ)dτ − |xl(nTi)− x′i(0)|
)}
(2.131)
Then
x′i(δt
′
e[n+ 1]) = x
′
i(0) + δt
′
e[n+ 1]x˙
′
i(0)− α sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0))I ′
(2.132)
with
I ′ = −β − δt′e[n+ 1]γ (2.133)
β =
1
α
(−cTi + |xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0)| − |xl(nTi)− x′i(0)|) (2.134)
γ =
1
α
(c− sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0))x˙′i(0)) (2.135)
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and
x˙′i(δt
′
e[n+ 1]) = x˙
′
i(0)− α sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0))B′ (2.136)
The random variables δt′e[n+ 1] and B
′ have the joint distribution
Pβ,γ(δt
′
e[n+ 1] ∈ dt;B′ ∈ dz) = |z| [pt(β, γ; 0, z)−∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
m(s,−|z|, µ)pt−s(β, γ; 0,−µ)dµds
]
1R(z)dzdt (2.137)
where R = [0,∞] if β < 0, R = (−∞, 0] if β > 0,  = sgn(−β), the function
m(t, y, z) =
3z
pi
√
2t2
e−(2/t)(y
2−|y|z+z2)
(∫ 4|y|z/t
0
e−3θ/2
dθ√
piθ
)
1[0,∞](z)dzdt
(2.138)
and
pt(u, v;x, y) =
√
3
pit2
exp
[
− 6
t3
(u− x− ty)2
+
6
t2
(u− x− ty)(v − y)− 2
t
(v − y)2
]
(2.139)
Proof. First, we manipulate the equation in the definition of the hitting time
δte[n+ 1] in the theorem statement. This equation reads
Ti − δt′e =
1
c
(|xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0)| . . .
− sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0))
∫ δt′e
0
x˙′i(τ)dτ − |xl(nTi)− x′i(0)|
)
(2.140)
Note that
x˙′i(τ) = x˙
′
i(0) + αB(τ) (2.141)
and that
B′(τ) = − sgn(xl((n+ 1)Ti)− x′i(0))B(τ) (2.142)
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is again a Brownian motion. Equation 2.140 is hence equivalent to
0 = β + δt′eγ +
∫ δt′e
0
B′(τ)dτ (2.143)
and we have
δt′e[n+ 1] = inf
{
δt′e : 0 = β + δt
′
eγ +
∫ δt′e
0
B′(τ)dτ
}
(2.144)
We define the random variable B′ = B′(δte[n + 1]). The joint distribution
of the random variables δte[n+ 1] and B
′ is known [63,64,66]. The function
pt(u, v;x, y) in Equation 2.139 is the transition density of the bidimensional
process (
∫ t
0
B′(τ)dτ,B′(t)), i.e.,
P (
∫ t+s
0
B′(τ)dτ ∈ du,B′(t+ s) ∈ dv|
∫ s
0
B′(τ)dτ = x,B′(s) = y)
=pt(u, v;x, y) (2.145)
for any t, s > 0.
In summary, the above theorems show that the sampled bidimensional
process (xi(te[n]), x˙i(te[n])) is Markov in n and Theorem 6 gives an excellent
approximation of the transition kernel of this Markov chain.
The above derivations hold for the case of one-dimensional motion. We will
now discuss how these ideas can be extended to the case of three-dimensional
motion. Assume xi(t) and xl(t) denote the position of the transmitter and
receiver in three-dimensional space at time t, respectively. We associate
each coordinate of the transmitter and receiver position with an independent
integrated reflected Brownian motion (IRBM) model as defined in Definition
3. We set x˙max in this definition to be smaller than c/
√
3, so that ‖x˙i(t)‖ < c
and ‖x˙l(t)‖ < c. Then by Theorem 1, the emission times te[n] are unique and,
by a trivial extension of Theorem 3, they form a strictly increasing sequence
of stopping times. The six-dimensional processes ξi(t) = (xi(t); x˙i(t)) and
ξl(t) = (xl(t); x˙l(t)) are both Feller processes and sampling ξi(t) at t = te[n]
yields a homogeneous Markov chain assuming the receiver motion ξl(t) is
given at all times nTi. We have some ideas on how the transition kernel of
this Markov chain could be approximated but have not established bounds to
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quantify the quality of our approximations. The remainder of this section will
elaborate on these ideas. We will derive an approximation of the transition
kernel P (ξi(te[n + 1])|ξi(te[n])) given the receiver motion ξl(t) at all times
nTi.
Let again δte[n + 1] = te[n + 1] − te[n]. By the definition of the emission
times te[n],
δte[n+ 1] = inf {δte : Ti − δte = . . .
1
c
(‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n] + δte)‖ − ‖xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])‖)
}
(2.146)
or equivalently
δte[n+ 1] = inf {δte : Ti − δte = . . .
1
c
(∥∥∥∥xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])− ∫ δte
0
x˙i(te[n] + τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥ . . .
−‖xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])‖)} (2.147)
Assume V is a rotation matrix such that V (xl((n + 1)Ti) − xi(te[n])) =
e1 ‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖, where e1 is the unit vector that has all coor-
dinates set equal zero other than the first one. We denote the q-th component
of the vector V x˙i(te[n] + τ) by x˙
v
i;q(te[n] + τ). Similarly to the assumption
in Equation 2.104 in Theorem 5, we will assume that
‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖ >
√
3x˙maxδtmax (2.148)
where
δtmax = Ti
(
1 +
√
3x˙max
c
1−
√
3x˙max
c
)
(2.149)
can be shown to upper bound δte[n+ 1] by the same arguments made in the
proof of Theorem 3 for the one dimensional case. This implies that
‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖ >
∫ δte
0
x˙vi;1(te[n] + τ)dτ (2.150)
For the one-dimensional case, the proof of Theorem 5 shows that the
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transition kernel is essentially unaffected when we condition on the event
{|x˙i(te[n] + τ)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ τ ≤ δtmax}. We conjecture that an analogous
statement holds for the three-dimensional case, i.e., we conjecture that the
transition kernel P (ξi(te[n + 1])|ξi(te[n])) is essentially unaffected when we
condition on the event {|x˙i;q(te[n] + τ)| < x˙max, 0 ≤ τ ≤ δtmax, q ∈ [3]} where
we denoted the q-th component of the vector x˙i(te[n] + τ) by x˙i;q(te[n] + τ).
We will assume this condition for our derivations below. Note that we can
then write
x˙i(te[n] + τ) = x˙i(te[n]) + αB(τ) (2.151)
for some three-dimensional Brownian motion B(τ), τ ≥ 0, that is indepen-
dent of x˙i(te[n] + τ), τ ≤ 0. Due to the spherical symmetry of Brownian
motion, B′(t) = V B(t) is again a three dimensional Brownian motion.
We then have∥∥∥∥xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])− ∫ δte
0
x˙i(te[n] + τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥V (xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n]))− ∫ δte
0
V x˙i(te[n] + τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥ (2.152)
=
∥∥∥∥e1 ‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖ − ∫ δte
0
V x˙i(te[n] + τ)dτ
∥∥∥∥ (2.153)
≈
∣∣∣∣‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖ − ∫ δte
0
x˙vi;1(te[n] + τ)dτ
∣∣∣∣ (2.154)
= ‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖ −
∫ δte
0
x˙vi;1(te[n] + τ)dτ (2.155)
= ‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖ − x˙vi;1(te[n])δte − α
∫ δte
0
B′1(dτ) (2.156)
Equation 2.152 holds because V TV = I. By the far-field approximation,
we can neglect the contribution of the second and third vector component in
the argument of the norm in Equation 2.153. Equation 2.155 follows from
Inequality 2.150 and Equation 2.156 follows from Equation 2.151.
Substituting
∥∥∥xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])− ∫ δte0 x˙i(te[n] + τ)dτ∥∥∥ in the defi-
nition of the hitting time δte[n+ 1] in Equation 2.147 by the approximation
50
in Equation 2.156 gives the hitting time
δt′e[n+ 1] = inf
{
δte : Ti − δte = 1
c
(‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖ . . .
−x˙vi;1(te[n])δte − α
∫ δte
0
B′1(dτ)dτ − ‖xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])‖
)}
(2.157)
The far-field approximation above allows us to approximate δte[n + 1] by
δt′e[n + 1]. This simplifies the problem significantly and allows us to use
the machinery we have developed for the case of one-dimensional motion.
The joint distribution of δt′e[n+ 1] and B
′
1(δt
′
e[n+ 1]) is identical to the joint
distribution of δt′e[n+1] and B
′ given in Theorem 6 when xl((n+1)Ti)−x′i(0)
is set to ‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖, x˙′i(0) is set to x˙vi;1(te[n]) and |xl(nTi)−
x′i(0)| is set to ‖xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])‖. Further, by the definition of δt′e[n + 1]
in Equation 2.157,∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
B′1(dτ)dτ = α−1 (−c(Ti − δt′e[n+ 1]) + ‖xl((n+ 1)Ti)− xi(te[n])‖
. . .− x˙vi;1(te[n])δt′e[n+ 1]− ‖xl(nTi)− xi(te[n])‖
)
(2.158)
The far-field approximation we made above essentially renders the second
and third coordinate of the three-dimensional Brownian motion B′(t) inde-
pendent of δt′e[n + 1]. Given δt
′
e[n + 1], the bidimensional random vectors
(
∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
B′2(τ)dτ,B′2(δt′e[n+1])) and (
∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
B′3(τ)dτ,B′3(δt′e[n+1])) are
hence independent and distributed like (
∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
B′(τ)dτ,B′(δt′e[n + 1])) for
some independent Brownian motion B′(t). The transition probability of the
bidimensional process (
∫ t
0
B′(τ)dτ,B′(t)) is known and given in Equation
2.145 [64]. Multiplying the joint densities of these bidimensional random
vectors, we can compute the distribution
P
(∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
B′(τ)dτ ∈ du,B′(δt′e[n+ 1]) ∈ dv
)
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Since
xi(te[n+ 1]) = xi(te[n]) +
∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
x˙i(te[n] + τ)dτ (2.159)
= xi(te[n]) + x˙i(te[n])δt
′
e[n+ 1] + αV
T
∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
B′(dτ)dτ
(2.160)
and
x˙i(te[n+ 1]) = x˙i(te[n]) + αV
TB′(δt′e[n+ 1]) (2.161)
the random vector (xi(te[n + 1]); x˙i(te[n + 1])) can be obtained from the
random vector (
∫ δt′e[n+1]
0
B′(τ)dτ ;B′(δt′e[n+ 1])) by a simple affine transfor-
mation.
2.10 Bayesian State Inference
On a high level, the above sections introduced a prior distribution on all rel-
evant system states: the transmitted symbols (Equation 2.31), the channel
gains (Equation 2.36), the receiver motion (Equation 2.37) and the trans-
mitter motion (Theorem 4 and 6). Further, we defined likelihood functions
of the observable data given these states (Equation 2.34). Theoretically, this
is sufficient to deduce the a posteriori distribution of the states and hence
obtain estimates according to any given cost function. But we have found
inference to be tractable only in some special cases, where we abstain from
trying to jointly estimate all states, but instead assume that some of the
states are known. We will first look at the case of a stationary transmitter.
2.10.1 Stationary Transmitter
We assume array i rests in the origin and transmits and array l is mobile and
receives. If the transmit array has only one element, assuming our isotropic
spreading model the generated acoustic field is spherically symmetric and
the receiver cannot uniquely determine its position and orientation. In fact,
the locus of possible positions is a sphere. However, if there are at least
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three elements on the receive array and the receiver has access to a compass
and a tilt sensor, this symmetry can be broken. Accelerometers are inexpen-
sive and can determine tilt reliably. The accuracy of magnetic compasses is
compromised by a submarine’s shielding ferric hull, but gyro-compasses do
not have this problem and are well suited for this task, because they rely on
the effect of gyroscopic precession instead of the Earth’s magnetic field [71].
Measurements from inertial sensors can easily be included for state inference
as we will explain below. But for now we will assume that the transmitter
has more than three elements and hence circumvent this problem. We will
further assume that there is no multi-path and that the transmitted signals
are known.
Given these assumptions, the sampled output equations from Equation
2.34 specialize to
rl,m[n] =
∑
j,k
hi,j;l,m[n, k]e
2pi
√−1fCi(ti,j;l,m[n]−nTi)si,j(ti,j;l,m[n]− kTi) + vl,m[n]
(2.162)
where ti,j;l,m[n] can now be solved for explicitly
ti,j;l,m[n] = nTi − ||xl,m(nTi)− xi,j||
c
(2.163)
and the noise vl,m[n] is i.i.d.. We model the channel gains hi,j;l,m[n, k] as
described in Section 2.7 and model the receiver position xl(nTi) and orien-
tation θl(nTi) as described in Section 2.8. The signals si,j(t) are assumed to
be known.
Equations 2.36 and 2.37 define a linear state space system driven by Gaus-
sian noise and Equations 2.162 define non-linear output equations. Several
inference methods have been developed for such systems. The extended
Kalman filter (EKF) is popular and basically linearizes the equations around
the current estimate in each step and then applies the standard Kalman filter
equations. This algorithm is considered the de facto standard in navigation
systems and GPS [72]. When the state equations or the output equations
are highly non-linear as in Equation 2.162, the EKF can, however, give poor
performance [73].
The application of the Kalman filter to a nonlinear system requires the
computation of the first two moments of the state vector and the obser-
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vations. This problem can be viewed as a specific case of a more general
problem: the calculation of the statistics of a random vector after a non-
linear transformation. The unscented transformation attacks this problem
with a deterministic sampling technique. It determines a set of points (called
sigma points) that accurately capture the true mean and covariance of the
sampled random vector. The nonlinear transformation is then applied on
each of these points, which results in samples of the transformed random
vector and a new sample mean and covariance can be computed. It can be
shown analytically that the resulting unscented Kalman filter (UKF) is supe-
rior to the EKF but has the same computational complexity [73]. Developing
the Taylor series expansions of the posterior mean and covariance shows that
sigma points capture these moments accurately to the second order for any
nonlinearity. For the EKF, only the accuracy of the first order terms can be
guaranteed [74].
We implemented an UKF for inference on the model presented here. We
played a known signal (a 100Hz wide pulse at a center frequency of 25kHz)
from a speaker and fed the UKF with the measurements from a moving
microphone. For this simple one-dimensional setup, we verified that this
approach yields position estimates with a precision of less than a millimeter.
Inertial sensors provide additional information about the trajectory to be
tracked. Accelerometers, for example, provide noisy observations of the ac-
celeration that the sensor experiences and gyroscopes measure experienced
angular velocity. When we use such sensors on the mobile receiver, the
generated observations and measurements are easily taken into account by
adding additional output equations to the state space system describing the
position and orientation of the receiver array. This combination of sensory
data is called sensor fusion. Measurements al;k[n] of the acceleration values
x
(2)
l;k (nTi) could for example be incorporated by adding the output equations
al;k[n] = x
(2)
l;k (nTi) + uk[n] (2.164)
where uk[n] is assumed to be white Gaussian noise.
Ideally, we would like to not only track the receiver position and orienta-
tion, but also communicate data. As described in Section 2.6 we use broad-
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band transmission signals si,j(t) of the form
si,j(t) =
∑
l∈[0:N ]
si,j[l]p(t− lT ) (2.165)
In order to communicate information from the transmitter to the receiver,
we could assume some of the symbols si,j[l] to be unknown, i.i.d. random
variables with a uniform distribution over the possible constellation points
and then estimate those unknown symbols jointly with the channel attenua-
tion and motion states. However, we find joint estimation of all these states
difficult and hard to implement for several reasons.
We want the pulse p(t) to be band-limited because as discussed in Section
2.5 the channel is band-limited. But in order for p(t) to have most of its
energy in a finite band, the pulse length needs to be large and hence, for
any time t , the value of si,j(t) depends on many symbols si,j[l]. The signals
si,j(t) are sampled at the random times ti,j;l,m[n]−kTi in Equation 2.162 and
si,j(ti,j;l,m[n]− kTi) =
∑
l∈[N ]0
si,j[l]p(ti,j;l,m[n]− kTi − lT ) (2.166)
The computational complexity of the EKF or the UKF is quadratic in the
dimension of the state vector and both methods require that a state space
model for the states to be estimated is available. The only state space system
for the unknown symbols in the sequence, si,j[l], we could find is a trivial one
with very large dimensionality:
si,j[l] = si,j[l], ∀j ∈ [K] and l ∈ Su (2.167)
where the set Su contains the indices of the unknown symbols. This would
make the complexity of each EKF or UKF step quadratic in the size of Su,
which is impractical. Another idea would be to run a particle filter on this
high dimensional state space system and then to only update those indices in
Su in each step, which are in the vicinity of bti,j;l,m[n]/Ti − ke. We have not
investigated this approach further but instead focused on a low complexity
deterministic approach for joint data and channel estimation.
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2.11 Deterministic Inference
This section will describe a method that facilitates reliable communication
over the underwater acoustic channel and at the same time is computation-
ally tractable enough to allow for an implementation on modern embedded
computing platforms. For a moment we will assume that array i is mobile
and transmits while array l is stationary and receives. Array i is trivial and
only carries one transducer. Array l carries K transducers. We account for
multi-path effects but assume that the Doppler is the same on all paths.
This is a good approximation when all phantom sources are near each other,
as is the case in the long range shallow water channel for example. Since
the transmit array is assumed trivial, no index is needed to enumerate its
elements. Without loss of generality we can assume the parameters i and
l fixed. In what follows there will be no ambiguity as to which of the two
arrays we are referring to and we hence drop the indices i and j for the sake
of notational simplicity.
We send a signal s(t) of the form described in Section 2.6 and choose
the symbols s[l] from an q-ary QAM constellation. Some of these symbols
are known and used for training. Some are unknown and used for data
communication.
Under the above assumptions the demodulated received signals from Equa-
tion 2.33 simplify to
rm(t) =
∫
τ
hm(t, τ)e
2pi
√−1fC(tm(t)−τ−t)s(tm(t)− τ)dτ + vm(t) (2.168)
where m indexes the receiving transducers and the emission time tm(t) solves
the implicit equation
t− tm(t)− ||xm(t)− x(tm(t))||
c
= 0 (2.169)
The sent signal s(t) has a bandwidth of 1/T and we can hence represent the
integral in Equation 2.168 as a sum:
rm(t) =
∑
k
hm;k(t)e
2pi
√−1fC(tm(t)−t)s(tm(t)− kT ) + vm(t) (2.170)
56
where
hm;k(t) = Thm(t, kT )e
−2pi√−1fCkT (2.171)
is the demodulated and sampled kernel.
We define the sequence of arrival times t−1m [n] as the solutions to the im-
plicit equation
t−1m [n]− nT −
||xm(t−1m [n])− x(nT )||
c
= 0 (2.172)
We abbreviate x(nT ) by x[n] and the derivative of x(t) at time nT by x˙[n].
Since the receiver was assumed stationary, we can solve for t−1m (nT ) explicitly
t−1m [n] = nT +
||xm − x(nT )||
c
(2.173)
The arrival times t−1m [n] are the inverse of the function tm(t) evaluated at
the times nT . They specify when a hypothetical impulse sent from the
transmitter at time nT , would arrive at the m-th receiving transducer.
If we sample the signal from Equation 2.170 at t = t−1m [n], we get
rm(t
−1
m [n]) =
∑
k
hm;k(t
−1
m [n])e
2pi
√−1fC(nT−t−1m [n])s[n− k] + vm(t−1m [n])
(2.174)
And if we further multiply both sides of this equation by e−2pi
√−1fC(nT−t−1m [n]),
we obtain
e−2pi
√−1fC(nT−t−1m [n])rm(t−1m [n]) =
∑
k
hm[n, k]s[n− k] + vm[n] (2.175)
where hm[n, k] = hm;k(t
−1
m [n]) and vm[n] is some noise sequence.
These equations motivate a direct equalization estimator for the symbols
s[n] of the following form:
s[n] ≈ sˆn =
∑
m,k
w[n,m, k]rm(t
−1
m [n− k])e−2pi
√−1fC((n−k)T−t−1m [n−k]) (2.176)
where w[n,m, k] are the complex-valued equalizer weights. We will assume
that k ranges from −MA to MC for some positive integers MA and MC
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and that M = MA + MC + 1. To reduce the number of parameters of this
estimator, we define the function
t−1m;n,k(x[n], x˙[n]) = (n− k)T +
||xm − x[n] + kT x˙[n]||
c
(2.177)
and substitute t−1m [n−k] by t−1m;n,k(x[n], x˙[n]) in Equation 2.176. The resulting
estimator is sˆn(θ[n]), where the parameter vector θ[n] ∈ R2MK+6 is such that
its components θz[n] satisfy
θz[n] =

Re(w[n,m, k −MA]); z = 2kK + 2m− 1, k ∈ [0 :M−1],m ∈ [K]
Im(w[n,m, k −MA]); z = 2kK + 2m, k ∈ [0 :M−1],m ∈ [K]
xq[n]; z = 2MK + q, q ∈ [3]
x˙q[n]; z = 2MK + 3 + q, q ∈ [3]
(2.178)
This notation formalizes that the equalizer weights w[n,m, k −MA], k ∈ [0 :
M − 1],m ∈ [K], the position x[n] and the velocity x˙[n] are concatenated
into one real-valued parameter vector, the vector θ[n]. The function sˆn(θ)
reads
sˆn(θ) =
∑
k∈[0:M−1],m∈[K]
(
θ2kK+2m−1 +
√−1 θ2kK+2m
) · . . .
rm(t
−1
m;n,k−MA(θ2MK+[3], θ2MK+3+[3])) · . . .
e
−2pi√−1fC((n−k+MA)T−t−1m;n,k−MA (θ2MK+[3],θ2MK+3+[3])) (2.179)
We define the objective function
Ln =
1
2
(θ[0]− θˆ)TC−1(θ[0]− θˆ) +
n∑
l=0
|s[l]− sˆl(θ[l])|2σ−2s
+
1
2
n−1∑
l=0
(θ[l + 1]− Tθ[l])TQ−1(θ[l + 1]− Tθ[l]) (2.180)
for some number of known training symbols s[l], l = 0, . . . , n and choose the
parameter vector θ[n] such that
θ[n] = argmin
θ[n]
min
θ[l],l∈[0,n−1]
Ln (2.181)
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The vector θˆ is the initial guess we have about the parameter vector θ[0]
and C is a covariance matrix specifying how much confidence we have in
this guess. The scalar σ−2s is a weighting factor and the matrix Q
−1 is a
weighting matrix. The matrix T is a transition matrix with Tθ[n] specifying
an estimate of θ[n+1]. Note that we allow for some error (θ[n+1]−Tθ[n]) in
this plant model. We choose a simple transition matrix T with components
Tz,u such that
Tz,u =

1; z = u, u ∈ [2MK + 6]
T ; z = 2MK + q, u = 2MK + 3 + q, q ∈ [3]
0; otherwise
(2.182)
The 6×6 submatrix on the bottom right of T is the transition matrix for the
position x[n] and the velocity x˙[n] according to the motion model presented
in Section 2.8 for d = 2.
The extended Kalman filter is known to find an approximate solution to
the least squares problem in Equation 2.180 when run on the state space
system
θ[n+ 1] = Tθ[n] + νn+1 (2.183)
and the output equations
s[n] = sˆn(θ[n]) + vn (2.184)
for n ≥ 0 [75]. The noise values vn are independent, mean-zero, circular
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with variance σ2s . We denote
the estimate of θ[n + 1] given the symbols {s[l], l ∈ [0 : n]} by θˆ[n + 1, n].
The initial state estimate θˆ[0,−1] is a Gaussian random vector with mean θˆ
and covariance C. The random vectors νn are independent and mean-zero.
Each vector νn is Gaussian with covariance Q. The covariance matrix Q is
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chosen such that its components Qz,u satisfy
Qz,u =

σ2w; z = u, u ∈ [2MK]
σ2a
T 4
4
; z = u, u ∈ 2MK + [3]
σ2aT
2; z = u, u ∈ 2MK + 3 + [3]
σ2a
T 3
2
; z = 2MK + q, u = 2MK + 3 + q, q ∈ [3]
σ2a
T 3
2
; z = 2MK + 3 + q, u = 2MK + q, q ∈ [3]
0; otherwise
(2.185)
for some variances σ2w and σ
2
a. The 6×6 submatrix on the bottom right of Q
is the covariance matrix for the position x[n] and the velocity x˙[n] according
to the motion model presented in Section 2.8 for d = 2. The 2MK × 2MK
submatrix on the top left of Q is diagonal and hence renders the evolution
of all equalizer weights independent. The equalizer weights are assumed to
be independent of the position and velocity of the transmitter.
We perform a method akin to decision directed equalization to obtain
estimates of the symbols s[n] that are unknown and used for communication.
In total N + 1 symbols s[n] are sent. We assume the first Npre symbols
{s[l], l ∈ [0 : Npre − 1]} and also a fraction of the subsequent symbols to
be known. Let the set Su ⊂ [0 : N ] contain the indices of the unknown
symbols. We first run the extended Kalman filter on the known first Npre
symbols {s[l], l ∈ [0 : Npre − 1]} and obtain θˆ[Npre, Npre − 1]. Now if Npre ∈
Su, then we find the point in the symbol constellation A that is closest to
sˆn(θˆ[Npre, Npre − 1]) and declare that point to be s[Npre]. The operation of
mapping a complex number to its nearest constellation point is called slicing.
Now regardless of whether Npre ∈ Su, the symbol s[Npre] is available. So the
extended Kalman filter can be updated and the next prediction θˆ[Npre +
1, Npre] can be computed. Now we check again if Npre + 1 ∈ Su and, if so,
we slice sˆn(θˆ[Npre + 1, Npre]) and declare the slicer output to be the symbol
s[Npre + 1]. We iterate the Kalman update and prediction steps and the
conditional slicing operation until the last symbol s[N ] is reached. At a high
level, the estimator sˆn(θ) first resamples the received waveforms to undo
any timing distortions and then filters the resampled signal to remove any
frequency selectivity present in the channel. We hence call this estimator
a resampling equalizer (RE). Algorithm 1 describes the operation of this
equalizer in pseudocode. The function slice(·) performs the slicing operation.
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Data: The transition matrix T , the covariance matrices Q and C, the
variance σ2s and the initial estimate θˆ are given. Further, the set
Su ⊂ [0 : N ] and the values of s[n] for n /∈ Su are given.
Result: The sequence of symbol estimates sˆn, n ∈ [0, N ], and the sequence
of hard decisions s¯n, n ∈ [0, N ].
% initialization:
P = C;
for n = [0 : N ] do
sˆn = sˆn(θˆ);
if n ∈ Su then
s¯n = slice(sˆn);
else
s¯n = s[n];
end
compute g ∈ C1×2MK+6, the numerical approximation to the gradient
∂sˆn(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θˆ
;
% perform Kalman update step:
e = s¯n − sˆn;
S = [Re(g); Im(g)]P [Re(g); Im(g)]T + 1
2
σ2sI;
K = P [Re(g); Im(g)]TS−1;
θˆ = θˆ +K[Re(e); Im(e)];
P = (I −K[Re(g); Im(g)])P ;
% perform Kalman prediction step:
θˆ = T θˆ;
P = TPT T +Q;
end
Algorithm 1: The operation of the resampling equalizer (RE).
The extended Kalman filter requires the values of the partial derivatives ∂sˆn(θ)
∂θ
evaluated at θˆ[n, n − 1], n ∈ [0 : N ]. We approximate these numerically as
shown in Algorithm 2.
Of course, it is not guaranteed that the slicer actually recovers the original
symbol each time. The rate at which the slicer misses is called the symbol
error rate (SER). We have found in our experiments that as long as the
SER is below 20%, the Kalman filter remains stable. Each of the unknown
QAM symbols {s[l], l ∈ Su} corresponds to a bit pattern. The receiver maps
the sliced symbols back to their corresponding bit pattern and ideally the
resulting bit sequence agrees with the bit sequence that was sent originally. In
most cases, however, there will be bit errors and the rate at which these occur
is called the bit error rate (BER). If the BER at the equalizer output is too
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Data: The state vector θˆ is given. The constants , δ > 0 are some small
real numbers.
Result: The vector g ∈ C1×2MK+6 which approximates the gradient ∂sˆn(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θˆ
.
% initialization:
g = 01×2MK+6;
for k = [0 : M − 1] do
for m = [K] do
g2kK+2m−1 = rm(t−1m;n,k−MA(θ2MK+[3], θ2MK+3+[3])) · . . .
e
−2pi√−1fC((n−k+MA)T−t−1m;n,k−MA (θ2MK+[3],θ2MK+3+[3]));
g2kK+2m =
√−1 g2kK+2m−1;
end
end
θˆ
+
= θˆ;
for q = [3] do
θˆ+2MK+q = θˆ
+
2MK+q + ;
g2MK+q = (sˆn(θˆ
+
)− sˆn(θˆ))/;
θˆ+2MK+q = θˆ2MK+q;
θˆ+2MK+3+q = θˆ
+
2MK+3+q + δ;
g2MK+3+q = (sˆn(θˆ
+
)− sˆn(θˆ))/δ;
θˆ+2MK+3+q = θˆ2MK+3+q;
end
Algorithm 2: Numerical approximation of ∂sˆn(θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣
θˆ
.
high for a given application, channel coding can be used at the transmitter to
reduce the BER at the expense of the rate the sequence of information bits
is transmitted [76–78]. Channel coding adds redundancy to the sequence of
information bits that is to be communicated. The enlarged bit sequence is
mapped to QAM symbols. These symbols are unknown at the receiver and
we call them information symbols. Our equalizer needs training, before any
unknown symbols can be estimated, and we hence add in some known QAM
symbols into this stream of information symbols. The resulting sequence
carries information symbols at the indices n ∈ Su and known symbols at the
other indices. At the receiver, the bit stream from the slicer output is fed
into a channel decoder that uses the added redundancy to reduce the BER on
the sequence of sent information bits. The required amount of redundancy
depends on the equalizer output BER and the maximal permissible BER
62
on the sequence of information bits. BER performance can be improved
significantly if the equalizer and the channel decoder collaborate. There
is vast literature on the field of iterative equalization and decoding (also
known as turbo equalization) that describes how this collaboration should
be furnished [79–84]. For these results to apply, the equalizer needs to be
capable of leveraging soft information from the decoder and further needs
to produce soft output instead of sliced hard decisions. There are standard
methods available to extend direct equalizers like the one we introduced in
this section so they fit this bill [81,82,85] and we refer to the given references
for the details. When used in the setting of turbo equalization, we refer to
our equalizer as a turbo resampling equalizer (TRE).
Let x[n+1, n] and x˙[n+1, n] denote the position estimate θˆ2MK+[3][n+1, n]
and the velocity estimate θˆ2MK+3+[3][n+1, n], respectively. In our simulations
and experiments, we found that, in order for the Kalman filter to converge,
the initial estimates of the transmitter position x[0,−1] and velocity x˙[0,−1]
must be accurate enough such that t−1m;0,0(x[0,−1], x˙[0,−1]) deviates from
t−1m;0,0(x[0], x˙[0]) by at most about one symbol period T , for all m ∈ [K]. The
trilateration method can be used to obtain estimates of x[0] and x˙[0] [86].
We transmit two chirps before any QAM symbols are sent and then measure
when each of these two chirps arrives at the receive transducers. Trilateration
computes two estimates of the transmitter position from these arrival time
measurements - one estimate for each transmitted chirp [86]. If we assume
that the first chirp was sent at time t = tC1 and that the second chirp was sent
at a later time t = tC2, then this method obtains estimates of the positions
x(tC1) and x(tC2). The difference quotient (x(tC2)− x(tC1)) /(tC2 − tC1)
gives the average velocity between the two times t = tC1 and t = tC2. We set
x˙[0,−1] equal to this average velocity and further set x[0,−1] = x(tC2) −
tC2x˙[0,−1].
For the derivation above we had assumed that the receiver array is station-
ary. If this assumption does not hold, we still use the introduced equalizer
for communication and accept that the states x[n] and x˙[n] no longer corre-
spond to the position and velocity of the transmitter with respect to a fixed
Cartesian frame of reference.
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Figure 2.11: MACE10 Transmission Map Day 177.
2.12 Experimental Results
Our turbo resampling equalizer (TRE) has demonstrated unprecedented com-
munication performance in US Navy sponsored field tests and simulations.
Some of our real data stems from the Mobile Acoustic Communications Ex-
periment (MACE) conducted in June 2010 about 100 km south of Martha’s
Vineyard, MA. The depth at the site is approximately 100 m. A mobile V-fin
with an array of transmit projectors attached was towed along a “race track”
course approximately 3.8 km long and 600m wide. The maximum tow speed
was 3 knot (1.5 m/s) and the tow depth varied between 30 and 60 m. The
receive hydrophone array was moored at a depth of 50 m. Figure 2.11 shows
a map centered around the location of the hydrophone array.
The red stars indicate the location of the projector array during the trans-
missions on day 177. The range between the transmit and receive array
varied between 2.7km and 7.2km. The weather was good throughout the 4
day experiment. Wednesday, June 23, was foggy and warm. The winds were
calm. The signal transmission started on Thursday (day 175). The winds
picked up to 10.6 m/s that day but laid down again Friday and Saturday.
One projector was used for signal emission and 2 hydrophones were used
for reception. We employed a rate 1/2, (131, 171) RSC code and puncturing
to obtain an effective code rate of 2/3. Blocks of 19800 bits were generated,
interleaved, and mapped to 16-QAM symbols. The carrier frequency was 13
kHz. The receive sampling rate was 39.0625 k samples/second. Data was
transmitted at a symbol rate of 9.765625 k symbols/second. Taking into
account the 10% overhead from equalizer training, we achieved a net data
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rate of 23.438kbps. At a distance of 2.7km the equalizer output BER was
below 10−6 and the overhead from equalizer training was 1%. The net data
rate hence increased to about 39kbps A raised cosine filter with a roll-off
factor 0.2 was used in both the transmitter and the receiver. Two chirps at
the beginning of the data transmission and the measurement of their time
dilation are used to find initial values for the transmitter velocity.
Figures 2.12, 2.13 and 2.14 summarize the bit error rate (BER) perfor-
mance of our receiver on the MACE 2010 data set. Zero is displayed as
10−10 in the BER plots. For all transmissions our receiver converged to the
right code word after two or less cycles. Figure 2.15 shows that the projected
speed between transmitter and receiver fluctuated significantly giving rise to
highly time-varying Doppler. Due to the shallow water at the experiment
site, the channel exhibited severe multi-path as illustrated in Figure 2.16.
Since our interaction and discussions with the subsea oil and gas industry,
we have begun to focus on communication over shorter distances while scaling
up bandwidth and data rate. On our campus, in a 1.22m×1.83m×49m wave-
tank, we have begun to experiment with a set of ITC-1089D transducers,
which have around 200kHz of bandwidth at a center frequency of around
300kHz. We recently achieved 1.2Mbps over a distance of 12m using this
experimental setup. A 64-QAM constellation was employed and the equalizer
output BER was about 10−3. In a smaller tank, we reached rates of 100Mbps
over distances of less than 1m. For this experiment, we repurposed high
frequency ultrasound transducers with a bandwidth of 20MHz and a center
frequency of 20MHz and again transmitted 64-QAM symbols. The BER at
the equalizer output was about 2× 10−2.
Table 2.1 compares the performance of our TRE method with compet-
ing approaches both from academia and industry. Speed values are maxi-
mum values with BER < 10−9. The LinkQuest modem is representative of
commercially available acoustic modems. The LinkQuest modem uses some
proprietary spread spectrum (SS) method for communication. The WHOI
modem uses frequency shift keying (FSK) for its robust 80bps mode. Both
of these methods handle motion well but only provide damn low data rates.
For their high data rate experiments, WHOI uses a combination of a phase-
locked loop and standard linear decision feedback equalization (DFE) as de-
vised in [33]. This method yields higher data rates than their FSK method
but requires both transmitter and receiver to be near stationary. The at-sea
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Figure 2.12: MACE10 Evaluation Day 175.
66
177.13 177.14 177.15 177.16 177.17 177.18 177.19 177.2 177.21 177.22 177.23
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
W
in
d
S
p
e
e
d
[i
n
m
/s
]
177.13 177.14 177.15 177.16 177.17 177.18 177.19 177.2 177.21 177.22 177.23
2
4
6
8
D
is
ta
n
c
e
[i
n
k
m
]
177.13 177.14 177.15 177.16 177.17 177.18 177.19 177.2 177.21 177.22 177.23
10
15
20
In
p
u
t
S
N
R
[i
n
d
B
]
177.13 177.14 177.15 177.16 177.17 177.18 177.19 177.2 177.21 177.22 177.23
−2
−1
0
1
2
S
p
e
e
d
[i
n
m
/s
]
SpeedOver Ground
Projected Speed
Projected Speed Estimate
177.13 177.14 177.15 177.16 177.17 177.18 177.19 177.2 177.21 177.22 177.23
10
−10
10
−8
10
−6
10
−4
10
−2
10
0
Time [in days]
B
E
R
1st Turbo Cycle
2nd Turbo Cycle
Figure 2.13: MACE10 Evaluation Day 177.
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Figure 2.14: MACE10 Evaluation Day 178.
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Figure 2.15: Speed as estimated by our Doppler compensator during an
example MACE10 transmission.
Table 2.1: Performance of different underwater communication methods in
past field-tests.
Team Data Rate Range Speed Power Method
LinkQuest 80bps 4km > 1.5m/s 48W SS
MIT/WHOI 80bps 4km > 1.5m/s 50W FH-FSK
MIT/WHOI 2.5kbps 1km < 0.05m/s 50W DFE
MIT/WHOI 150kbps 9m 0m/s ∼ 10W DFE
Our Team 23.4kbps > 7.2km > 1.5m/s 15W TRE
Our Team 39kbps 2.7km > 1.5m/s 15W TRE
Our Team 1.2Mbps 12m > 1.5m/s 0.33W TRE
Our Team 100Mbps < 1m 0m/s 1W TRE
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experiments in [33] show that at a carrier frequency of 15kHz this method
tolerates phase variations up to about 2rad/s which corresponds to a speed
of only 0.0318m/s. Our TRE method is robust to all levels of Doppler that
we were able to simulate in laboratory experiments and at-sea tests so far
(> 1.5m/s) and still reliably obtains the highest data rates ever recorded for
acoustic underwater communication. The ultrasound equipment we used for
our 100Mbps experiment did not allow the transmitter or receiver to move
so only the stationary case could be tested.
2.13 Conclusions
Current wireless underwater modems suffer a significant performance degra-
dation when communication platforms are mobile and Doppler effects corrupt
the transmitted signals. FSK can be made to be robust to Doppler effects but
then uses the available time and frequency resources rather inefficiently and
typically only obtains a data rate of 80bps. Coherent communication has
the potential to significantly improve data rate and bandwidth efficiency.
Existing approaches, however, only work if the Doppler variation is suffi-
ciently small and roughly constant for the duration of a block. In our work,
time-varying Doppler is explicitly modeled, tracked and compensated. We
propose to resample the received waveforms non-uniformly and adapt the
sampling rate on-the-fly. The resulting signals are then filtered to remove
any intersymbol interference caused by time dispersion and multi-path ef-
fects. Integrated into an iterative turbo equalization based receiver, this
novel resampling equalizer has demonstrated unprecedented communication
performance in US Navy sponsored field tests and simulations. We achieved
a data rate of 39kbps at a distance of 2.7km and a data rate of 1.2Mbps at
a distance of 12m. The latter link is capable of streaming video in real-time,
a first in wireless underwater communication.
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CHAPTER 3
FINITE BLOCK-LENGTH ACHIEVABLE
RATES FOR QUEUING TIMING
CHANNELS
3.1 Introduction
While most communication systems convey information by controlling the
amplitudes of signals at each time instant, information can also be sent by
controlling the timing at which events occur. For example it is widely believed
that neurons exchange information by sending spike trains [87], where infor-
mation is contained in the random lengths of the interspike intervals. Another
example is packet switching networks, where forwarding moves packets from
their source toward their ultimate destination. The sources can choose when
to send packets, but a queuing mechanism in the forwarding nodes obscures
the timing information.
The landmark paper “Bits through Queues” [88] characterizes such chan-
nels. Suppose the “packets” are identical and only their arrival time carries
information. The times at which the sender puts packets on the network
Enc Queue Dec
Figure 3.1: Conveying information through packet timings in a queueing
system.
encodes a message as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The packets go through a
first-come, first-serve single-server queue with exponential service times. The
decoder observes when the packets depart from the queue and then chooses
one of the possible messages. For an arrival process constrained to be of
rate λ packets per second, it was demonstrated [88] that for an exponential
service time distribution of rate µ > λ the capacity C(λ) is given by
C(λ) = λ log2
µ
λ
nats/s
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A point process viewpoint version of the problem with the same fundamental
limits was considered in [89, 90]. Rather than considering n inter-arrival
times and n inter-departure times of the queue, the time axis was fixed to be
[0, Tn] at the encoder and [0, Tn] at the decoder. In [91], Bedekar and Azizoglu
considered a discrete time analog to the continuous-time model studied in [88]
where packets arrive to and depart from a discrete-time single-server queue
with i.i.d. geometrically distributed service times. For an arrival process
constrained to be of rate λ packets per time slot, it was demonstrated [91]
that for a queue with service times of rate µ > λ the capacity C(λ) is given
by
C(λ) = H(λ)− λ
µ
H(µ) nats/slot
where H(·) denotes the binary entropy function.
The timing channels with memoryless service times (i.e. exponential in
the continuous case and geometric in the discrete case) are known to be
the simplest, and in some sense canonical, queuing timing channels. This
chapter focuses on the discrete time model with memoryless service times
and discusses the maximal achievable rate of communication when there is
a practical finite-length restriction on the codewords.
When each codeword corresponds to the timing of packets in n time units
and the probability of error may not exceed , the maximal achievable rate
can be substantially less than capacity. By using Markov chain analysis,
we prove a lower bound on the maximal channel coding rate achievable at
blocklength n and error probability . We shall show that the maximal
channel coding rate is lower bounded by
C(λ)− n−1/2σQ−1()− log n
2n
+O(n−1)
where C(λ) is the channel capacity whose closed form expression is given
above, Q(·) denotes the Q-function and σ2 is the asymptotic variance of the
underlying Markov chain for which we give a closed form expression below.
Dropping the last two terms in this expression yields a good approximation
which in turn can be used to anticipate the achievable rate on this channel
in the finite block length regime.
Asymptotic bounds on the maximal channel coding rate were studied ex-
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tensively in the 1960s for the case of memoryless channels [92–94]. Wolfowitz
introduced hypothesis testing to information theory in [95]. Strassen built on
his results in [94], where he combined hypothesis testing arguments (Neyman-
Pearson lemma), Feinstein’s lemma [96] and bounds on the convergence rate
of the central limit theorem [97, 98] to give the strongest result to date. At
the time non-asymptotic bounds were constructed in [95, 96, 99]. Recently,
this research has been readdressed for memoryless channels [100] and new
non-asymptotic bounds were derived in [101]. Strassen’s asymptotic expan-
sion gives very accurate estimates when compared to the tightest bounds
available [101].
The queuing timing channel considered here has memory and previous
results therefore do not apply. We show that the bound provided by the
Berry-Esseen theorem in the memoryless channel case still holds and then
prove the asymptotic result above by use of Feinstein’s lemma. Further,
as mentioned before, we obtain a closed form expression for the asymptotic
variance σ2. Finding such an expression for a given Markov chain is generally
hard and significant research in the area of steady-state stochastic simulation
[102, 103] yields a closed form solution only for the class of homogeneous
birth-death processes.
3.2 Basic Definitions and Conventions
• For x ∈ [0, 1], denote x¯ , 1− x.
• Denote Bern(p) to be the Bernoulli distribution with parameter p.
• Denote the binary entropy function H(p) = −p log p− p¯ log p¯.
• X denotes a random variable, E[X] denotes an expectation, and x
denotes a realization.
• x denotes a vector (x1, x2, ..., xn).
• A random process Φ = (Φ1, Φ2, . . .) on a probability space (Ω,F , P ) is
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a Markov process if for any n,
P (Φ1 ∈ A1, Φ2 ∈ A2, . . . , Φn ∈ An)
= P (Φ1 ∈ A1)
n∏
i=2
P (Φi ∈ Ai|Φi−1 ∈ Ai−1).
• Z is the set of all integers and Z+ = {z ∈ Z : z ≥ 0}.
• Denote [n]j = {j, . . . , n} with [n] ≡ [n]1.
• Denote Xn to be the sequence of counting functions on [n]0, i.e. the set
of functions x0, . . . , xn for which xi ∈ Z+ and xi ≥ xi−1. Denote Yn to
be the set of counting functions y on [n]0 for which y0 = 0.
• For a sequence of input sets and output sets {Xn,Yn : n ≥ 1}, a channel
is a a sequence of conditional distributions {PY n|Xn(·|xn) : xn ∈ Xn, n ≥
1}.
• Given a distribution PXn on Xn and channel PY n|Xn(·|xn), denote PY n
as the induced output distribution.
• Denote the information density as i(xn,yn) , log PY n|Xn (yn|xn)
PY n (yn)
.
• For any  ∈ (0, 1), an (M,n, ) code is a sequence {(x(i),D(i)), i =
1, . . . ,M} where x(i) ∈ Xn and {D(i)} are mutually disjoint with
P (D(i)|x(i)) > 1−  ∀i.
• The rate of an (M,n, ) code is denoted by R = logM
n
.
• Borrowing notation from [94, 95], N(, n, λ) denotes the supremum of
the integers M such that an (M,n, )-code exists and E[Xn/n] = λ.
• Denote the rate-constrained capacity as
C(λ) , lim→0 limn→∞ logN(,n,λ)n .
• We drop subscripts whenever they are clear from the context. For
example PY n|Xn(yn|xn) = P (yn|xn).
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3.3 System Description and Preliminaries
Throughout this document, we consider a discrete-time point process version
of the problem, analogous to [89, 90]. The communication channel we con-
sider is an interesting example of a channel with memory. It is essentially a
probabilistic single server queuing system with the length of the queue being
the memory of channel. At each discrete time instance i, the random variable
X˜i, i ∈ [n − 1], indicates if there was an arrival at the back of the queue at
time i, and Y˜i indicates if there was a departure from the front of the queue at
time i. Further, Xi (Yi) counts the total number of arrivals (departures), Qi
denotes the length of the queue at time i, and the initial length of the queue
Q0 ≡ X0 is a non-negative integer-valued random variable with distribution
PQ0 = PX0 . Then note that we have
Xi = Q0 +
i∑
l=1
X˜l (3.1)
Yi = 0 +
i∑
l=1
Y˜l (3.2)
Qi = Q0 +Xi − Yi−1 = Qi−1 + X˜i − Y˜i−1 (3.3)
This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. Note that there is a bijection between
(Q0, X˜1, . . . , X˜n) and the channel input, X
n , (X0, X1, . . . , Xn). For ge-
ometrically distributed service times, the binary random variables Y˜i are
conditionally independent given Qi and are distributed according to the con-
ditional law pertaining to a Z channel
PY˜i|Qi(Y˜i|Qi) =

1; Y˜i = 0, Qi = 0
µ¯; Y˜i = 0, Qi > 0
0; Y˜i = 1, Qi = 0
µ; Y˜i = 1, Qi > 0
(3.4)
The vector Y n ∈ Yn is the channel output vector and there is a bijection
between Y n ∈ Yn and (Y˜i : i ∈ [n]). With this the channel law reads
P (yn|xn) =
n−1∏
i=0
P (y˜i|qi) (3.5)
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− Yi−1
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Figure 3.2: A simple time-invariant description of the queuing timing
channel.
We assume the queue to be stable and hence the arrival rate λ = E[Xn]
n
to
be smaller than the serving rate µ. We now state the following theorem:
Theorem 7. [91]: For the queueing timing channel of rate µ given by (3.5),
C(λ) = H(λ)− λ
µ
H(µ) (3.6)
The optimal P ∗Xn is given by X˜i drawn i.i.d. with Bern(λ) distribution and
Q0 independently drawn with piQ given by
piQ(q) =
{
λ¯µ−λµ¯
µ
; q = 0
λ¯µ−λµ¯
µ¯µ
ρq; q > 0
(3.7)
where ρ , λµ¯
λ¯µ
.
Note that ρ < 1 if and only if λ < µ. We will also exploit how under P ∗Xn ,
the output Y˜i’s are i.i.d.:
Theorem 8. (Burke’s Theorem) For any n, for the channel given by (3.5)
and PXn = P
∗
Xn given in Theorem 7, the outputs Y˜i’s are i.i.d. with Bern(λ)
distribution.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for continuous time queues and can be
found in [104].
Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we assume that PXn = P
∗
Xn .
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By the above theorem
P (yn) =
n−1∏
i=0
P (y˜i) (3.8)
It is also well-known from Burke’s theorem that under P ∗Xn , the (Qi : i ≥ 0)
form a Markov chain and likewise for the random process
(
(Qi, Y˜i) : i ≥ 0
)
.
The transition probabilities for the Markov chain pertaining to (Qi : i ≥ 0)
are given by
PQi+1|Qi(qi+1|qi) =

λ; qi+1 = qi + 1, qi = 0
λ¯; qi+1 = qi, qi = 0
λ¯µ; qi+1 = qi − 1, qi > 0
λµ¯; qi+1 = qi + 1, qi > 0
1− λµ¯− λ¯µ; qi+1 = qi, qi > 0
(3.9)
If and only if λ < µ, there exists a probability measure piQ on N0 that solves
the system of equations∑
qi∈N0
piQ(qi)PQi+1|Qi(qi+1|qi) = piQ(qi+1) (3.10)
for all qi+1 ∈ N0 and this measure is called the invariant measure. Note that
for irreducible Markov chains the existence of such a probability measure is
equivalent to positive recurrence. For the transition probabilities given it can
be checked that piQ(qi) as defined in Theorem 7 is the solution.
The following lemma uses arguments introduced by Feinstein [96] to give
a lower bound on N(, n, λ).
Lemma 2. (Feinstein) For any distribution PXn and any θ ∈ R there exists
an (M,n, ) code such that
M ≥ eθ {− P (i(xn,yn) ≤ θ)} (3.11)
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3.4 Finite-Length Scaling
Recall that by (3.5) and (3.8) the distributions P (yn|xn) and P (yn) factor
and hence
i(xn,yn) =
n−1∑
i=0
log
P (y˜i|qi)
P (y˜i)
=
n−1∑
i=0
f(y˜i, qi) (3.12)
where
f(y˜i, qi) , log
P (y˜i|qi)
P (y˜i)
(3.13)
The composed state ψi = (y˜i, qi) again forms a positive recurrent Markov
chain whose transition probabilities are illustrated in Figure 3.3. The invari-
q= 0, y˜ = 0
q= 1, y˜ = 0
q= 2, y˜ = 0
q= 1, y˜ = 1
q= 2, y˜ = 1
λ¯µ¯
λ¯µ¯
λ¯µ¯
λ¯µ¯
λµ¯
λµ¯
λµ¯
λµ¯
λµ¯
λ¯
λ¯
λµ
λµ
λµ
λµ
λµ
λ¯µ
λ¯µ
λ¯µ
λ¯µ
Figure 3.3: Possible transitions in the Markov chain (Y˜ , Q).
ant measure piΨ for this chain is only a slight extension to piQ:
piΨ (y˜, q) = PY˜i|Qi(y˜|q)piQ(q) (3.14)
The proof of the following theorem is one of the main contributions of this
chapter because it can be used to proof an asymptotic expansion of the
quantity N(, n, λ).
Theorem 9. The asymptotic variance
σ2 = lim
n→∞
1
n
Var(i(xn,yn)) (3.15)
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is well defined, positive and finite, and
σ2 = Var(f(Ψ0)) + 2
∞∑
i=1
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) (3.16)
Further the following Berry-Esseen type bound holds:
sup
ξ∈R
∣∣∣∣P (i(xn,yn)− nC(λ)σ√n ≤ ξ
)
− Φ(ξ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ O(n−1/2) (3.17)
Proof. A detailed proof can be found in the appendix. We only give a sketch
here. The Markov chain Ψ is aperiodic and irreducible. The state space of
Ψi can be chosen to be X = {0, 1} × N ∪ {(0, 0)}. First we verify that there
exists a Lyapunov function V : X → (0,∞], finite at some ψ0 ∈ X, a finite
set S ⊂ X, and b <∞ such that
E[V (Ψi+1)− V (Ψi)|Ψi = ψ] ≤ −1 + b1S(ψ), ψ ∈ X (3.18)
The chain is skip-free and the found Lyapunov function is linear and hence
also Lipschitz. These properties imply that the chain is geometric ergodic
[105, 106] and the bound in (3.17) hence holds by arguments made in [107].
Another approach towards proofing Berry-Esseen type bounds for Markov
chains is to verify a mixing condition but the resulting bounds are weaker
[108].
Remark 2. An explicit solution to the asymptotic variance of a general
irreducible positive recurrent Markov chain is not available.
Significant research in the area of steady-state stochastic simulation has
focused on obtaining an expression for the asymptotic variance [102,103] and
has yielded a closed form solution only for the class of homogeneous birth-
death processes when f(ψi) simply returns the integer valued state itself.
We build upon an idea introduced in [109] to give an explicit closed form
solution to the asymptotic variance in (3.15).
Theorem 10. The asymptotic variance defined in (3.15) has a closed form
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solution:
σ2 = −Var(f(Ψ0)) + 2
∞∑
i=0
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) (3.19)
where
Var(f(Ψ0)) = log
2(
1
λ¯
)piQ(0) + log
2(
µ
λ
)µpiQ(0)
+ log2(
µ¯
λ¯
)µ¯piQ(0)− C2 (3.20)
∞∑
i=0
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) = log
1
λ¯
(−cM˜
ρ
1− ρ − cM0ρ)
+ log
µ
λ
cM0
ρ
1− ρ + log
µ¯
λ¯
ρ
1− ρ(cM˜ − ρcM0) (3.21)
and we define
cM0 =
λ¯
µ¯
(
µ log(
µ
λ
) + µ¯ log(
µ¯
λ¯
)− C
)
(3.22)
cM˜ =
{
cM0
µ
+ (C − log µ
λ
)
piQ(0)
µ¯
}
(3.23)
Proof. Again we only sketch the proof here and refer to the appendix for a
detailed version. For the computation of the sum
∑∞
i=0 Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) we
will setup and solve a recursion.
We define
r(ψ, i) =
∑
ψ′∈X
(f(ψ′)− C)piΨ (ψ′)pΨi|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′) (3.24)
Clearly
r(ψ, 0) = (f(ψ)− C)piΨ (ψ) (3.25)
and
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) =
∑
ψ∈X
(f(ψ)− C)r(ψ, i) (3.26)
=
∑
ψ∈X
f(ψ)r(ψ, i) (3.27)
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Note, however, that for the computation of the asymptotic variance we ac-
tually do not even need to know this covariance for each i. It is sufficient to
know its sum. So we define
R(ψ) =
∞∑
i=0
r(ψ, i) (3.28)
exchange limits
∞∑
i=0
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) =
∑
ψ∈X
f(ψ)R(ψ) (3.29)
and derive and solve a recursion for the sequence R(ψ).
Using the result stated in Theorem 9 we can prove the final contribution
of this chapter:
Theorem 11.
logN(n, , λ) ≥ nC(λ)−√nσQ−1()− 1
2
log n+O(1) (3.30)
where C(λ) is given by (3.6) and σ is defined as in Theorem 9.
Proof. By Theorem 9 ∃A > 0 :
|P ((i(x,y)− nC)/
√
nσ2 ≤ ξ1)− Φ(ξ1)| ≤ A√
n
∀ξ1 ∈ R (3.31)
Let B > A and ξ1 = Φ
−1( − B√
n
) < Φ−1() = ξ0. Set θ =
√
nσξ1 + nC and
the application of Feinstein’s Lemma [96,110] yields
logN(n, , λ)− nC −√nσξ0
≥ log
(
− P
(
i(x,y)− nC√
nσ
≤ ξ1
))
+
√
nσ(ξ1 − ξ0) (3.32)
≥ log
(
− Φ(ξ1)− A√
n
)
+
√
nσO(
1√
n
) (3.33)
Remark 3. We believe that the above result can be strengthened by dropping
the term 1
2
log n from the right hand side of the inequality. By use of hypothe-
sis testing arguments Strassen [94] was able to prove the above bound without
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the 1
2
log n term for the class of discrete memoryless channels. The used ar-
guments can probably be extended to hold for the non-memoryless channel
considered here as well since the information density factors and by Theorem
9 a Berry-Esseen type bound holds.
Theorem 11 confirms that C(λ) is the operational capacity of the chan-
nel and any rate R < C(λ) is achievable. For illustration we plotted the
approximation
C(λ)− n−1/2σQ−1() (3.34)
to the achievable coding rate for blocklengths ranging between 50 and 3000,
various values for  and the example values λ = 0.2, µ = 0.8 in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Channel coding rate in the finite block-length regime.
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CHAPTER 4
CAN YOU HEAR MY VOICE NOW? IP
OVER VOICE-OVER-IP FOR
CENSORSHIP CIRCUMVENTION
4.1 Introduction
The Internet is playing an ever-increasing role in connecting people from
across the world, facilitating the free circulation of speech, ideas and infor-
mation. This poses serious threats to repressive regimes as it elevates their
citizens’ awareness and provides them a powerful medium to arrange coor-
dinated opposition movements. The recent unrest in the Middle East [111]
demonstrates the very strong power of the Internet in arranging nation-wide
protests that, in several cases, resulted in revolutionizing or even overthrow-
ing repressive regimes. In response to such threats, repressive regimes make
use of different technologies to restrict and monitor their citizens’ access to
the Internet; i.e., they censor the Internet. Censorship devices leverage var-
ious techniques [112,113] ranging from simple IP address blocking and DNS
hijacking to the more complicated and resource-intensive deep packet inspec-
tion (DPI) in order to enforce their blocking and monitoring. Citizens iden-
tified as non-complying with the censors’ restrictions can face different con-
sequences ranging from Internet service disruption to severe life-threatening
punishments [114].
To help censored users gain open access to the Internet, different systems
and technologies have been designed and developed [115–121], generally re-
ferred to as censorship circumvention tools. These systems are composed
of computer and networking technologies that allow Internet users to evade
monitoring, blocking, and tracing of their activities. We observe that the
biggest challenge facing the existing circumvention systems is the lack of “un-
observability”: while these systems can, under certain conditions, circumvent
censorship they are not effectively able to hide the fact that their users are
making use of them [115–119]. For instance, the Tor [118] anonymity net-
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work is not able to effectively evade censorship as a censor can block all
of the publicly advertised IP addresses of Tor relays. This has two major
consequences: first, users caught (by censors) leveraging these circumvention
systems may face various punishments such as imprisoning. Second, and
even more catastrophic, this lack of unobservability usually leads to the lack
of availability ; i.e., circumvention systems with observable communication
are easily blocked by censors. Censors proactively [122] look for Internet ser-
vices that help with censorship circumvention and either block any access to
them by their citizens, or leave them (partially) open to identify their users.
In particular, censors rigorously look for IP addresses belonging to circum-
vention technologies (e.g., HTTP/SOCKS proxies) and add them to the IP
blacklists maintained by their censoring firewalls [112, 123]. Consequently,
citizens under repressive regimes often find it difficult to access the existing
circumvention systems. For instance, the popular Tor network has frequently
been/is blocked by several repressive regimes [122,124].
To provide unobservable circumvention, different approaches have been
taken by the research community. Several systems [115, 117, 125] provide
unobservability by pre-sharing secrets with their intended clients. The Tor
system, for instance, has recently deployed Tor bridges [125], which are volun-
teer proxies whose IP addresses are distributed among Tor users in a selective
manner. This makes Tor bridges less prone to be identified by censors, as
compared to the publicly-advertised Tor entry nodes; however, there are se-
rious challenges in distributing their IP addresses among users [126,127]. In
a similar manner, Infranet [115] and Collage [117] aim for unobservability
by pre-sharing some secret information with their users. This, however, is
neither scalable nor effective as it is challenging to share secrets with a large
number of real users, while keeping them secret from censors at the same
time [128–130].
As another approach to provide unobservability, several systems use vari-
ous obfuscation techniques. For instance, Ultrasurf [131] and Psiphon [132]
try to confuse content filtering tools by obfuscating their design and traffic
patterns. Such obfuscation, however, jeopardizes users’ security, as analyzed
in a recent study [133]. Appelbaum et al. propose pluggable transports [134]
for Tor, a platform that allows one to build protocol-level obfuscation plugins
for Tor traffic. These plugins obfuscate a Tor client’s traffic to Tor bridges
by shaping it to look like another protocol that is allowed by censors. Obf-
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sproxy [135] is the first Tor pluggable transport. It adds an additional layer
of encryption to Tor traffic to obfuscate Tor’s content identifiers, like the
TLS parameters; however, it does not remove Tor’s statistical patterns like
packet timings and sizes. Murdoch et al. [136] mention several weaknesses
for obfsproxy, including being susceptible to either an active or passive at-
tacker who has recorded the initial key exchange. StegoTorus [137] provides
better unblockability, but comes with a much higher overhead [136]. Skype-
Morph [138] morphs Tor traffic into Skype video calls in order to make it
undetectable against deep-packet inspection and statistical analysis. The
common issue with the aforementioned traffic obfuscation techniques is that
they only obfuscate communication patterns, but not the end-hosts. In other
words, while a censor may find it hard to detect the obfuscated traffic using
traffic analysis, it will be able to identify the end-hosts that obfuscate the traf-
fic through other active/passive attacks, e.g., SkypeMorph and StegoTorus
relays can be enumerated using prevalent port knocking techniques [122,139],
zig-zag [140] attack, and insider attack [141]. Once the identity of a circum-
venting end-host is known to a censor, the unobservability is completely lost
and the end-host is easily blocked by the censor. CensorSpoofer [141] is an-
other recent proposal that performs traffic obfuscation by mimicking VoIP
traffic. Like most of the other designs noted above, CensorSpoofer needs to
pre-share some secret information with the clients, posing a scalability chal-
lenge. In addition, it requires a usable upstream channel for its operation
since its circumvented traffic is unidirectional.
As another recent trend, several proposals have sought unobservability by
integrating circumvention into the Internet infrastructure [120, 121]. For in-
stance Telex [120] and Cirripede [121] conceal the circumvented traffic inside
the regular HTTPS traffic thanks to friendly ISPs that deflect/manipulate
the intercepted connections. The real-world deployment of such circumven-
tion systems requires collaboration of several trusted ISPs that make software
and/or hardware modifications to their infrastructure; this does not seem to
be realized in short-time until there are enough financial/political motives for
the ISPs. Moreover, a recent study [142] shows that an adversary capable of
changing routing decisions is able to block these systems.
In this chapter we propose FreeWave, a censorship circumvention infras-
tructure that is highly unobservable (hence, highly available). The main
idea of FreeWave, as shown in Figure 4.1, is to tunnel Internet traffic inside
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Figure 4.1: The main architecture of FreeWave.
non-blocked VoIP communications by modulating them into acoustic signals
that are carried over VoIP connections. For a censored user to use FreeWave
for circumvention, she needs to setup a VoIP account with a public VoIP
provider, and also to install FreeWave’s client software on her machine. Part
of the FreeWave system is a FreeWave server that listens on several publicly
advertised VoIP IDs to serve FreeWave clients. To make a FreeWave connec-
tion, a user’s FreeWave client software makes VoIP connections to FreeWave
server’s VoIP IDs. The client and server, then, tunnel the circumvented In-
ternet traffic inside the established VoIP connections, by modulating network
packets into acoustic signals carried by the established VoIP connections.
We claim that FreeWave provides strong unobservability by performing
two kinds of obfuscations: traffic obfuscation and server obfuscation. First, as
FreeWave tunnels Internet traffic inside actual, encrypted VoIP connections,
its traffic patterns are very hard to distinguish from benign VoIP connections.
Traffic obfuscation is also aimed for by recent morphing-based techniques
like SkypeMorph [138] and StegoTorus [137]; however, FreeWave provides
stronger traffic obfuscation as it completely runs the target protocol instead
of partially imitating it. The second obfuscation performed by FreeWave,
which is unique to FreeWave, is server obfuscation, which prevents censors
from detecting circumvented traffic by matching the destination addresses of
traffic. Server obfuscation is an important feature that similar circumvention
systems such as SkypeMorph [138] and StegoTorus [137] fail to provide. As
we describe later in this chapter, the way the FreeWave server is connected
to the Internet results in getting FreeWave’s VoIP traffic relayed by various,
oblivious VoIP peers, preventing a censor from blocking/identifying Free-
Wave’s VoIP traffic based on IP addresses (see Figure 4.1). For instance,
FreeWave connections made through Skype get relayed by Skype supern-
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odes [143], which are oblivious Skype users residing outside1 the censorship
region. As another example, if FreeWave uses Google Voice, FreeWave con-
nections will get relayed by Google servers that are oblivious to the cir-
cumvention process. Server obfuscation, as defined above, is missing in all
previous designs except CensorSpoofer [141]. For instance, in the case of Tor
pluggable transports like SkypeMorph [138] and StegoTorus [137], once the
IP address of the deploying Tor bridge is revealed to a censor (e.g., using port
knocking [122, 126, 127, 139]), the unobservability is lost and the censor will
be able to identify/block users connecting to that Tor bridge. In FreeWave,
on the other hand, even if a censor identifies the IP address belonging to a
FreeWave server it will not be able to block connections to it since users’ con-
nections to that FreeWave server are not direct connections, but are relayed
through varying, oblivious VoIP nodes. We provide a thorough comparison
of FreeWave with similar obfuscation-based techniques in Section 4.9.
The strong unobservability of FreeWave makes it highly unblockable (i.e.,
available). FreeWave’s availability is tied to the availability of the VoIP ser-
vice: Since the operation of FreeWave is not bound to a specific VoIP provider,
in order to block FreeWave a censor needs to block all VoIP connections with
the outside world. This is not desirable by the censoring ISPs due to differ-
ent business and political implications. VoIP constitutes an important part
of today’s Internet communications [146–148]; a recent report [147] shows
that about one-third of U.S. businesses use VoIP solutions to reduce their
telecommunications expenses, and the report predicts the VoIP penetration
to reach 79% by 2013, a 50% increase compared to 2009.
We implement a prototype of FreeWave over the popular VoIP service of
Skype and measure its performance. To achieve reliable communication over
VoIP connections we design a communication encoder/decoder tailored for
the VoIP’s lossy communication channel. Specifically, we take advantage of
Turbo codes and QAM modulation techniques [84, 149] in order to reliably
encode the circumvented traffic inside the VoIP connections. Our evalua-
tions show that FreeWave provides connection bit rates that are suitable for
regular web browsing. We validate FreeWave’s usability by clients that are
1The supernodes assigned to a particular Skype client by the Skype protocol are ge-
ographically close to that client for better quality of service; hence a FreeWave server is
expected to use nearby supernodes. In addition, a FreeWave server can adjust the list of
its Skype supernodes [144,145], as described later.
88
geographically far away from the FreeWave server.
Contributions: In this chapter we make the following main contributions:
1. We propose FreeWave, a novel infrastructure for censorship circumven-
tion that works by modulating Internet traffic into the acoustic signals
carried over VoIP connections. The use of actual VoIP connections,
as well as being relayed by oblivious VoIP nodes, provides promising
unobservability for FreeWave.
2. We design communication encoders and decoders to efficiently modu-
late Internet traffic into acoustic signals.
3. We prototype FreeWave on the popular VoIP service of Skype and
evaluate its performance and security.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 4.2 we review
our threat model and the goals in designing our circumvention system. We
describe the design of our proposed circumvention system, FreeWave, in Sec-
tion 4.3, and Section 4.4 discusses our design details. In Section 4.5, we
discuss the features of our designed circumvention system. We thoroughly
analyze the security of FreeWave in Section 4.6. In Section 4.7 we describe
the design of MoDem, the communication block of FreeWave software. We
describe our prototype implementation in Section 4.8 along with the evalua-
tion results. In Section 4.9 we compare FreeWave with two recent proposals
of SkypeMorph [138] and CensorSpoofer [141]; this is followed by additional
related work in Section 4.10. In Section 4.11 we discuss FreeWave’s limi-
tations and several recommendations. Finally, the chapter is concluded in
Section 4.12.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Threat Model
We assume that a FreeWave client is connected to the Internet through a
censoring ISP, e.g., an ISP that is controlled and regulated by a repressive
regime. Based on the regulations of the censoring ISP its users are not
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allowed to connect to certain Internet destinations, called the censored desti-
nations. The users are also prohibited from using censorship circumvention
technologies that would help them to evade the censoring regulations. The
censoring ISP uses a set of advanced technologies to enforce its censoring
regulations, including IP address blocking, DNS hijacking, and deep packet
inspection [112,113]. The censoring ISP also monitors its users’ network traf-
fic to identify and block any usage of censorship circumvention tools; traffic
analysis can be used by the censor as a powerful technique for this purpose.
We assume that the censoring ISP enforces its regulations such that it does
not compromise the usability of the Internet for its users, due to different
political and economic reasons. In other words, the enforced censorship does
not disable/disrupt key Internet services. In particular, we consider VoIP
as a key Internet service in today’s Internet [146, 148, 150], and we assume
that, even though a censor may block certain VoIP providers, the censor will
not block all VoIP services. VoIP constitutes a key part in the design of
FreeWave.
4.2.2 Design Goals
We consider the following goals in the design and evaluation of FreeWave.
Later in Section 4.5, we discuss these features for the FreeWave circumvention
system proposed in this chapter and compare FreeWave with related work.
Unblockability: The main goal of a censorship circumvention system is
to help censored users gain access to censored Internet destinations. As a
result, the most trivial property of a circumvention system is being accessible
by censored users, i.e., it should be unblockable by censors.
Unobservability: Unobservability is to hide users’ utilization of a circum-
vention system from censorship authorities, which is a challenging feature
to achieve due to the recent advances in censorship technologies [112]. The
importance of unobservability is two-fold; first, an observable circumvention
can jeopardize the safety of a user who has been caught by the censor while
using the circumvention system. Second, a weak unobservability commonly
results in a weak unblockability, as it allows censors to more easily identify,
hence block, traffic generated by the circumvention system.
Security: Several security considerations should be made once analyzing a
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circumvention system. These considerations include users’ anonymity, con-
fidentiality, and privacy against various parties including the censors, the
circumvention system, and third parties.
Deployment feasibility: An important feature of a circumvention system
is the amount of resources (e.g., hardware, network bandwidth, etc.) required
for it to be deployed in the real world. A circumvention system is also desired
to have few dependencies on other systems and entities in order to make it
more reliable, secure, and cost-effective.
Quality of service: A key feature in making a circumvention system
popular in practice is the quality of service provided by it in establishing
circumvented connections. Two important factors are connection bandwidth
and browsing latency.
4.3 FreeWave Scheme
In this section, we describe the design of FreeWave censorship circumven-
tion. Figure 4.1 shows the main architecture of FreeWave. In order to get
connected through FreeWave, a user installs a FreeWave client on her ma-
chine, which can be obtained from an out-of-band channel, similar to other
circumvention systems. The user sets up the installed FreeWave client by en-
tering her own VoIP ID and also the publicly advertised VoIP ID of FreeWave
server. Once the FreeWave client starts up, it makes a VoIP audio/video call
to FreeWave server’s VoIP ID. As discussed in Section 4.4.2, the FreeWave
server is configured such that VoIP connections initiated by clients are relayed
through various oblivious VoIP peers, e.g., Skype supernodes; this is a key
security feature of FreeWave as it prevents a censor from blocking FreeWave’s
VoIP connections using IP address blocking. Also, since FreeWave’s VoIP
connections are end-to-end encrypted, a censor will not be able to identify
FreeWave’s VoIP connections by analyzing traffic contents, e.g., by looking
for the VoIP IDs. Using the established VoIP connection, a FreeWave client
circumvents censorship by modulating its user’s Internet traffic into acoustic
signals that are carried over by such VoIP connections. FreeWave server de-
modulates a client’s Internet traffic from the received acoustic signals, and
proxies the demodulated traffic to the requested Internet destinations.
Next, we introduce the main components used in FreeWave and describe
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how these components are used in the design of FreeWave’s client and server.
4.3.1 Components of FreeWave
In this section, we introduce the main elements used in the design of Free-
Wave client and server software. The first three components are used by
both FreeWave client and FreeWave server, while the fourth element is only
used by FreeWave server.
VoIP client VoIP client is a Voice-over-IP (VoIP) client software that al-
lows VoIP users to connect to one (or more) specific VoIP service(s). In
Section 4.4.2, we discuss the choices of the VoIP service being used by Free-
Wave.
Virtual sound card (VSC) A virtual sound card is a software application
that uses a physical sound card installed on a machine to generate one (or
more) isolated, virtual sound card interfaces on that machine. A virtual
sound card interface can be used by any application running on the host
machine exactly the same way a physical sound card is utilized. Also, the
audio captured or played by a virtual sound card does not interfere with that
of other physical/virtual sound interfaces installed on the same machine. We
use virtual sound cards in the design of FreeWave to isolate the audio signals
generated by FreeWave from the audio belonging to other applications.
MoDem FreeWave client and server software use a modulator/demodulator
(MoDem) application that translates network traffic into acoustic signals and
vice versa. This allows FreeWave to tunnel the network traffic of its clients
over VoIP connections by modulating them into acoustic signals. We provide
a detailed description of our MoDem design in Section 4.7.
Proxy FreeWave server uses an ordinary network proxy application that
proxies the network traffic of FreeWave clients, received over VoIP connec-
tions, to their final Internet destinations. Two popular choices for FreeWave’s
proxy are the HTTP proxy [151] and the SOCKS proxy [152]; a SOCKS
proxy supports proxying of a wide range of IP protocols, while an HTTP
proxy only supports proxying of HTTP/HTTPS traffic, but it can perform
HTTP-layer optimizations like pre-fetching of web contents. Several proxy
solutions support both protocols.
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Figure 4.2: The main components of FreeWave client.
4.3.2 Client Design
The FreeWave client software, installed by a FreeWave user, consists of three
main components described above: a VoIP client application, a virtual sound
card (VSC), and the MoDem software. Figure 4.2 shows the block diagram
of the FreeWave client design. MoDem transforms the data of the network
connections sent by the web browser into acoustic signals and sends them
over to the VSC component. The FreeWave MoDem also listens on the
VSC sound card to receive specially formatted acoustic signals that carry
modulated Internet traffic; MoDem extracts the modulated Internet traffic
from such acoustic signals and sends them to the web browser. In a sense,
the client web browser uses the MoDem component as a network proxy, i.e.,
the listening port of MoDem is entered in the HTTP/SOCKS proxy settings
of the browser.
The VSC sound card acts as a bridge between MoDem and the VoIP client
component, i.e., it transfers audio signals between them. More specifically,
the VoIP client is set up to use the VSC sound card as its “speaker” and “mi-
crophone” devices (VoIP applications allow a user to select physical/virtual
sound cards). This allows MoDem and the VoIP client to exchange audio
signals that contain the modulated network traffic, isolated from the audio
generated/recorded by other applications on the client machine.
For the FreeWave client to connect to a particular FreeWave server it only
needs to know the VoIP ID belonging to that FreeWave server, but not the IP
address of the FreeWave server. Every time the user starts up the FreeWave
client application on her machine, the VoIP application of FreeWave client
initiates an audio/video VoIP call to the known VoIP ID of the FreeWave
server.
93
VoIP
client VSC MoDem
HTTP 
trafficAudio Audio
VoIP
traffic
The 
Internet
VoIP 
peers
The 
Internet
Censored
DestinationsProxy
HTTP 
traffic
FreeWave Server
Figure 4.3: The main components of FreeWave server.
4.3.3 Server Design
Figure 4.3 shows the design of FreeWave server, which consists of four main
elements. FreeWave server uses a VoIP client application to communicate
with its clients through VoIP connections. A FreeWave server chooses one
or more VoIP IDs, which are provided to its clients, e.g., through public
advertisement.
The VOIP client of the FreeWave server uses one (or more) virtual sound
cards (VSC) as its “speaker” and “microphone” devices. The number of
VSCs used by the server depends on the deployment scenario, as discussed
in Section 4.4.1. The VSC(s) are also used by the MoDem component, which
transforms network traffic into acoustic signals and vice versa. More specif-
ically, MoDem extracts the Internet traffic modulated by FreeWave clients
into audio signals from the incoming VoIP connections and forwards them to
the last element of the FreeWave server, FreeWave proxy. MoDem also mod-
ulates the Internet traffic received from the proxy component into acoustic
signals and sends them to the VoIP client software through the VSC in-
terface. The FreeWave proxy is a regular network proxy, e.g., an HTTP
proxy, that is used by the FreeWave server to connect FreeWave clients to
the open Internet. As mentioned above in Section 4.3.2, the web browser of
a FreeWave client targets its traffic to a network proxy; such proxied traffic
is received and handled by FreeWave server’s proxy server (through the VoIP
connections, as described).
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4.4 Other Design Details
4.4.1 Deployment Scenarios
The FreeWave system proposed in this chapter can be deployed by “good”
entities that run FreeWave servers to help censored users gain an uncensored
access to the Internet. We consider the following scenarios for a real-world
deployment of FreeWave. In Section 4.6, we discuss the security considera-
tions for each of these scenarios.
Personal deployment: A person having an open access to the Internet
can set up a personal FreeWave server on her personal machine, anonymously
helping censored users evade censorship. Such a person can, then, advertise
her VoIP ID (used with her FreeWave server) publicly (e.g., through social
networks) and anyone learning this ID would be able to connect to the In-
ternet by running FreeWave client software. To save bandwidth, she can
configure her FreeWave server to enforce restrictions on the quality of service
provided to clients.
Central VoIP-center: FreeWave service can be deployed and maintained
by a central authority, e.g., a for-profit or non-profit organization. The de-
ploying organization can build and run FreeWave servers that are a capable
of serving large numbers of FreeWave clients. To do so, the deployed Free-
Wave servers should utilize several physical/virtual sound cards in parallel.
Also, by creating VoIP accounts on several different VoIP service providers,
such a central FreeWave system will be able to service FreeWave clients who
use various VoIP services. Such a central deployment of FreeWave can oper-
ate for commercial profit, e.g., by charging clients for the used bandwidth,
or can be established as a non-profit system, e.g., being funded by NGOs or
pro-freedom governments.
Central phone-center: As an alternative approach, FreeWave can be
deployed using an automated telephone center. More specifically, instead of
VoIP IDs, FreeWave will publicize several phone numbers, which are used by
clients to connect to the FreeWave server. FreeWave users need to use the
exact same FreeWave client software, except that instead of making VoIP
calls to a VoIP IDs they will make VoIP calls to FreeWave server’s phone
numbers. Compared to the “central VoIP-center” scenario, this has the big
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advantage that clients can arbitrarily choose any VoIP service provider for
the client software, while in the “central service” design users need to choose
from the VoIP systems supported by FreeWave server (though a powerful
FreeWave server can support many VoIP systems).
Distributed service: FreeWave service can also be deployed in a dis-
tributed architecture, similar to that of Tor [118] anonymity network. More
specifically, a FreeWave network can be built consisting of a number of vol-
unteer computers that run instances of FreeWave server software on their
machines. A central authority can manage the addition of new volunteer
nodes to the system and also the advertisement (or distribution) of their
VoIP IDs to the clients.
4.4.2 The Choice of VoIP Systems
There are numerous free/paid VoIP service providers that can be utilized
by the FreeWave system, e.g., Skype2, Vonage3, iCal4, etc. A VoIP service
provider usually supplies its VoIP client software to its users, but there are
also some VoIP software that can be used for different VoIP accounts, e.g.,
PhonerLite5. In this section, we mention some candidate VoIP services that
can be used by FreeWave.
Skype
Skype is a peer-to-peer VoIP system that provides voice calls, instant messag-
ing, and video calls to its clients over the Internet. Skype is one of the most
popular VoIP service providers with over 663 million users as of September
2011 [153].
Skype uses an undisclosed proprietary design, which has been partly reverse-
engineered in some previous research [144, 145, 154]. These studies find that
Skype uses a peer-to-peer overlay network with the Skype users as its peers.
There are two types of nodes on Skype: ordinary nodes, and supernodes (SN).
Any Skype client with a public IP address, having sufficient CPU, memory,
2http://www.skype.com
3http://www.vonage.com
4http://www.icall.com/
5http://www.phonerlite.de/index_en.htm
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and network bandwidth serves as a supernode, and all the other nodes are or-
dinary nodes. In addition, Skype uses a central login server that keeps users’
login credentials and is used by Skype users to register into Skype’s overlay
network. Apart from the login server, all Skype communications work in a
peer-to-peer manner, including the user search queries and online/oﬄine user
information.
A key feature that makes Skype an ideal choice for FreeWave is its peer-
to-peer network. Depending on its network setting [143], an ordinary Skype
user deploys some supernodes as her proxies to connect to the Skype net-
work, to make/receive calls, and to update her status. In particular, a Skype
call made toward an ordinary Skype node gets relayed to her by her su-
pernodes [144, 145]. Each ordinary node maintains a supernode-cache [145]
table that keeps a list of reachable (usually nearby) supernodes, discovered
by the Skype protocol. We use this feature to provide server obfuscation for
FreeWave: By having our FreeWave server act as an ordinary Skype node,
the VoIP connections that it receives will be relayed by alternative supern-
odes, rendering IP address blocking impossible. We discuss this further in
Section 4.6. Also note that a censor cannot map a FreeWave server to its
supernodes since the supernode-cache table is a large, dynamic list; further, a
Skype client can change its supernodes more frequently by flushing [144,145]
its supernode-cache.
Based on the criteria mentioned for a supernode, an easy way to be treated
as an ordinary node by Skype is to reside in a firewalled, NATed network
subnet [143, 145]. As another interesting feature of Skype for FreeWave is
that all Skype connections are secured by end-to-end encryption [144,145].
SIP-Based VoIP
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [155] is a lightweight, popular signaling
protocol and is widely used by VoIP providers, e.g., SFLphone6, Zfone7,
and Blink8, to establish calls between clients. A SIP-based VoIP system
consists of three main elements [155]: 1) user agents that try to establish
SIP connections on behalf of users, 2) a location service that is a database
6http://sflphone.org/
7http://zfoneproject.com/
8http://icanblink.com/
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keeping information about the users, and 3) a number of servers that help
users in establishing SIP connections. In particular, there are two types of
SIP servers; registrar servers receive registration requests sent by user agents
and update the location service database. The second types of SIP servers
are proxy servers that receive SIP requests from user agents and other SIP
proxies and help in establishing the SIP connections.
Once a SIP connection is established between two user agents a media
delivery protocol is used to transfer media between the users. Most of the
SIP-based VoIP systems use the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [156]
to exchange audio data, and the Real-Time Transport Control Protocol
(RTCP) [156] protocol to control the established RTP connections. User
agents in a SIP-based VoIP system are allowed to use an encryption-enabled
version of RTP, called Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [157],
in order to secure their VoIP calls. Note that the encryption supported by
SRTP is performed end-to-end by SIP agents and VoIP servers are not re-
quired to support encryption. We mandate the SIP-based design of FreeWave
to use SRTP for media transfer.
Similar to Skype, if a user agent is behind NAT or a firewall, it will use an
intermediate node to establish its VoIP connections. In particular, two pop-
ular techniques used by VoIP service providers to bypass NAT and firewalls
are session border controller (SBC) [158] and RTP bridge servers [159]. As
in the case of the Skype-based FreeWave, putting a FreeWave server behind
a firewall masks its IP address from censors, as the VoIP calls to it will be
relayed through oblivious intermediate nodes. However, better care needs to
be taken in this case since, unlike Skype, SIP-based VoIP systems are not
peer-to-peer.
Centralized VoIP
Several VoIP providers use their own servers to relay VoIP connections, in
order to improve connectivity, regardless of the VoIP protocol that they use.
One interesting example is the Google Voice9, which relays all of its calls
through Google servers, hence disguising a callee’s IP address from a censor.
Also note that the calls in Google Voice are encrypted.
9https://www.google.com/voice
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4.5 Evaluation of the Design Goals
In Section 4.2.2, we listed several features that we consider in designing an
effective circumvention system. Here, we discuss the extent to which our
proposed system, FreeWave, achieves such requirements.
Unblockability: In order to use FreeWave, a client only needs to know the
VoIP ID of the FreeWave server, i.e., server-id, but no other secret/public
information like the server’s IP address. server-id is distributed in a public
manner to the users, so we assume that it is also known to censors. Con-
sidering the use of encrypted VoIP connections by FreeWave, this public
knowledge of server-id does not allow censors to identify (and block) the
VoIP connections to the FreeWave server. In addition, a censor will not be
able to identify FreeWave’s VoIP connections from their IP addresses since,
as discussed in Section 4.4.2, the encrypted VoIP connections to the Free-
Wave server are relayed through oblivious, intermediate nodes (given the
FreeWave server is set up appropriately). For instance, in Skype-based Free-
Wave the VoIP connections to the FreeWave server are relayed by oblivious
Skype supernodes. Also, FreeWave server is not mapped to a particular set
of supernodes, i.e., its VoIP connections are relayed through a varying set of
super nodes. In all of the above arguments, we assume that the VoIP service
provider used by FreeWave is not colluding with the censors; otherwise, the
unobservability is lost. Such collusion could happen if a centralized VoIP
service, e.g., Google Voice, informs censors of the clients calling FreeWave’s
Google Voice ID, or if the censors control the supernodes used by a FreeWave
server.
Another point in making FreeWave unblockable is that it does not depend
on a particular VoIP system, and can select from a wide range of VoIP
providers. As a result, in order to block FreeWave, censors will need to block
all VoIP services, which is very unlikely due to several political and economic
considerations.
Note that unblockability is a serious challenge with many existing circum-
vention systems, as the very same information that they advertise for their
connectivity can be used by censors to block them. For example, the Tor [118]
system requires its clients to connect to a public set of IP addresses, which
can be IP-filtered by censors. More recently, Tor has adopted the use of
Tor bridges [125], which are volunteer proxies with semi-public IP addresses.
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Unfortunately, there are different challenges [122, 126, 127, 130, 139] in dis-
tributing the IP addresses of Tor bridges only to real clients, but not to the
censors.
Unobservability: The arguments made above for FreeWave’s unblocka-
bility can also be used to justify its unobservability. As mentioned above,
even though FreeWave server’s VoIP ID (server-id) is assumed to be known
to censors, the end-to-end encryption of VoIP connections prevents a censor
from observing users making VoIP connections to server-id. In addition,
VoIP relays sitting between FreeWave clients and a FreeWave server, e.g.,
Skype supernodes, foil the identification of FreeWave connections through
IP address filtering.
Deployment feasibility: The real-world deployment of FreeWave does not
rely on other entities. This is in contrast to some recent designs that need col-
laboration from third parties for their operation. For instance, Infranet [115]
requires support from some web destinations that host the circumvention
servers. As another example, several recent proposals [120, 121, 160] rely on
the collaboration from friendly ISPs for their operation.
Quality of service: In Section 4.8, we discuss the connection performance
provided by our prototype implementation of FreeWave. Our results show
that FreeWave provides reliable connections that are good for normal web
browsing.
4.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security of FreeWave clients to the threats
imposed by different entities.
4.6.1 Security Against Censors
The end-to-end encryption of VoIP connections protects the confidentiality
of the data sent by FreeWave clients against a monitoring censor, even if
the censor is able to identify VoIP connections targeted to FreeWave. Such
end-to-end encryption also ensures the web browsing privacy of FreeWave
clients. As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, Skype calls are encrypted end-to-end,
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and SIP-based VoIPs also provide end-to-end encryption using the SRTP
protocol. In the case of centralized VoIP services, like the Google Voice, the
encryptions are usually client-to-server; hence the FreeWave client should
ensure that its VoIP provider is not colluding with the censors.
Even though FreeWave uses encrypted VoIP connections, a censor may still
try to identify FreeWave-generated VoIP connections by performing traffic
analysis, i.e., by analyzing communication patterns. The use of actual VoIP
connections by FreeWave (instead of shaped connections as in [137, 138])
makes traffic analysis particularly hard. We show this in Section 4.8.3 by
analyzing FreeWave’s VoIP connections and comparing them with regular
VoIP connections. As discussed in Section 4.8.3, the choice of the VoIP
system affects the feasibility of traffic analysis. Please see Section 4.8.3 for
more discussion on FreeWave traffic analysis.
4.6.2 Security Against FreeWave Servers
A FreeWave server only knows the VoIP IDs of its client, but not their IP
addresses since the VoIP connections are being relayed through intermediate
VoIP nodes. As a result, unless the VoIP service (e.g., the Google Voice
server, or a Skype supernode owned by a FreeWave server) is colluding with
the FreeWave server, the FreeWave server will not be able to link VoIP IDs to
IP addresses, i.e., the client is anonymous to the server. Note that anonymity
against circumvention systems is not demanded by typical censored users who
are only willing to access non-sensitive censored information like the news,
and in fact some popular circumvention mechanisms do not provide such
anonymity, e.g., the single-proxy based systems such as the Anonymizer [119].
A FreeWave client can strengthen its anonymity against the FreeWave server
in different ways. For instance, she can enforce its VoIP traffic to be relayed
by additional intermediate VoIP relays, e.g., by the client’s Skype supernodes.
In the basic design of FreeWave mentioned above, a FreeWave server can
observe the traffic contents exchanged by a FreeWave client, since the tun-
neled traffic is not always encrypted. However, a client can easily ensure
security and privacy from the server by using an extra layer of encryption.
For instance, a client can use FreeWave to get connected to an anonymity
system like Anonymizer [119], and then use the tunneled connection with this
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anonymity system to browse the Internet. This secures this client’s traffic
from the FreeWave server, as well as making it confidential. Note that con-
sidering the fact that FreeWave clients are anonymous to FreeWave servers,
clients may opt not to use such an additional protection for low-sensitive
activities like web browsing.
4.6.3 Security Against VoIP Providers
Except for the centralized VoIP services, the VoIP connections between Free-
Wave clients and servers are encrypted end-to-end using the keys shared
through the VoIP protocol. In the case of a centralized VoIP service, like
the Google Voice, FreeWave parties can exchange a key using a key sharing
mechanism, like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [161], over the established
FreeWave VoIP. As a result, the VoIP provider will not be able to observe
the data being communicated or the web destinations being browsed. How-
ever, the VoIP service provider might be able to identify VoIP IDs that have
made VoIP calls to a FreeWave server. As a result, in order to ensure its
unobservability FreeWave needs to use VoIP providers that are not colluding
with the censors. Note that FreeWave does not rely on a particular VoIP
system and any VoIP provider can be used for its operation.
4.7 FreeWave MoDem
The MoDem component is one of the main components of both FreeWave
client and FreeWave server application, which translates Internet traffic into
acoustic signals and vice versa. MoDem consists of a modulator and a demod-
ulator. MoDem’s modulator modulates data (IP bits) into acoustic signals,
and MoDem’s demodulator extracts the encoded data from a received acous-
tic signal. In the following, we describe the design of MoDem’s modulator
and demodulator.
4.7.1 Modulator Description
We design a bit-interleaved coded modulation (BICM) [149] for MoDem’s
modulator, which is shown in Figure 4.4. First, the modulator encodes the
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Figure 4.4: The modulator block of FreeWave’s MoDem. The modulated
data is wrapped by a wrapper protocol before being transformed into
acoustic waveforms.
information bits, {ai}, i.e., IP traffic, using a channel encoder with rate Rc.
The encoded stream, {bi}, is permuted using a random interleaver [149],
and the interleaved sequence is then partitioned into subsequences cn =
{c1n, . . . , cQn } of length-Q (n is the partition index and Q is a parameter of our
modulator). Finally, a QAM mapper [149] generates the modulated data by
mapping each subsequence cn to a 2
Q-ary quadrature amplitude modulation
symbol.
We design a wrapper protocol to carry the modulated data. This wrapper
performs three important tasks: 1) it allows a demodulator to synchronize
itself with the modulator in order to correctly identify the starting points of
the received data; 2) it lets the sender and receiver negotiate the modulation
parameters; and, 3) it lets the demodulator adapt itself to the time-varying
channel. Figure 4.4 shows the modulated data being wrapped by our wrapper
protocol. As can be seen, the modulated bit stream is converted into data
frames that are sent over the VoIP channel. Each data frame starts with
a known preamble block, which is needed for synchronization as well as for
receiver initialization purposes. The frame preamble is followed by a signal
block that is used to communicate the modulation and coding parameters
used for this particular frame. The signal block is followed by N blocks of
training and data symbols. The data symbols are the output of the QAM
modulator. The training blocks are needed to adapt the demodulator to the
time-varying channel.
The data frames, as generated above, are sent over the VoIP channel using
acoustic signals. In particular, for xn being the n-th symbol in a frame, the
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frame is mapped to a waveform x(t) : R→ C as follows:
x(t) =
∑
l
xlp(t− lT ) (4.1)
where p(t) is a basic pulse shifted by multiples of the symbol period T . This
signal is then transformed to a passband [84] signal with the center frequency
of fC :
xPB(t) = 2 Re{x(t)e2piifCt} (4.2)
which is then sent over the VoIP channel (by getting sent to the virtual sound
card). Re{} returns the real component of a complex number, and i is the
imaginary unit.
4.7.2 Demodulator Description
Figure 4.5 shows MoDem’s demodulator, which is designed to effectively
extract the data that the modulator embedded into an audio signal. For an
audio waveform, r(t), received from the virtual sound card, the demodulator
shifts its spectrum by the center frequency fC , passes it through a low-
pass filter and then samples the resulting signal at symbol rate (equal to
1/T ). The synchronizer correlates the preamble block with the obtained
samples, declares the point of maximum correlation as the starting point of
the received frame, discards all samples before this point, and enumerates
the remaining samples by rn(n = 1, 2, ...). We assume the voice channel to
be linear and can hence write [84]:
rn =
Kp∑
k=−Kf
hn,kxn−k + wn (4.3)
where n and k are time and delay indices, respectively. Also, wn is a complex
white Gaussian noise process, which models the noise added to the modu-
lated data as a result of the noisy channel (e.g., due to VoIP codec’s lossy
compression). Moreover, hn,k is the channel gain [84], which may vary in
time. The channel length is assumed to be at most Kf +Kp+ 1, where Kf is
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Figure 4.5: Block diagram of MoDem’s demodulator.
the length of the precursor and Kp is the length of the postcursor response.
The demodulator passes the discrete stream of {r} through a Turbo equal-
izer [84]. The goal of this equalizer is to obtain an estimation of {x}, i.e.,
the discrete modulated data. The estimated data is passed to a channel
decoder, which is the equivalent decoder for the encoder used by MoDem’s
modulator. We also put an interleaver and a de-interleaver block between
the Turbo equalizer and the channel decoder modules; this is to uniformly
distribute burst bit errors, generated in the channel, across the stream in
order to improve the decoding process. This is because our channel decoder
performs well with distributed errors, but poorly with bursty errors.
4.8 Prototype and Evaluation
In this section, we describe our prototype implementation and discuss its
connection performance.
4.8.1 Implementation Setup
We have built a prototype implementation of FreeWave over Skype. Our
MoDem component uses Matlab’s libraries for acoustic signal processing,
and we use Virtual Audio Card 10 as our virtual sound card (VSC) software.
We also use the free version of Skype client software11 provided by Skype Inc.
as our VoIP client component. Our MoDem software, as well as the Skype
client, is set up to use the Virtual Audio Card as its audio interface. We
have built our FreeWave client and FreeWave server using the components
mentioned above. In order to emulate a real-world experience, i.e., a long
distance between a FreeWave client and a FreeWave server, we connect our
10http://software.muzychenko.net/eng/vac.htm
11http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/get-skype/
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FreeWave client to the Internet though a VPN connection. In particular,
we use the SecurityKISS12 VPN solution that allows us to pick VPN servers
located in different geographical locations around the world. Note that this
identifies the location of our FreeWave clients; our FreeWave server is located
in Champaign, IL, USA.
MoDem specifications: Our evaluations show that the data rates that
can be achieved with our system clearly depend on the bandwidth of the
Internet connection and the distance between the client and server. The
minimum bandwidth required for a voice call is 6 kbps for both upload and
download speeds, according to Skype. For the pulse function of MoDem’s
modulator, p(t) (Section 4.7), we use a square-root raised cosine filter with
a roll-off factor 0.2 and a bandwidth of 1/T . The carrier frequency fC is
chosen such that the spectrum of the voiceband is always covered. At the
demodulator, the same square-root raised cosine filter is used for low-pass
filtering. Our communication system automatically adjusts the symbol con-
stellation size Q, the channel coding rate Rc, and the symbol period T such
that the best possible data rate is achieved. The receiver knows how well
the training symbols were received, and based on this feedback the modu-
lator can optimize the data rate. The relationship between the data rate R
and the above parameters is R = (QRc)/T . Our designed demodulator is
iterative [84]. The number of iterations needed for convergence depends on
the channel condition, which is typically measured by means of the signal to
noise power ratio, the SNR.
4.8.2 Connection Performance
Connection data rates: Table 4.1 shows the bit rates achieved by Free-
Wave clients connecting from different geographic locations to our FreeWave
server, located in Champaign, IL, USA. At the beginning of each FreeWave
connection, our client runs an assessment subprotocol to identify the best
codecs and the reliable data rate. The table lists the best compromise be-
tween data rates and packet drop rates, for different clients. As can be seen,
clients in different parts of Europe are reliably able to get connection bit
rates of 16kbps by using FreeWave over Skype. Users within the US are
12http://www.securitykiss.com/
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Figure 4.6: BER versus SNR for FreeWave.
Table 4.1: Evaluation results of FreeWave.
Client location
MoDem parameters
Data rate
Packet
Q 1/T RC drop rate
Berlin, Germany 4 8 kHz 0.5 16000 bps 0
Frankfurt, Germany 4 8 kHz 0.5 16000 bps 0
Paris, France 4 8 kHz 0.5 16000 bps 0
Maidenhead, UK 4 8 kHz 0.5 16000 bps 0
Manchester, UK 4 8 kHz 0.5 16000 bps 0
Lodz, Poland 4 8 kHz 0.5 16000 bps 0.06
Chicago, IL 4 9.6 kHz 0.5 19200 bps 0.01
San Diego, CA 4 9.6 kHz 0.469 18000 bps 0
able to achieve higher data rates, e.g., 19.2kbps for a client in Chicago, IL.
Note that the distance between a FreeWave client and the FreeWave server
slightly affects the achievable data rates. To illustrate this, Figure 4.6 shows
the bit error rate (BER) performance of our designed demodulator for differ-
ent SNRs in the log-scale for a 19kbps FreeWave connection. As can be seen,
for SNRs larger than 5.4dB the BER tends to zero (the zero value cannot
be shown in the log-scale figure). A distributed deployment of FreeWave can
provide users from many different geographic locations with the same reliable
data rate speeds; for instance, FreeWave servers running in Europe can assist
FreeWave users from the Middle East better than the FreeWave servers that
are located in the US.
Maximum achievable data rates: As illustrated above, our FreeWave
prototype is able to reliably achieve bit rates of up to 19kbps, using the
MoDem component designed in this chapter. It is possible to design more
complicated MoDems that can achieve higher bit rates; however, a MoDem
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will not be able to achieve arbitrarily large data rates. This is due to the fact
that each VoIP codec samples speech at a particular rate (or at a given range
of rates) [162] and FreeWave cannot achieve data rates higher than a codec’s
bit-rate. For instance, Skype generates a bit-rate between 6 and 40kbps [162]
(depending on the distance between the end-hosts, Internet bandwidth and
few other factors), resulting in a “maximum” achievable rate of 40kbps for
FreeWave (the actual rate achieved depends on the efficiency of MoDem).
The “L16” codec generates a 128kbps data rate, resulting in a maximum
FreeWave bit-rate of up to 128kbps. As another instance, the widely used
codec of “G.711” produces a 64kbps data rate [162], leading to a maximum
FreeWave bit rate of 64kbps.
We believe that the bit rates achievable by the current design of FreeWave
are enough for normal web browsing, especially for a user under a repressive
regime who aims to do normal web browsing. On the other hand, a trivial
approach to achieve much higher rates is to encode Internet traffic into the
video signals carried over VoIP connections. This requires designing efficient
modulator/demodulators for encoding data into video, which we leave for
future research.
4.8.3 Traffic Analysis
In order to resist traffic analysis, FreeWave VoIP connections should have
communication patterns similar to that of regular VoIP connections. Note
that FreeWave uses encrypted VoIP connections, so a censor will not be
able to analyze packet contents (popular VoIP providers like Skype pro-
vide/mandate encrypted VoIP connections). The two traffic patterns that
may be used for traffic analysis in this case are packet rates and packet sizes.
Most of the standard VoIP codecs, like the widely used G.7 series [162],
use fixed bit rates and fixed packet sizes during a given connections, or even
across all connections [162]. This prevents any kind of traffic analysis against
FreeWave connections that use these codecs. In fact, these codecs are widely
used by different VoIP providers, e.g., the Google Voice service [163]. On the
other hand, several VoIP codecs use variable bit-rates, most notably Skype’s
proprietary SILK [164] codec. When FreeWave uses a VoIP service that uses
variable-bit-rate codecs, special care needs to be taken to prevent traffic anal-
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ysis. We have analyzed the FreeWave traffic sent over Skype in our prototype
implementation, and have compared its traffic patterns with regular Skype
traffic. We observe that there are two states in a regular Skype call: “Skype-
Speak”, in which the callee is speaking over Skype, and “Skype-Silence”, in
which the callee is silent (e.g., she is listening to the person on the other side
of the line).
Table 4.2 shows the average communication statistics for the three different
types of Skype traffic, i.e., Skype in the Skype-Speak state, Skype in the
Skype-Silent, and Skype tunneling FreeWave. All the analysis is done for
the same pair of Skype peers. As can be seen from the table, FreeWave over
Skype generates communication patterns very similar to regular Skype in the
Skype-Speak state, while the Skype-Silent state generate lower packet rates
and smaller packet sizes. This is because in order to conserve bandwidth
Skype’s SILK [164] codec reduces its packet rate and uses smaller packets
when the audio signal captured by the Skype client is weak. We observe that,
based on this analysis, a FreeWave over Skype call makes communication
patterns very similar to a typical Skype call: In a typical Skype call, when
one side of the connection is in the Skype-Speak state, the other side is usually
in the Skype-Silent state (i.e., listening to the other side). In a FreeWave
over Skype call, also, when one side of the connection is sending data the
other side is usually idle, e.g., a web traffic is a serious of HTTP GET and
HTTP RESPONSE messages that appear in a sequence. Furthermore, simple
modifications can be made to FreeWave client and server software in order
to better hide its traffic pattern; for instance, one side can stop sending data
if the other side is sending data, or a dummy audio can be sent if both sides
have been silent for a long time. Once again, note that this is only required
if FreeWave is deployed on a VoIP system that uses a variable-length audio
codec.
4.9 Comparison with Similar Systems
Recently, there have been two proposals for censorship circumvention that,
similar to FreeWave, use the openness of VoIP to evade censorship. Due to
their similarity with FreeWave we describe the advantages of FreeWave over
them in this section.
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Table 4.2: Comparing communication patterns of regular Skype with
FreeWave-over-Skype.
Pattern
FreeWave
Skype-Speak Skype-Silent
over Skype
Average packet rate (pps) 49.91 50.31 49.57
Average packet size 148.64 146.50 103.97
Minimum packet size 64 64 64
Maximum packet size 175 171 133
4.9.1 SkypeMorph
SkypeMorph [138] is a pluggable transport [134] for Tor. SkypeMorph is de-
signed to obfuscate the connections between Tor [118] users and Tor bridges [125]
so that they look like legitimate Skype traffic. The main goal of SkypeMorph
is to make it hard for a censor to distinguish between obfuscated Tor bridge
connections and actual Skype calls using deep-packet inspection and statis-
tical traffic analysis. A big implementation-wise difference with our proposal
is that SkypeMorph does not completely run, but mimics, Skype, whereas
FreeWave runs the target VoIP protocol in its entirety. FreeWave has the
following main advantages over SkypeMorph:
Server obfuscation: Similar to the most of existing obfuscation-based
techniques, SkypeMorph only provides traffic obfuscation, but it does not
provide server obfuscation. A censor may not be able to identify SkypeMorph
traffic through statistical analysis, since SkypeMorph shapes it to look like
a regular Skype traffic. However, if a censor discovers the IP address of a
SkypeMorph Tor bridge, e.g., through bridge enumeration [126,127], Skype-
Morph’s obfuscations do not provide any protection since the censor can eas-
ily block its traffic by IP addresses matching. As an indication to the severity
of this problem, the Chinese censors were able to enumerate all bridges in
under a month [140]. Once a Tor bridge is known to a censor, SkypeMorph
is not able to provide any protection.
On the other hand, FreeWave provides server obfuscation in addition to
traffic obfuscation. Instead of morphing the traffic into VoIP, FreeWave uses
the overlay network of VoIP systems to route the connections among users
and servers. As a result, FreeWave’s VoIP traffic gets relayed by “oblivi-
ous” VoIP nodes, hiding the identity (e.g., the IP address) of the FreeWave
server. Even a censor who knows the IP address of a FreeWave server will
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not be able to identify and/or block client connections to that server, since
these connections do not go directly to the server. For instance, if Skype is
used by FreeWave, the FreeWave connections get relayed by Skype supern-
odes, which are oblivious Skype users residing “outside” the censoring ISP
(please see Section 4.4.2 for further discussion). Note that there is not a
one-to-one correspondence between supernodes and FreeWave servers, i.e.,
various supernodes relay traffic to a particular FreeWave server for different
connections. As another example, if Google Voice is used by FreeWave, all
the FreeWave connections get relayed by Google servers, hiding FreeWave
servers’ IP addresses. Note that we assume that VoIP connections are also
encrypted.
Comprehensive traffic obfuscation SkypeMorph shapes Tor traffic into
Skype calls, but it does not run the actual Skype protocol (except for the
Skype login process) [138]. This can enable sophisticated attacks that can
discriminate SkypeMorph from Skype by finding protocol details that are not
properly imitated by SkypeMorph. For instance, SkypeMorph fails to mimic
Skype’s TCP handshake [165], which is essential to every genuine Skype call.
Also, Skype protocol may evolve over time and SkypeMorph would need to
follow the evolution. FreeWave, on the other hand, runs the actual VoIP
protocol in its entirety, providing a more comprehensive traffic obfuscation.
No need to pre-share secret information: SkypeMorph needs to se-
cretly share its Skype ID with its clients, as well as its IP address and port
number (this can be done using Tor’s BridgeDB [166] as suggested by the
authors). Once this secret information is disclosed to a censor (e.g., through
bridge enumeration) the identified Tor bridge will need to change both its IP
address and its Skype ID, as suggested in [138], to reclaim its accessibility by
clients. FreeWave, however, does not need to share any information with its
clients: even the VoIP IDs of the FreeWave servers are publicly advertised
without compromising the provided unobservability.
Obfuscation diversity: SkypeMorph is designed to morph traffic only
into Skype. As a result, if a censor decides to block Skype entirely, Skype-
Morph will be blocked as well. FreeWave, on the other hand, is a general
infrastructure and can be realized using a wide selection of VoIP services.
Needless to say, SkypeMorph may also be modified to mimic other popular
VoIP services, but it requires substantial effort in understanding and analyz-
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ing the candidate VoIP system. FreeWave, however, can be used with any
VoIP service without the need for substantial modifications.
4.9.2 CensorSpoofer
A key goal in the design of CensorSpoofer [141] is to provide unobservability,
as is the case in FreeWave. CensorSpoofer decouples upstream and down-
stream flows of a connection; the upstream flow, which is supposed to be
low-volume, is steganographically hidden inside instant messages (IM) or
email messages that are sent towards the secret IM or email addresses of
the CensorSpoofer server. The IM IDs or the email addresses of the Censor-
Spoofer server need to be shared securely with clients through out-of-band
channels. The CensorSpoofer server sends the downstream flow of a connec-
tion by spoofing a randomly chosen IP address, in order to obfuscate its own
IP address. This spoofed flow is morphed into an encrypted VoIP protocol
to obfuscate traffic patterns as well. A CensorSpoofer client also needs to
generate “dummy” packets towards the spoofed IP address to make the con-
nection look bidirectional. FreeWave makes the following contributions over
CensorSpoofer:
No invitation-based bootstrapping: A new CensorSpoofer client needs
to know a trusted CensorSpoofer client in order to bootstrap [141]. The
trusted client helps the new client to send her personalized upstream ID
and SIP ID to the CensorSpoofer server. Finding an existing, trusted Cen-
sorSpoofer client might be challenging for many new clients unless Censor-
Spoofer is widely deployed. Also note that even an existing CensorSpoofer
client needs to re-bootstrap its CensorSpoofer connectivity if her personal-
ized CensorSpoofer IDs are discovered by the censors. FreeWave, on the
other hand, does not require an invitation-based bootstrapping.
Comprehensive traffic obfuscation Unlike FreeWave and similar to
SkypeMorph, CensorSpoofer does not entirely run the VoIP protocol. This
can enable sophisticated attacks that are able to find protocol discrepancies
between CensorSpoofer and genuine VoIP traffic. Also, the use of IP spoofing
by CensorSpoofer may enable active traffic analysis attacks that manipulate
its downstream VoIP connection and watch the server’s reaction.
Bidirectional circumvention: In CensorSpoofer VoIP connections only
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carry the downstream part of a circumvented connection. The upstream
data are sent through low-capacity steganographic channels inside email or
instant messages [141]. FreeWave, however, provides a high-capacity channel
for both directions of a circumvented connection.
4.10 Related Work
Censorship circumvention systems have been evolving continuously to keep
up with the advances in censorship technologies. Early circumventions sys-
tems simply used network proxies [167] residing outside censorship territories,
trying to evade the simple IP address blocking and DNS hijacking techniques
enforced by pioneer censorship systems. Examples of such proxy-based cir-
cumvention tools are DynaWeb [116], Anonymizer [119], and Freenet [168].
Proxy-based circumvention tools lost their effectiveness with the advent
of more sophisticated censorship technologies such as deep-packet inspec-
tion [112, 113]. Deep-packet inspection analyzes packet contents and statis-
tics looking for deviations from the censor’s regulations. This has led to
correspondingly more sophisticated circumvention tools that remain accessi-
ble to their users. Many circumvention designs seek availability by sharing
some secret information with their users so that their utilization is unobserv-
able to the censors agnostic to this secret information. In Infranet [115], for
instance, a user needs to make a special, secret sequence of HTTP requests
to an Infranet server to request censored web contents, which are then sent to
him using image steganography. Collage [117] similarly bases its unobserv-
ability on sharing secrets with its clients. A Collage client and the Collage
server secretly agree on some user-generated content sharing websites, e.g.,
flickr.com, and use image steganography to communicate through these web-
sites. The main challenge for these systems, which rely on pre-sharing secret
information, is to be able to share secret information with a large set of actual
users while keeping them secret from censors; this is a big challenge to solve
as indicated in several researches [128–130]. Sharing secret information with
users has also been adopted by the popular Tor [118] anonymity network.
The secret pieces of information here are the IP addresses of volunteer Tor
relays, known as Tor bridges [125], that proxy the connections of Tor clients
to the Tor network. This suffers from the same limitation as censors can
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pretend to be real Tor users and gradually identify a large fraction of Tor
bridges [126,127,139].
More recently, several researches propose to build circumvention into the
Internet infrastructure [120,121,160]. Being built into the Internet infrastruc-
ture makes such circumvention highly unobservable: a client’s covert com-
munication with a censored destination appears to the censor to be a benign
connection to a non-prohibited destination. Telex [120], Cirripede [121] and
Decoy Routing [160] are example designs using such infrastructure-embedded
approach. Decoy Routing needs to share secrets with its clients using out-
of-band channels, whereas Telex and Cirripede share the secret informa-
tion needed to initialize their connections using covert channels inside Inter-
net traffic. Cirripede uses an additional client registration stage performed
steganographically, distinguishing it from the other designs. Even though
these systems are a large step forward in providing unobservable censorship
circumvention, their practical deployment is not trivial as they need to be
deployed by a number of real-world ISPs that will make software/hardware
modifications to their network infrastructures, posing a substantial deploy-
ment challenge.
Another research trend uses traffic obfuscation to make circumvented traf-
fic unobservable. Appelbaum et al. propose a platform that allows one
to build protocol-level obfuscation plugins for Tor, called pluggable trans-
ports [134]. These plugins obfuscate a Tor client’s traffic to Tor bridges by
trying to remove any statistical/content pattern that identifies Tor’s traffic.
Obfsproxy [135], the pioneer pluggable transport, removes all content iden-
tifiers by passing a Tor client’s traffic through an additional layer of stream
cipher encryption. Obfsproxy, however, does not disguise the statistical pat-
terns of Tor’s traffic. SkypeMorph [138] and StegoTorus [137] attempt to
remove Tor’s statistical patterns as well by morphing it into popular, un-
censored Internet protocols such as Skype and HTTP. Flashproxy [169] is
another recently designed pluggable transport that separates a Tor client’s
traffic into multiple connections, which are proxied by web browsers render-
ing volunteer websites.
CensorSpoofer [141] is another recent proposal that, similar to Skype-
Morph [138], shapes Tor traffic into VoIP protocols. CensorSpoofer is unique
in separating the upstream and downstream flows of a circumvented connec-
tion, and in using IP spoofing to obfuscate its server’s identity. A security
114
concern with morphing approaches [137,138,141,170] is that they do not pro-
vide a provable indistinguishability; censors may be able to devise advanced
statistical classifiers and/or protocol identifiers to find discrepancies between
a morphed traffic and genuine connections. Another approach that similarly
uses VoIP traffic is TranSteg [171]; it re-encodes a VoIP call packets using a
different, lower-rate codec in order to free a portion of VoIP packet payloads,
which are then used to send a low-bandwidth hidden traffic.
4.11 Limitations and Recommendations
Server location In order to achieve server obfuscation, special care needs
to be taken in setting up a FreeWave server. In the case of Skype, for
instance, the FreeWave server should be completely firewalled such that its
Skype traffic is completely handled by Skype supernodes. Also, a FreeWave
server should use a large, dynamic set of supernodes (i.e., by flushing its
supernode cache [144,145]) so that one cannot map a FreeWave server to its
supernodes. A corrupt supernode (e.g., controlled by the censors) used by
a FreeWave server can identify the clients that used FreeWave through that
supernode. The mechanisms to protect server obfuscation vary depending
on the utilized VoIP system.
Traffic analysis If the VoIP service deployed by FreeWave uses a variable-
length audio codec, like SILK [164], FreeWave’s traffic might be subject to
traffic analysis. In Section 4.8.3, we showed that the current deployment of
FreeWave over Skype performs well against simple traffic analysis, yet more
sophisticated traffic analysis [172] may be able to distinguish FreeWave’s
current prototype from Skype. A trivial countermeasure is to add some pre-
recorded human speech to FreeWave’s audio, which would further reduce
FreeWave’s data rate. A better approach is to encode FreeWave’s traffic into
video, instead of audio, which is more robust to traffic analysis and provides
much higher throughputs.
Trusting the VoIP provider A VoIP provider colluding with censors can
significantly degrade FreeWave’s obfuscation promises if FreeWave deploys it.
On the bright side, FreeWave can choose from a wide range of VoIP providers.
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In the case of Skype, in particular, Chinese Skype users get provided with
a special implementation of Skype, TOM-Skype, which is suspected [173]
to have built-in surveillance functionalities such as text message filtering
[174–177].
Denial of service Since FreeWave’s VoIP IDs are public, censors can ex-
haust FreeWave servers by making many FreeWave connections. Different
approaches can be taken to limit the effect of such attempts, such as the ex-
isting sybil defense mechanisms [178], as well as usage limitation enforcement
per VoIP caller.
4.12 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented FreeWave, a censorship circumvention system
that is highly unblockable by censors. FreeWave works by modulating a
client’s Internet traffic inside the acoustic signals that are carried over VoIP
connections. Being modulated into acoustic signals, as well as the use of
encryption, makes FreeWave’s VoIP connections unobservable by a censor.
By building a prototype implementation of FreeWave we show that FreeWave
can be used to achieve connection bit rates that are suitable for normal web
browsing.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Assume N is the maximal size of an -Code such that D(i) ⊂ F (x(i)),
where
F (x) = {y : i(x,y) > θ} (A.1)
Then we have
P (D(i)) =
∫
D(i)
P (dy) <
∫
D(i)
e−θP (dy|x) ≤ e−θ (A.2)
and
P (∪iD(i)) ≤
∑
i
P (D(i)) ≤ Ne−θ (A.3)
Let D = ∪iD(i). By the maximality of N it follows that
P (Dc ∩ F (x)|x) < 1−  (A.4)
Or equivalently
 < P (D ∪ F c(x)|x) ≤ P (D|x) + P (F c(x)|x) (A.5)
Multiplying this inequality with P (dy) and integrating it over x then yields
 ≤ P (D) + P (i(x,y) ≤ θ) (A.6)
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Putting everything together we obtain the result
− P (i(x,y) ≤ θ) ≤ P (D) ≤ Ne−θ (A.7)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 9
The Markov chain Ψ is aperiodic and irreducible. The state space of Ψi can
be chosen to be X = 2× N ∪ {(0, 0)}. First we verify that Foster’s criterion
holds
Lemma 3. There exists a Lyapunov function V : X→ (0,∞], finite at some
ψ0 ∈ X, a finite set S ⊂ X, and b <∞ such that
E[V (Ψi+1)− V (Ψi)|Ψi = ψ] ≤ −1 + b1S(ψ), ψ ∈ X (A.8)
Further this function V is Lipschitz, i.e., for some α > 0
|V (y)− V (x)| ≤ α||y − x|| ∀y, x ∈ X (A.9)
and for some β > 0 and
sup
x∈X
E[eβ||Ψi+1−Ψi|||Ψi = x] <∞ (A.10)
Proof. We need to find a function V such that E[V (Ψi+1)− V (Ψi)|Ψi = ψ] ≤
−1 for all but a finite number of ψ ∈ X. If we simply choose V (y˜, q) = cq for
some sufficiently large constant c > 0, then the requirement is clearly satisfied
for all ψ ∈ X such that y˜ = 1, but it fails to hold otherwise. To fix this
shortcoming we reward the transitions to a state with y˜ = 1 by a decreasing
difference V (Ψi+1)−V (Ψi). In particular we choose V (y˜, q) = (q− y˜)/(µ−λ).
Standard calculations reveal that for that choice E[V (Ψi+1) − V (Ψi)|Ψi =
ψ] = −1 for all ψ ∈ X with q > 1. Linear functions are always Lipschitz and
||Ψi+1 − Ψi|| is bounded almost surely.
By the results in [105] or Proposition A.5.7 in [106], the chain Ψ is then
geometrically ergodic.
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By Theorem A.5.8 in [106], the asymptotic variance σ2 is well defined,
non-negative and finite, and
σ2 = Var(f(Ψ0)) + 2
∞∑
i=1
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) (A.11)
Finally, f(y˜, q) is a bounded, nonlattice, real-valued functional on the state
space X and hence
Pψ0
(∑n−1
i=0 f(y˜i, qi)− npiΨ (f)
σ
√
n
≤ ξ
)
− Φ(ξ) (A.12)
=
pΦ(ξ)
σ
√
n
[ η
6σ2
(1− ξ2)− fˆ(ψ0)
]
+ o(n−1/2) (A.13)
where pΦ(ξ) denotes the density of the standard Normal distribution Φ, fˆ is
the solution to Poissons equation and η is a constant [107]. The solution fˆ
can be chosen such that piΨ (fˆ) = 0 and the claim follows by averaging out
ψ0.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 10
Using the representation of σ2 in Equation 3.16, it remains to find explicit
expressions for Var(f(Ψ0)) and the sum
∑∞
i=0 Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)).
The term Var(f(Ψ0)) is easy to compute
Var(f(Ψ0)) = log
2(
1
λ¯
)piQ(0) + log
2(
µ
λ
)µpiQ(0)
+ log2(
µ¯
λ¯
)µ¯piQ(0)− C2 (A.14)
Equation 3.21 holds true.
Proof. For the computation of the sum
∑∞
i=0 Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) we will set up
and solve a recursion. Grassmann proposed this approach in [109] to obtain
the asymptotic variance of a continuous time finite state birth-death process.
We define
r(ψ, i) =
∑
ψ′∈X
(f(ψ′)− C)piΨ (ψ′)pΨi|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′) (A.15)
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Clearly
r(ψ, 0) = (f(ψ)− C)piΨ (ψ) (A.16)
and
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) =
∑
ψ∈X
(f(ψ)− C)r(ψ, i) =
∑
ψ∈X
f(ψ)r(ψ, i) (A.17)
Note however that for the computation of the asymptotic variance we actually
do not even need to know this covariance for each i. It is sufficient to know
its sum. So we define
R(ψ) =
∞∑
i=0
r(ψ, i) (A.18)
write
∞∑
i=0
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) =
∑
ψ∈X
f(ψ)R(ψ) (A.19)
and derive a recursion for R(ψ).
For mean ergodic Markov processes pΨi|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′) → piΨ (ψ) as i → ∞ and
hence
lim
i→∞
r(ψ, i) = 0 (A.20)
Summing r(ψ, i + 1) − r(ψ, i) in i from zero to infinity then clearly yields
(C − f(ψ))piΨ (ψ). By the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations
pΨi+1|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′)− pΨi|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′)
=
∑
ψ′′∈X
pΨi|Ψ0(ψ
′′|ψ′){pΨi+1|Ψi(ψ|ψ′′)− δψ,ψ′′} (A.21)
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and thus
r(ψ, i+ 1)− r(ψ, i)
=
∑
ψ′∈X
(f(ψ′)− C)piΨ (ψ′)
{
pΨi+1|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′)− pΨi|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′)
}
=
∑
ψ′′∈X
{
pΨi+1|Ψi(ψ|ψ′′)− δψ,ψ′′
}
r(ψ′′, i) (A.22)
If this expression for r(ψ, i + 1) − r(ψ, i) is also summed in i from zero to
infinity and then compared to the above result of the same sum, we obtain
(C − f(ψ))piΨ (ψ) =
∑
ψ′′∈X
{
pΨi+1|Ψi(ψ|ψ′′)− δψ,ψ′′
}
R(ψ′′) (A.23)
For notational convenience we abbreviate the right-hand side of Equation
A.23 by D(ψ).
For ψ with q > 0 and y˜ = 0
D(ψ) =(λ¯µ¯− 1)R(q, 0) + λ¯µ¯R(q + 1, 1) + λµ¯R(q, 1)
+ λµ¯R(q − 1, 0) (A.24)
For ψ with q > 0 and y˜ = 1
D(ψ) =(λµ− 1)R(q, 1) + λ¯µR(q + 1, 1) + λ¯µR(q, 0)
+ λµR(q − 1, 0) (A.25)
And for ψ with q = 0 and y˜ = 0
D(ψ) = −λR(0, 0) + λ¯R(1, 1) (A.26)
Adding Equations A.24 and A.25 yields
λ¯R(q + 1, 1)− λR(q, 0)− λ¯R(q, 1) + λR(q − 1, 0) (A.27)
We now sum Equation A.23 in two ways:∑
ψ′∈X:q′≤q
D(ψ) = λ¯R(q + 1, 1)− λR(q, 0) = M(q, 0) (A.28)
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for q ≥ 0 where we defined
M(q, 0) =
∑
ψ′∈X:q′≤q
(C − f(ψ))piΨ (ψ) (A.29)
and ∑
ψ′∈X:q′<q||q′=q,y˜=1
D(ψ) = −λµ¯R(q − 1, 0)− λµ¯R(q, 1)
+λ¯µR(q, 0) + λ¯µR(q + 1, 1) = M(q, 1) (A.30)
for q ≥ 1 where we defined
M(q, 1) =
∑
ψ∈X:q′<q||q′=q,y˜=1
(C − f(ψ))piΨ (ψ) (A.31)
We can combine Equations A.28 and A.30 to obtain the first-order recurrence
R(q + 1, 0) =
λµ¯
λ¯µ
R(q, 0) + M˜(q) (A.32)
for q ≥ 0 where
M˜(q) =
1
µ
M(q + 1, 1)−M(q + 1, 0) + λµ¯
λ¯µ
M(q, 0) (A.33)
Note that
M(q, 0) = C
1− piQ(0)
µ¯
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1
1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
− ∑
ψ∈X:q′≤q
f(ψ)piΨ (ψ)
=
piQ(0)
µ¯
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1
1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
(
µ log(
µ
λ
) + µ¯ log(
µ¯
λ¯
)− C
)
=
λ¯
µ¯
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1 (
µ log(
µ
λ
) + µ¯ log(
µ¯
λ¯
)− C
)
= cM0
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1
(A.34)
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and with this Equation A.33 becomes
M˜(q) =
1
µ
M(q + 1, 1) (A.35)
But
M(q + 1, 1) = M(q, 0) + (C − log µ
λ
)piQ(0)
µ
µ¯
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1
=
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1{
cM0 + (C − log µ
λ
)piQ(0)
µ
µ¯
}
So we obtain
M˜(q) =
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1{
cM0
µ
+ (C − log µ
λ
)
piQ(0)
µ¯
}
= cM˜
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q+1
(A.36)
and the generating function
M˜(z) =
∑
q≥0
M˜(q)zq =
cM˜
λµ¯
λ¯µ
1− z λµ¯
λ¯µ
(A.37)
We now define two new sequences aq and bq such that
R(q, 0) = aq + bqR(0, 0) (A.38)
Clearly, a0 = 0 and b0 = 1. By substituting Equation A.38 into Equation
A.32 we find that
aq+1 =
λµ¯
λ¯µ
aq + M˜(q) (A.39)
and
bq+1 =
λµ¯
λ¯µ
bq (A.40)
The solution to the recurrence bq is obvious:
bq =
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q
(A.41)
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In order to obtain the solution to the recurrence bq we employ the generating
function method ∑
q≥0
aq+1z
q =
λµ¯
λ¯µ
∑
q≥0
aqz
q +
∑
q≥0
M˜(q)zq (A.42)
and therefore
z−1A(z) =
λµ¯
λ¯µ
A(z) + M˜(z) (A.43)
We can now solve this equation for A(z) to obtain
A(z) =
M˜(z)
z−1 − λµ¯
λ¯µ
= cM˜
λµ¯
λ¯µ
z(
1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
z
)2 (A.44)
and the corresponding sequence
aq = cM˜q
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q
(A.45)
Finally
R(q, 0) = aq + bqR(0, 0) = cM˜q
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q
+
(
λµ¯
λ¯µ
)q
R(0, 0) (A.46)
Further∑
ψ∈X
r(ψ, i) =
∑
ψ′∈X
(f(ψ′)− C)piΨ (ψ′)
∑
ψ∈X
pΨi|Ψ0(ψ|ψ′) = 0 (A.47)
and summing this equation in i yields∑
ψ∈X
R(ψ) = 0 (A.48)
This result now allows us to compute R(0, 0): Using Equation A.28 we can
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write ∑
ψ∈X
R(ψ) =
∑
q≥0
R(q, 0) +
∑
q≥0
(
λ
λ¯
R(q, 0) +
1
λ¯
M(q, 0)
)
=
1
λ¯
∑
q≥0
(R(q, 0) +M(q, 0)) (A.49)
Combining Equations A.38, A.48 and A.49 then yields
R(0, 0) = −
∑
q≥0 aq +
∑
q≥0M(q, 0)∑
q≥0 bq
= −cM˜
λµ¯
λ¯µ
1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
− cM0λµ¯
λ¯µ
(A.50)
Using the expressions for R(j + 1, 1), R(j, 0) and M(j, 0) from Equations
A.28, A.46 and A.34, respectively, we are eventually in a position to simplify
the expression in Equation A.19:
∞∑
i=0
Cov(f(Ψ0), f(Ψi)) = log
1
λ¯
R(0, 0)
+ log
µ
λ
(
λ
λ¯
∑
q≥0
R(q, 0) +
1
λ¯
∑
q≥0
M(q, 0)
)
+ log
µ¯
λ¯
∑
q>0
R(q, 0) (A.51)
where
∑
q≥0
R(q, 0) = cM˜
λµ¯
λ¯µ(
1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
)2 + R(0, 0)1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
= −cM0
λµ¯
λ¯µ
1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
(A.52)
and
∑
q≥0
M(q, 0) = cM0
λµ¯
λ¯µ
1− λµ¯
λ¯µ
(A.53)
The claim then follows.
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